Big Profits from Small Stocks


December 17, 2023

Hilary Kramer is the author ofThe Little Book of Big Profits from Small Stocks (2012, Wiley). Kramer is a highly successful investor who has made most of her money by investing in single-digit priced stocks. She reveals her methods in this book.

Important Note: I am a value investor. I am looking to buy stocks at 50% or less of intrinsic value. Kramer’s approach is similar in many ways, but she is not a value investor per se. Kramer is still trying to buy stocks for less than they are worth, either relative to future earnings or relative to book value.

Kramer writes:

So why aren’t more Main Street investors looking to low-priced stocks? Well, one of the biggest beliefs on Wall Street is that stocks under $10 are too dangerous for most investors. Many institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pensions, are actually prohibited from owning stocks that trade in the single digits. Stock that have fallen below that magic $10 mark often lose the attention of the research departments, so no analysts follow them and they tend to be ignored. Wall Street often treats the single-digit priced stock sector as a graveyard, best passed as quickly as possible while whistling on the way to other endeavors.

Kramer has identified three categories of low-priced stocks:

    • Fall angels: These are large company stocks that have stumbled and fallen out of favor for various reasons. Some are cyclical stocks, while some were companies where management made mistakes and earnings fell short of Wall Street expectations.
    • Undiscovered growth companies: Many of these happen to be overlooked because they are in unattractive industries.
    • Bargain bin stocks: These are stocks trading below book value.

Kramer notes that it’s essential to read the company’s financial statements and investor presentations. There’s no easy way to high stock market profits.

Here’s an outline:

    • The Classic Under $10 Stock
    • The Price Is Not Just Right, It’s Critical
    • Oh, How the Mighty Have Fallen
    • Growing Out of Sight
    • Shopping the Bargain Bin
    • Getting the World Healthy and Wealthy
    • Around the World Under $10
    • Forget Everything You Thought You Knew
    • Looking for the Right Stuff
    • Well Bought is Half Sold
    • Beware the Wolves of Wall Street
    • Low Prices and High Profits

 

THE CLASSIC UNDER $10 STOCK

Kramer mentions Darling International (DAR) as the classic $10 stock. The company collects used cooking oil and grease from restaurants all over the United States. Another division stops at slaughterhouses and butcher shops to collect hides, bone, and other animal by-products. They turn all this unusable stuff into useable products.

Kramer noticed Darling stock when it fell from $16 to $4. She found that Darling’s competitors were small, locally-owned companies that had a hard time competing with Darling’s economies of scale. At the time, the company had 39 facilities around the United States and 970 trucks and tractor-trailers collecting raw materials from 115,000 locations. Most of Darling’s customers were on long-term contracts.

Darling was growing rapidly both organically and by acquisition of smaller competitors. Revenues had increased from $323 million in 2003 to $645 million in 2007. Profits had almost doubled from $.29 a share to $.59 a share. The company had also paid down it’s long-term debt. Kramer:

Darling may be in a stinky business, but it is one profitable company. In spite of this, by the end of 2008 the stock was solidly in the single digits, trading at $5 and change. Recently, the company had moved into alternative energy where the collected grease could be used to create biofuel.

Darling stock hit $4, which is where Kramer bought. A little less than three years later, the stock exceeded $16. Kramer’s investment had produced a 300 percent gain. Kramer writes:

In this book, my goal is to help you find your Darlings. After two decades of investing, I can tell you that low-priced stocks are a great way to build, or rebuild, your wealth. Many of my biggest winning stocks over the years started out as single-digit priced stocks. They were stocks that were way off Wall Street’s radar screens for a variety of reasons, but once the Street and large institutional investors discovered them, they often soared in price.

Kramer says these breakout stocks share three characteristics:

    1. Low-priced (mainly under $10).
    2. Undervalued.
    3. Have specific catalysts in the near future that put them on the threshold of breaking out to much higher prices.

That said, some stocks under $10 are cheap because they deserve to be. So it’s essential to have a good investment process, including reading the company’s financial statements and presentations. Kramer adds that she wish she hadn’t sold Darling, as the stock was soon in the mid-20s.

Kramer points out that there will always be recessions and economic slowdowns periodically. It is wise to build a list of obsessive lifestyle stocks, because usually these stocks sell off just like other stocks during a recession but the businesses in question tend not to decline nearly as much.

 

THE PRICE IS NOT JUST RIGHT, IT’S CRITICAL

The major brokerage houses have gone to great lengths to discourage trading in low-priced stocks. To be sure, there are many low-priced stocks belonging to bad businesses, bankrupt companies, and overhyped enterprises. But there are many solid companies that just happen to have hit challenges, causing their stocks to drop.

Kramer gives another example of a stock that hit single digits where the business itself was solid: Dendreon (DNDN).

Dendreon was developing a new drug manufactured from the patient’s own immune cells. This new drug represented a potentially groundbreaking step in the fight against prostate cancer. FDA approval looked imminent.

However, in May of 2007, the FDA decided they needed more trials and more information before they could approve the drug for widespread usage. The stock began dropping and by May of 2009, Dendreon stock hit $2.60. The market cap of the company had gone from $3 billion to $400 million.

Kramer did her homework and found that Dendreon’s new drug was likely to be approved after the new trials. It took some time for Kramer to buy a full position, but she ended up getting one at an average price of $5 per share.

In May 2009, the FDA approved Dendreon’s new drug. In less than two weeks, the stock was back over $20 and worth $3 billion again. The stock kept going up from there because it was clear the new drug would be a commercial success. A year later, Kramer sold for more than $50, a 900 percent profit–a ten-bagger. Kramer:

I am not going to tell you that every low-priced stock you buy in your lifetime will breakout and become a ten-bagger. Most investors only have a few of those in a lifetime. I am going to tell you that we can make Wall Street’s aversion to low-priced stocks work for you more often than not and produce consistent and exciting profits. Any ten-baggers you run across long the way will just be icing on the cake!

 

OH, HOW THE MIGHTY HAVE FALLEN

Kramer writes:

These are companies that were once considered blue chip or growth darlings that have fallen monstrously out of favor with Wall Street and investors. These are stocks that were once widely owned and if not loved, at least admired and respected. Something went drastically wrong for these companies and the share price plummeted into single digits. In most cases investors sold too late and much money was lost along the way, often creating a cloud of ill will and outright distrust for these companies in many cases…

Often in the stock market, though, aversion can signal opportunity.

Kramer explains:

When it comes to identifying true fallen angels, there are two key questions you need to ask. The first question iswhat went wrong? Did management overdiversify the basic business and expand into areas where they had no expertise or advantage? Did the company borrow too much money and is now having a hard time generating sufficient cash flow to service their debt load? Has a competitor surpassed them in the marketplace? Has there been a change in consumers’ buying habits and preferences that have left the company behind? Have there been accounting irregularities or regulatory issues that the company must put behind it in a satisfactory manner before the company can return to profitability? Are there customer or supplier lawsuits weighing on the company and its stock price? The list of problems, mistakes, and management stumbles that make a once great company into a fallen angel are legion. Before you even consider investing in a fallen angel stock you need to know exactly what went wrong and who is responsible for the problems.

The next question then becomescan it be fixed? Can the company shed itself of unprofitable divisions or subsidiaries that take away from the core business? Can management regain focus and catch back up to its competitors? Can the company generate sufficient cash flow to pay down its debt or can the balance sheet be restructured in a fashion that allows a return to profitability? Can regulatory issues be solved without permanent harm to the company? Can they maintain a reasonable relationship with key suppliers and customers until the current crisis has passed? Are the accounting and regulatory issues mistakes or are they fraudulent or criminal activity? Can their products and services regain acceptance from consumers? Once we figure out what has gone wrong, we need to figure out if the problems can be fixed. If so, we have a candidate for a fallen angel stock, and in my experience the companies that do achieve a turnaround can then see their stock price double or even triple before too much time passes.

Kramer is quick to note that many of these stocks are not good investments for a variety of reasons. So the investor has to carefully examine many such companies in order to identify one or a tiny handful of fallen angels.

Kramer gives the example of Ford Motor Company (F). For a long time, Ford was the bluest of blue chips. The company was incorporated in 1903 and is credited with inventing the production line method of assembling vehicles. In World War II, Ford creating a great number of vehicles to meet military demand.

Froom 2005 to 2010 however, the company stumbled. Not only had they acquired many other car companies and divisions that were not profitable, but they had rising healthcare costs combined with slowing sales and declining margins. Management then made a bet in 2006 that they might need cash. So they raised $23.6 billion in debt. The CEO said this would cushion the company if there were a recession. Kramer:

In 2008 the bottom came out from under the U.S. car market. The automakers were heavily exposed to the consumer lending market and as the credit crisis deepened default rates climbed and profits evaporated. In 2008 For had the worst year in its history, losing over $414 billion as the recession deepened. Auto industry executives ended up going hat in hand to Capitol Hill to plead for a federal bailout.

Here is where Ford’s gamble at the end of 2006 paid off. Both Chrysler and General Motors (GM) ended up having to file bankruptcy and accept government bailouts and funding. Ford had enough cash on hand from the cash-out refinancing that they did not have to go to those lengths to survive. Because they had cash on hand they could run their day-to-day operations without government assistance. They engineered an equity-for-debt sawp that reduced debt loads by more than $10 billion. Management worked out a deal with the UAW to accept stock in lieu of cash for pension and healthcare expenses. Ford’s stock fell under $2 in 2009 as things looked bleak for the entire industry, and it began to divest some of its noncore lines like Jaguar, Land Rover, and Volvo.

This was where Kramer got interested in Ford’s stock. Ford had lowered its debt and also Kramer found, after doing some research, that Ford’s F150 line of trucks was still dominant and the company had a loyal customer base. Two years later, Ford stock (F) had gone from $2 to $18.

Kramer next describes her greatest fallen angel investment ever, one where the stock increased dramatically over the 8+ years that Kramer held it: Priceline.com (PCLN). Many internet stocks had crashed after the bubble in 1999-2000. This included Priceline, which had hit $1 per share.

The company had made some misteps by trying to expand beyond travel services using a name-your-own-price model to sell gasoline, groceries, long distance telephone plans, and a host of other items. They also tried to compete with eBay (EBAY) in the online auction business. They even tried a name-your-own-price home mortgage program. Nearly all these ventures failed.

The stock had fallen from $165 to $1. But Kramer discovered that the company still had plenty of cash. And Priceline was exiting all of their noncore operations and schemes and returning to their basic travel business. Friends told Kramer they were still using the service and were still very satisfied. Kramer bought the stock in February 2003.

The company did a one for six reverse stock split. This made Kramer’s cost basis, adjusted for the reverse split, $7.63 per share. By 2011, the stock had hit $543 and Kramer was continuing to hold it. Kramer:

I have made over 70 times my money by finding this fallen angel and asking two crucial questions:What went wrong?andCan it be fixed?

What went wrong was obvious. The stock got caught up in the collapse of the Internet boom and management tried to enter businesses where they had no competitive advantage. And once they returned to their original core focus, I felt it could be fixed and that it was only a matter of time before business and the stock price began to grow again.

What’s the best way to find fallen angel candidates? Kramer offers several methods. Read the news, as the stocks of one-time leaders that have fallen are usually paid attention in the media. Look at 52-week low lists. Check all the stocks in the S&P 500 to see which ones are single-digit stocks. Finally, one of the best tools is to use a web-based stock screener.

After you have a list of candidates, you have to go to work reading the financial statements and company presentations. You have to ask the two questions: What went wrong?and Can it be fixed?

 

GROWING OUT OF SIGHT

You can make a lot of money if you own a growth stock, but the key is to buy at a low price. Kramer explains that many growth stocks are already very popular, which means their stock prices are already quite high. Kramer writes:

We are more interested in the type of stocks that legendary Peter Lynch described in his classic bookOne Up On Wall Street. Mr. Lynch described the perfect stock as one that was in a boring niche business. Preferably the company would be a business that was dull or downright disagreeable. He jokingly said that he would also like it if there were rumors of toxic waste or Mafia involvement! This type of stock would be way off the Wall Street radar screen, and few institutions would own it and analysts would not cover it or write reports for the sales force to pump the stock.

Kramer reminds the reader that she had already described just such a stock in the first chapter: Darling International. Rendering and grease collection is a dull messy business, but a necessary one. Kramer jokes that she has never been to a party and heard someone talking about the wonderful hide rendering company that was in their portfolio. Kramer:

This is exactly what made Darling such an outstanding investment opportunity. No one was paying any attention to the company as they grew into the largest company in the business and grew earnings rapidly. Darling was not only a classic under $10 breakout stock, it was also an undiscovered growth stock.

Of course, not all growth stocks that are still cheap are unknown. Sometimes investors simply give up on a company, which makes the stock low-priced.

Kramer suggests a class of companies she calls “obsessive product companies.”

These companies make products that people simply do not want to live without regardless of what is going on in the economy or the world. There are some hobbies or products that become lifestyles. Many of these are not recognized on Wall Street for the simple reason that they do not share the same interests or recognize that in many cases the company in question makes a product that is not going to go away regardless of the economy. If business does slow down a bit, it is simply going to create pent-up demand. Purchases may be delayed but they will not be denied!

Krames gives the example of Cabela’s (CAB), the outdoor superstore company. In late 2008, like other retailers, Cabela’s saw slowing sales and the stock fell to $5. Kramer explains what Wall Street missed: Cabela’s sells hunting and fishing products, and the buyers of these products are very serious about their chosen hobby. Also, while Cabela’s had over $300 million in debt, the company had close to $400 million in cash. Moreover, their credit card operation never really experienced big losses, again because their customers were very serious about their hobby and didn’t want to let their Cabela’s account become delinquent.

Furthermore, the company was asset rich. It owned 24 of their 29 locations, and the book value of the stock was over $12.

In 2008, Kramer began buying the stock under $5. By the end of 2009, Cabela’s had over $500 million in cash and they had reduced their debt. Kramer sold at $14.92, for a return of almost 200 percent in less than a year.

Kramer notes that there will always be recessions and slowdowns periodically. It is wise to build a list of obsessive lifestyle stocks. When recession hits, these stocks tend to decline just like other stocks even though the obsessive lifestyle businesses tend not to decline nearly as much as other businesses.

Furthermore, Kramer suggests looking for companies that can experience earnings growth without necessarily being exciting. She gives the example of Dole Foods (DOLE). The company was founded in 1891. In 2003, businessman David Murdoch bought the company from Castle and Cook. The company expanded into other lines of fruits and vegetables. In 2009, the company went public at $12.50 a share.

Nobody paid any attention. Kramer:

Dole had grown into the largest producer and distributor of fruits and vegetables in the world but to investors these were not exciting products. The stock price languished and early in 2010 it fell below the $10 mark where I began to take notice of the company.

Kramer believed that the demand for healthy foods was only going to grow in the years ahead. This was true not only in the United States, but also in many emerging markets globally. The stock soon increased 50 percent. Kramer writes:

The mantra of most growth stock investors is bigger, better, faster. They are looking for the newest fads and the most exciting products. The truth is that the best growth stories are often found in our cupboards and refrigerators. The regular seemingly boring products we use every day can create growth stories and when those companies see their stock price fall into the single digits, they become tremendous profit opportunities.

Kramer also recommends running a web-based stock screen. Search for companies that have been growing steadily for at least five years. Most of these stocks will already be high-priced, but occasionally you may find a low-priced one. Kramer:

…just finding oneof these before Wall Street does can make a huge difference in your net worth over time.

Kramer:

To run this search, set the screener to look for stocks that have grown earnings and revenues by at least 15 percent a year for the past five years. We also want companies that do not owe a lot of money and have decent balance sheets. Legendary investor Benjamin Graham once set that threshold as owning twice what you owe, so I think that’s a reasonable threshold. Set the debt to equity ratio at a maximum of .3. This will give us a company with at least 70 percent equity and 30 percent debt as part of the total capital structure.

Of course, you also include on the screen the requirement that the stock price be below $10. Kramer:

Your list of stocks is going to be short and the companies will be small. In fact if you ran it right now for U.S. stocks the resulting list would be just 51 names out of all the stocks listed on major exchanges and markets here in the United States. The largest company on this list is going to be just $750 million in market capitalization and the smallest is just under $30 million in total market cap. There are some pretty interesting companies and it will be worth your time to search this list and dig a little deeper to find the real winners out of this list. You want to look for companies with products that have exposure to huge potential markets like alternative energy, smartphones, and other communication devices, social networking, or any other product or service that can see continued steady growth for years to come… Decent levels of insider ownership are also preferable in these small, steady growers. If the founders and managers of these little growth gems still own a good share of the company, say 10 percent or more, they have a vested interest in seeing the stock price go higher over time.

Kramer next mentions a screen for explosive growers. These are low-priced breakout stocks that have seen a surge of earnings and revenues in the past year. Kramer:

We usually find two types of companies on this list. One is a company that stumbled or is caught by the economic cycle and has had depressed earnings and sales. Now the cycle has swung back in their direction and they are set to surge. The other is a company that has a breakthrough with some product or service that suddenly takes the world by storm and is set to explode upward.

We want explosive growth here so we will initially set the bar high. Set your screener to look for companies with earnings growth of at least 100 percent annually. Often profit margins are also exploding so revenue growth is not as critical with this screen. Again, we do not want too much debt, but we can give these exploders a little more room, so set the debt to equity ratio ceiling at 50 percent.

Once again, a recession or a bear market can create many low-priced stocks among the explosive growers. Kramer says the investor will learn to love recessions and bear markets for this very reason.

 

SHOPPING THE BARGAIN BIN

This is the method of finding stocks that are trading below tangible book value. (Intangible assets are not included.) Kramer:

Bargain bin stocks sell below book value for many reasons. The company could be experiencing a slowdown in its business and Wall Street has abandoned the stock. The whole industry may be unloved, as was once the case with electric utility stocks back in the 1980s. Cost overruns on nuclear power plants and a hostile regulatory environment had all of these stocks selling for less than their book value. In the aftermath of the Savings and Loan crisis in the early 1990s, almost all small bank and thrift stocks sold well below the value of their assets. Sometimes it is just a stock that is too small for analysts to follow and the stock price has languished as the assets have grown. Our job is to figure out if those assets can be converted to either a higher stock price or be turned into cash via a takeover or restructuring in the near future.

Kramer gives the example of Tesoro (TSO), a major North American refiner of petroleum products. In 2008, its stock fell well below its book value. When the economy slows down, business is awful for refiners. However, the company had many tangible assets and we knew the recession would eventually end. Tesoro owned seven refineries and 879 retail gas stations. Tesoro also owned 900 miles of oil pipelines around the country. The most important point, writes Kramer, is that there are not many refineries in the United States. There hasn’t been a new refinery built in the United States since 1977. Therefore, these are irreplaceable assets. Kramer:

The assets already appeared pretty valuable to me. Although the business was terrible the asset pile was worth a lot of money. With the stock trading around $8 or so the tangible book value of Tesoro was about $23 a share. The assets were being discounted in the marketplace by more than 65 percent. That was just the discount from the accounting value of the assets. Because refineries are irreplaceable assets the discount was even greater when you considered the real value of Tesoro’s asset collection.

Kramer bought Tesoro around $8. Once the economy recovered, so did Tesoro’s profits and the stock soon tripled.

As far as screening for companies trading below tangible book, Kramer also recommends that the companies be profitable so that they are not burning through their assets. Kramer then recommends including on the screen that the debt to equity be a maximum of .30. And of course, the screen includes stocks that are below $10. Kramer concludes the chapter:

When we look over the list of stocks priced cheap compared to their assets, we want to consider what the actual assets are. The key question is: Can they be turned into profits at some point? If the assets are cash or commodity inventories, the answer is probably yes. They can be sold, returned to shareholders, or perhaps a competitor or private equity investor will recognize the value and buy the company at a premium. Are the assets real estate, such as commercial properties, hotels, or apartments? If so they can also probably be sold at a profit at a point in the future.

 

GETTING THE WORLD HEALTHY AND WEALTHY

The opportunities in low-priced stocks, whether fallen angels, undiscovered growth gems, or bargain stocks, occur in a variety of sectors. That said, some sectors may be particularly interesting, depending upon the investor and his or her expertise. Kramer mentions the biotech and pharmaceutical sector:

This particular sector is absolutely overflowing with low-priced investment opportunities–a trend I expect to continue in the near future.

There are a few key reasons for the sector’s hot hand. The most obvious reason is the advancements in technology. It seems like there is a new breakthrough drug, medical treatment, or device almost every week. We have seen advances not just in biotechnology, but in robotic surgery, titanium hips, cancer protocols, and life extension programs. Increasingly we are seeing the breakthroughs come from smaller companies wth smaller stock prices.

Kramer adds that there is a real need for these products. For example, in 2010, nearly 1.6 million Americans were diagnosed with cancer, and 570,000 died from the disease, according to the American Cancer Society. Furthermore, according to the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, the number of new cancer cases diagnosed annually in the United States is expected to increase by 45 percent to 2.3 million in 2030. There are also increasingly more cancer cases globally.

In the United States, according to the National Cancer Institute, part of the National Institute of Health (NIH), total expenditures on cancer treatment will grow at least 27 percent from 2010 to 2020, advancing from $127.6 billion to $158 billion. Kramer notes that the good news is that these treatment dollars are being funneled into innovative companies fighting this disease.

Here’s where the importance of smaller, lower-priced companies in this sector comes into play. The giant drug companies are looking to partner with these smaller companies to develop new products as an addition to their own research and development efforts.

Sometimes big pharmaceuticals, if they don’t partner with a smaller company, will acquire the company instead.

Kramer mentions that she bought Ariad Pharmaceuticals at $8 a share in 2011. Ariad is an emerging biopharmaceutical company that at the time had three potentially game-changing cancer treatments. Kramer explains that for one of these treatments, Merck partnered with Ariad. Kramer comments:

The partnership approach to developing drugs is going to be the model of groundbreaking research in the future. By setting up news searches and tracking the news of the largest pharmaceutical companies, you can keep on top of the exciting smaller companies that are working on potential blockbuster drugs.

Successful partnerships with larger drug companies have turned some single-digit stocks into huge winners. Regeneron (RGEN) has seen its stock price go from under $6 a share to well over $60 in just over five years as its partnership with pharmaceutical giant Sanofi-aventis has allowed it to develop promising cancer and autoimmune system drugs. Incyte’s partnership with Novartis helped drive the strock price from $2 to over $20 in three years.

Smaller biotechnology companies can push the curve in new research in ways that larger more established companies simply cannot. Rather than invest in unproven drugs and technologies, the larger companies prefer to provide cash and assistance to the up-and-coming companies. In return they can access potential breakthrough drugs with less overhead. It is a win for the company, for investors in the smaller company, and often for patients. As researchers and biotech companies continue to search for the answers for mankind’s medical issues these opportunities for low-priced breakout stocks will be increasingly available to attentive investors.

Kramer also mentions breakthroughs in medical devices and surgical techniques. This includes new cardiac stents being developed, new robotic surgical devices, new bone and joint replacement products, and many other devices and products to improve health and combat age-old problems.

Kramer points out that it takes some specialized effort to effectively search the universe of healthcare, drug, and biotechnology companies. Sometimes growth screens will produce ideas, but often more digging is required. Kramer concludes:

You can find news on such developments at www.fda.gov. The site has a wealth of information of new drugs being approved and which companies are developing them. It also tracks which drugs are in short supply and could lead to production ramp-up or higher margins for their manufacturers. The site also has information and reports that will help you understand the approval process for new drugs which will prove useful over the long run as you search for cheap stocks in the medical and drug fields.

This is an area where you probably need to learn to steal ideas as well… It took me many years to develop the expertise and contacts needed to continually uncover the potential big winners, particularly in biotech stocks. You can get ideas from top managers in the field by searching through the portfolios of top mutual fund managers specializing in the medical and biootech fields. They have to disclose their portfolio to the SEC and are widely available on various research and financial sites on the Internet.

One new drug or technology can take a company from obscurity to superstardom and the stock price will go higher than you could have ever though possible. Staying on top of which smaller single-digit stocks have promising research and strong partnerships with large drug companies can be a tremendous source of single-digit stock winners over your investing career.

 

AROUND THE WORLD UNDER $10

Emerging markets have evolved and become more like U.S. markets. There are the same cycles of fear and greed that create fallen angel stocks. Kramer:

Companies will be created that have exciting new products with the potential for strong long-term growth and yet stay under the radar screen for an extended period of time. We can find low-priced potential breakout stocks located all around the world in today’s dynamic, connected stock markets.

Kramer comments:

In a lot of ways emerging economies look a lot like the United States did back around the turn of the century. Back then people moved from the rural towns into the cities as jobs in new industries became available. Automobiles began to replace the horse and buggy. Radios and telephones became items that were desired by every household. Investing in companies that built infrastructure, like the steel and railroad companies, was hugely successful. So was putting your money into electric utilities and energy companies that served the growing demand for power. Early investors in companies that sprang up to serve these new consumers, like Sears, Roebuck and Company, also did very well.

Today we are seeing similar trends developing, as smartphones and portable commmunications and entertainment devices are adopted throughout the world and are in high demand in emerging economies like China, Brazil, and India. Further, the robust demographic growth in emerging economies is creating the need for bigger, better, and more efficient infrastructure to maintain such growth.

Kramer gives the example of Cemex (CX). When she was in Mexico in 2001, Kramer noticed the country was experiencing a building boom. She got curious about all the cement trucks and construction vehicles, not to mention cranes. CX not only sold cement in Mexico, but also in the United States, Europe, the Philippines, and the Middle East. Kramer bought the stock around $8 in early 2003, and over the next three years, the stock went over $30, allowing her so sell at around $29. Kramer continues:

Interestingly, the stock collapsed again in the global recession of 2008. As global building began to collapse as credit tightened and the economy slowed, the shares fell all the way back into the single digits. In fact, Cemex stock fell below $4. Once again, as the global economy began to dig itself out, the stock slowly reversed and reached a high of $14 a share a little more than a year later.

Building materials stocks like Cemex are going to get hit hard during a time of a global slowdown, but will be among the first and fastest to recover at the first sign of an improvement in economic conditions. Emerging markets may have frequent stumbles along the way to progress but once the trend towards a more industrialized consumer society begins, history tells us it rarely reverses itself. Following building supply- and infrastructure-related stocks and buying when they are low priced and unpopular can be a path to large long-term profits.

Moreover, as an emerging economy creates a new middle class, there will be demand for goods and services that make life more interesting.

 

FORGET EVERYTHING YOU THOUGHT YOU KNEW

First, the efficient market hypothesis, which says all available information is already reflected in all stocks and therefore it’s impossible to beat the market except by luck, is simply not true. Most of the examples Kramer has given illustrate this. Also, various value investors have beaten the market over time for nearly a century.

Second, a low P/E ratio is not typically how to find a low-priced breakout stock because often a low-priced breakout stock has very little earnings, which makes the P/E ratio very high.

My note here: My fund, the Boole Microcap Fund, uses five metrics for cheapness:

    • low price-to-earnings (low P/E)
    • low price-to-cash flow (low P/CF)
    • low price-to-sales (low P/S)
    • low price-to-book (low P/B)
    • low enterprise value-to-EBITDA (low EV/EBITDA)

In the terrific book,What Works on Wall Street (4th edition), James P. O’Shaughnessy demonstrates that using all five of these metrics of cheapness simultaneously has produced the highest returns historically.

My fund also uses other quantitative information like a high Piotroski F-Score, low debt, high insider ownership, insider buying, high ROE, and positive 6-month and 1-year momentum.

So while I do agree with Kramer’s explanation of fallen angels, undiscovered growth stocks, and bargain bin favorites, I don’t entirely agree on low P/E. It’s OK for the P/E to be high (or even negative!) as long as most of the other metrics of cheapness are low. However, I do estimate normalized sales, earnings, and cash flows, and if most of the metrics for cheapness are quite low relative to normalized estimates, then these can be particularly interesting stocks.

Moreover, if a company has been profitable for years, and then suddenly has its profits disappear for temporary reasons like a recession, that can be the makings of an excellent investment when the stock price has collapsed.

Kramer says a high P/E is OK if earnings have temporarily collapsed, but she does write the following:

As a rule we want our companies to be profitable. As we discussed, many of them stumbled and that’s why they are a low-priced stock in the first place. The fact that they are still profitable in the worst of times gives us an indication management knows what they are doing and can return to higher profitability levels in short order. If they are not profitable there needs to be some reason or catalyst that we can see that will restore the bottom line to black ink in a relatively short period of time.

Kramer continues by explaining that an improvement or deterioration in various metrics can be more important than the absolute level:

Let’s consider return on equity for a second. This is a widely used measure in financial research that evaluates how much a company is earning relative to the amount of equity invested in the company. It is a pretty good measure of how profitably management is using the money entrusted to it by shareholders. However just the number by itself is not enough to evaluate a stock for breakout potential.

Kramer gives the example of Toll Brothers (TOL). The company has a decent year in 2006 and had a return on equity (ROE) of 20 percent. That seems good, however year over year the ROE had declined from 53 percent to 20 percent. This was, for Kramer, a huge red flag. The trend continued and TOL had a small ROE in 2007 and negative ROE in 2008. This example illustrates why the direction of many metrics can be more important than the absolute level.

 

LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT STUFF

Kramer holds that the company should have a relatively strong balance sheet, and own at least as much as they owe. In other words, the debt to total capitalization should be below 0.50. If it’s higher than that, there is an increased risk of bankruptcy during a recession or business slowdown.

Kramer writes:

It is also very important to read the footnotes and fine print in a filing of a prospective stock. I want to see if the auditors signed off and issued an unqualified opinion of the company’s financials. If they issued a qualified opinion that’s a huge red flag that something may be wrong with the data I am using to evaluate the company. Has the company recently changed auditors? That can be a flag as well, and indicates the previous firm had some questions that company didn’t want to answer or did not like the conclusions the auditor drew out of the financial data. Is there a concern about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern? Are there a lot of complex off-balance-sheet arrangements? These could have a substantial negative influence on the company’s leverage and operating ratios that are not included in the basic balance sheet and income statement presentation.

Kramer highly recommends going to the investor relations part of a company’s website. She gives Wendy’s/Arby’s Group (WEN). (Keep in mind Kramer was writing this book in 2011. Today Wendy’s and Arby’s are separate entities.)

When I go to the investor relations section of their website I find links to all their SEC filings, historical information about their finances, and stock price. The last few years of press releases, including quarterly earnings reports, are readily available. The really interesting section to me is webcasts and presentations. Here I find links to recent presentations at various conferences and investor meetings, including videos and PowerPoint presentations.

I see from the presentation that the company is introducing a new line of burger products in the second half of 2011 that look pretty enticing. They have a strong balance sheet and are buying back stock. I see in the presentation that they have recently increased the dividend. Managing is continuing with their efforts to sell the Arby’s business and refocus on the core Wendy’s brand. The presentation contains information about international expansion plans, menu changes, as well as a discussion of finances. This is all valuable information and reinforced my conviction about owning the company.

Kramer adds that not all companies have in-depth investor presentations, but many do. Note: Many microcap companies–the focus of my fund, the Boole Microcap Fund–do not have these presentations, but some do.

Kramer continues:

The next thing I like to do is look at the stock price chart. I am not a chartist by any means, but the price chart can provide valuable information, especially in timing my purchase of a low-priced breakout stock. Is the stock moving higher on increased buying activity in the stock? This could be a sign that the larger investors, such as hedge funds, are starting to notice the company and I want to get in as soon as possible. Is the stock breaking out to new highs? Has it bounced off a level of support, such as a double price bottom that might indicate institutional buying is putting a bottom in the stock and the time to buy has been reached? I never make a decision because of the chart itself but if the stock has passed the research process, charts can provide valuable information about what other investors think of the company.

Kramer adds:

Another important piece of information I like to check when evaluating a stock is who is buying and selling the shares. Are insiders buying or selling the stock? If they are selling is it just one officer or director or several of them? One seller could be someone in need of cash for some personal reason but many sellers over a period of time is a huge red flag. If the folks running the company are selling, I am not so sure I should be buying the stock. I need to check my conclusion. Insiders may sell for several reasons, but they only buy for one: They like the potential of the company and think the stock is underpriced relative to the potential for gains in the future. Insider buying increases my conviction about a company that has passed all my other tests.

Kramer also recommends calling experts, which is easier if you happen to know some, but can still be done even if you don’t.

Moreover, Kramer mentions some great research resources, including Value Line, which not only has momentum-based rankings, but also has a decade’s worth of historical financial data plus analyst commentary. Standard and Poor’s also publishes valuable stock research. Furthermore, some of Morningstar’s equity research is available for free. Yahoo! finance has free information on companies.

Note: There are other resouces, too, including Seeking Alpha, for which you have to pay roughly $33 a month. And, for microocap investors, there is the Micro Cap Club (https://microcapclub.com/), which you can join for $500 a year (or for free if you write up an investment idea and it is accepted) and also Small Cap Discoveries (https://smallcapdiscoveries.com/), which costs $1,000 a year.

 

WELL BOUGHT IS HALF SOLD

First, every investor will make plenty of mistakes. Many top investors are only right 49% of the time or up to 60% of the time. How you deal with mistakes is important. I wrote last week about this: https://boolefund.com/the-art-of-execution/

Sometimes, if the stock falls, it makes sense to buy more. Other times, it’s best to sell. The most important question to ask yourself is: Knowing what I know now, would I buy the stock at its current price? If yes, then buying more after the decline is the right move. If no, then immediately selling is the right move. Remember the quote attributed to John Maynard Keynes:

When the facts change, I change my mind; what do you do?

Kramer writes:

You want to read any filings or news releases since you bought the stock. Has the company taken on more debt? Did they miss a key product launch date? Is the company spending its cash at an alarming rate? Are inventories growing as customers delay or cancel orders? Have regulatory or legal issues emerged that change the outlook for the company? Have the macroeconomic issues that face the company changed since you bought the stock? You are looking for material negative changes in the company or its outlook since you originally bought the stock. If there are any, then you want to sell the stock. The old adage that the first loss is the best one holds true. If the situation worsens, do not wait for a bounce or to get back to even–sell the stock and move on.

Kramer next handles the topic of when to sell winners. If the stock price has gone up, you want to review the situation. Are revenues and profits still growing or rebounding? Is the company paying down debt or otherwise fixing any balance sheet issues? Are the company’s products being well-received?

Kramer then adds:

On the technical side of things, is daily trading volume increasing or at least staying steady? This can be a sign that the big institutions that sold the stock when it was falling are now buying back in and this is going to push the stock price still higher. Is the stock making new 52-week highs? Are you seeing a steady pattern of higher highs and, more importantly, higher short-term lows in the stock? Stocks are always going to move in ebbs and flows. When you chart a low point of a pullback above the low point of the prior round of profit taking, this is a very bullish sign for the stock. Buyers are moving in and the stock is probably heading higher, so ride the wave and let your profits grow.

As long as things are improving you want to own the stock. I have stocks today like Priceline that I have simply never sold even though they have risen by hundreds of percent.

Kramer then writes:

As a stock move higher there are some indications that indicate it is time to part ways with the stock. If business starts to slow and is no longer improving it is time to sell. If revenues and earnings have been rising and then the company announces a down quarter, it is time to ring the register and take your profits. If you have a stock that has moved higher and the company announces a large debt or equity offering, you want to consider selling the shares…. The need to raise moeny is a sign that the company is not generating enough cash to meet its goal and it’s a reason to consider taking profits.

Sometimes it also makes sense to sell part of the position as the stock movies higher. This, too, is covered in last week’s blog post about The Art of Execution: https://boolefund.com/the-art-of-execution/

Kramer makes another important point: If it seems like now everyone loves the stock, whereas previously (when the stock price was low) they hated or ignored the stock–which is what created the opportunity for you to buy at a low price–then it’s time to consider selling. The question becomes: if everyone loves it, who is left to buy?

Finally, sometimes the stock you own will get acquired, in which case you have to sell but can usually do so at a higher price than you paid. It also makes sense, argues Kramer, to be aware of when larger companies may want to buy smaller competitors. Often such inorganic growth (via acquistions) is less expensive than organic growth (opening new locations, developing new products, etc.). As discussed earlier, this can frequently be the case for large drug companies: In order to expand their product lines, they will look to acquire smaller companies.

 

BEWARE THE WOLVES OF WALL STREET

Low-priced stocks are viewed as riskier than higher-priced stocks, but usually that’s not case. Kramer writes:

All things being equal, the answers to the risk versus reward equation are found in the financial statements, not the stock price. This is a classic case of broad-based statements, such as ‘all low-priced stocks are risky,’ just being wrong.

That said, as an investor you do have to be careful of “pump and dump” schemes, which historically have often happened with very low-priced stocks. Kramer:

Unscrupulous operators accumulate or create a large block of stock at a very low price. They then hype the stock as the next big thing to unsuspecting investors. They talk about getting in on the ground floor, revolutionary breakthroughs, and other buzzwords designed to get the blood pumping and the greed flowing. When investors get excited about this wonderful company, the operators simply dump their stock at much higher prices and walk away with investors’ hard-earned money.

Most of the time these companies have no real business or assets. They are just shell companies set up for the specific purpose of fleecing investors. Some of them may be little mining stocks or small tech companies that are badly underfunded and will be broke and bankrupt very shortly.

Kramer adds:

The SEC has done a great job of cleaning up the penny stock brokerage firms and they are not as prevalent as they once were. However there are still a few out there and as long as greed and dishonesty exist there always will be.

Krames then writes:

I do not want to imply that all Internet-based research on low-priced stocks or advisory services devoted to low-priced stocks are bad. I run such a service myself and I know several other reputable conscientious folks who do the same. The best defense against being taken advantage of in the stock market is to do the homework yourself and check the facts before you buy the story! You will quickly be able to see who is trying to make you money and who is trying to rip you off.

Furthermore, you must be aware that there are many low-priced stocks that deserve to be low-priced. Also, nearly every company that goes bankrupt sees its stock go to a low price before bankruptcy. That’s why it’s important, again, to do your homework. You have to be sure the company doesn’t have too much debt. Also, is the company making money or losing money? If the company is losing money, do they have a credible turnaround plan in place? Kramer:

If you see allegations of accounting or securities fraud in a company’s reports, it is best just to take a pass on that issue even if you think there is potential. Unless you are a very experienced forensic accountant or securities attorney, it becomes very difficult to decipher exactly how these cases will end. Lots of people thought companies like Enron and WorldCom would be able to survive after the initial fraud allegations were revealed. They were not and a lot of people lost a lot of money.

Kramer concludes the chapter:

The key to avoiding risks in the stock market, especially in low-priced stocks, is to use common sense. No one is going to send you an email to tell you all about a stock that is going to make you rich beyond your wildest dreams. As I have said earlier in this book, finding these gems takes work and effort on your part and no one is going to give you the keys to the kingdom with no effort or cost on your part. Keep in mind, if your Uncle Fred were really a great stock picker he would not borrow $100 every time you see him. Read the 10Q and 10K, go through the financials, and read management’s discussion of the business. Check the footnotes for warning signs and red flags.

Most of the time the alleged risks of low-priced stocks are just that–alleged. If you find a stock with the right financial and business characteristics the risks are actually nonexistent. It is the perception of greatly increased risks with low-priced stocks that is creating the opportunities for us to earn breakout profits.

 

LOW PRICES AND HIGH PROFITS

In this chapter, Kramer wraps up the book. She writes:

Hopefully I have given you the tools and information you need to begin investing in the exciting world of low-priced breakout stocks. Over my years in and around the financial markets I have found this to be the single best area for investors to earn explosive gains in stocks.

Kramer again:

By getting ahead of Wall Street in lower-priced stocks we benefit from the institutional pack-mentality that dominates many traditional investment managers. When they are selling and pushing stocks to low prices, we are buying. Then, when their excitement for these stocks return, we are selling to them. We are finding solid growth stocks before Wall Street notices and will see our stocks soar when they show up on the Street’s radar screen. There simply is no better way for individual investors to outperform the market in my opinion.

Kramer argues that it pays to be optimistic about the long term:

If you focus on the fear you miss opportunities. If you focused on all that was wrong with the auto industry in 2008, you would have totally missed the fact that Ford was in fine shape and stood to benefit fomr the problems of its competitors. If you gave up when Dendreon got the first delay from the FDA, you would have missed some spectacular gains by never investigating further to discover that it was just a delay and approval for their cancer drugs was probably forthcoming.

The same applies to the stock market itself. Markets are going to have declines. There will be recessions and bear markets throughout your career. The right way to look at these occasions is as inventory creation events, not catastrophes.

I would add that often microcap stocks have a low correlation with the broader market. Warren Buffett, arguably the greatest investor of all time, said in 1999 during the internet bubble:

If I was running $1 million today, or $10 million for that matter, I’d be fully invested. Anyone who says that size does not hurt investment performance is selling. The highest rates of return I’ve ever achieved were in the 1950s. I killed the Dow. You ought to see the numbers. But I was investing peanuts then. It’s a huge structural advantage not to have a lot of money. I think I could make you 50% a year on $1 million. No, I know I could. I guarantee that.

Kramer writes:

There is another advantage to owning low-priced stocks when the market corrects. Many of these stocks are fallen angels or growth companies that stumbled briefly, driving the stock below $10. Wall Street and the big institutions already sold their shares and your stocks will not experience the type of selling pressure higher-priced issues are experiencing. When the large leveraged investors, like hedge funds, need to sell stocks they sell the higher priced more liquid issues to meet margin calls, not lower-priced smaller companies. So not only does the selling not hit your stocks as hard as the big names, they often push the big companies down to where they become inventory for you!

Kramer continues:

The best investors fit into the category that I like to call optimistic cynics. They are well aware that every bear market has ended and every economic recession has been followed by an economic recovery. They also know that the world is fully of entrepreneurs and innovators who will discover new solutions to old problems and the world gets better over time throughout history. They know that companies that are out of favor today are often tomorrow’s darlings. In the stock market, optimism pays off over time. It always has and always will.

The cynical part comes from not taking anyone’s word for anything. Trust but verify is the order of the day. Great investors do not act on tips, rumors, and sales pitches. By doing their research and homework they avoid many of the mistakes investors can make that will damage their net worth. They dig into the financial filings and company presentations to determine what is really going on with the company and the likelihood they can recover or continue to grow. When markets are soaring and everyone is piling into stocks, great investors ask the most critical question of all:Is it really different this time? When markets are collapsing they ask themselves if the world is really ending. The answers to those questions help to temper your enthusiasm at market tops and turn your fear into action at market bottoms.

Kramer advises reading as much as possible, which she says is “some of the best advice I can give you about successful investing.” Not just people who agree with your views of the world, the market, and stocks, but also people who disagree with your views. Sometimes you will find holes in your thought process and other times you will gain more confidence in your previous conclusions. Either way, it can make you a better investor.

Kramer reminds us that we have to pay close attention to the footnotes to search for any red flags or time bombs. Also, the company presentation, often available on their website, usually contains valuable information about new products, services, or markets, as well as management’s plans.

It’s also a good idea to see if insiders are buying. If they are, that’s always a bullish signal because it means the people running the company believe the stock is undervalued. On the other hand, if groups of insiders are selling, especially at a low price, that’s a huge red flag. Moreover, if excellent professional investors are buying or selling, it’s a good idea to pay attention to that.

Kramer ends with the following:

Investing in low-priced potential breakout stocks is work. However it can increase your net worth quicker than almost any other effort applied to investing I am aware of. One investment like Priceline can make it easier to put the kids through college or retire a few years earlier. An investment in an undiscovered growth gem like Darling can pay for a dream vacation or even a dream home. If you are willing to work at it, investing in single-digit stocks should add many digits to your account values over time.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time.

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Best Way to Build Wealth


December 10, 2023

The best way to build wealth is through long-term investing. The more wealth you have, the more freedom you have to achieve your goals in life.

A smart long-term investment for many investors is an S&P 500 index fund. It’s just basic arithmetic, as Jack Bogle and Warren Buffett frequently point out: https://boolefund.com/warren-buffett-jack-bogle/

But you can get much higher returns–at least 18% per year (instead of 10% per year)–by investing in cheap, solid microcap stocks.

Because most professional investors have large assets under management, they cannot even consider investing in microcap stocks. That’s why there continues to be a wonderful opportunity for enterprising investors. Microcaps are ignored, which causes most of them to become significantly undervalued from time to time.

Warren Buffett obtained the highest returns of his career when he invested primarily in microcap stocks. Buffett says that he could get 50 percent a year today if he were managing a small enough sum so that he could focus on microcap stocks: https://boolefund.com/buffetts-best-microcap-cigar-butts/

Check out this summary of the CRSP Decile-Based Size and Return Data from 1927 to 2020:

Decile Market Cap-Weighted Returns Equal Weighted Returns Number of Firms (year-end 2020) Mean Firm Size (in millions)
1 9.67% 9.47% 179 145,103
2 10.68% 10.63% 173 25,405
3 11.38% 11.17% 187 12,600
4 11.53% 11.29% 203 6,807
5 12.12% 12.03% 217 4,199
6 11.75% 11.60% 255 2,771
7 12.01% 11.99% 297 1,706
8 12.03% 12.33% 387 888
9 11.55% 12.51% 471 417
10 12.41% 17.27% 1,023 99
9+10 11.71% 15.77% 1,494 199

(CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. You can find the data for various deciles here: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html)

The smallest two deciles–9+10–are microcap stocks, which are stocks with market caps below $500 million. What jumps out is the equal weighted returns of the 9th and 10th size deciles from 1927 to 2020:

Microcap equal weighted returns = 15.8% per year

Large-cap equal weighted returns = ~10% per year

In actuality, the annual returns from microcap stocks will be 1-2% lower because of the cost of entering and exiting positions. So it’s better to say that an equal weighted microcap approach has returned 14% per year from 1927 to 2020, versus 10% per year for an equal weighted large-cap approach.

 

VALUE SCREEN: +2-3%

By consistently applying a value screen–e.g., low EV/EBITDA, low P/E, low P/S, etc.–to a microcap strategy, you can add 2-3% per year.

IMPROVING FUNDAMENTALS: +2-3%

You can further increase performance by screening for improving fundamentals. One powerful way to do this is using the Piotroski F_Score, which works best for cheap micro caps. See: https://boolefund.com/joseph-piotroski-value-investing/

 

BOTTOM LINE

If you invest in microcap stocks, you can get about 14% a year. If you also implement a simple screen for value, that adds at least 2% a year. If you then screen for improving fundamentals, that boosts performance by at least another 2% a year.

In brief, if you invest systematically in undervalued microcap stocks with improving fundamentals, you can get at least 18% a year. That compares quite well to the 10% a year you could get from an S&P 500 index fund.

What’s the difference between 10% a year and 18% a year? If you invest $100,000 at 10% a year for 30 years, you end up with $1.7 million, which is quite good. If you invest $100,000 at 18% a year for 30 years, you end up with $14.3 million, which is significantly better.

Please contact me with any questions or comments.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Outsiders: Radically Rational CEOs


November 19, 2023

William Thorndike is the author of The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success (Harvard Business Review Press, 2012). It’s an excellent book profiling eight CEOs who compounded shareholder value at extraordinary rates over decades.

Through this book, value investors can improve their understanding of how to identify CEOs who maximize long-term returns to shareholders. Also, investors can become better businesspeople, while businesspeople can become better investors.

I am a better investor because I am a businessman and a better businessman because I am an investor. – Warren Buffett

Thorndike explains that you only need three things to evaluate CEO performance:

  • the compound annual return to shareholders during his or her tenure
  • the return over the same period for peer companies
  • the return over the same period for the broader market (usually measured by the S&P 500)

Thorndike notes that 20 percent returns is one thing during a huge bull market–like 1982 to 1999. It’s quite another thing if it occurs during a period when the overall market is flat–like 1966 to 1982–and when there are several bear markets.

Moreover, many industries will go out of favor periodically. That’s why it’s important to compare the company’s performance to peers.

Thorndike mentions Henry Singleton as the quintessential outsider CEO. Long before it was popular to repurchase stock, Singleton repurchased over 90% of Teledyne’s stock. Also, he emphasized cash flow over earnings. He never split the stock. He didn’t give quarterly guidance. He almost never spoke with analysts or journalists. And he ran a radically decentralized organization. Thorndike:

If you had invested a dollar with Singleton in 1963, by 1990, when he retired as chairman in the teeth of a severe bear market, it would have been worth $180. That same dollar invested in a broad group of conglomerates would have been worth only $27, and $15 if invested in the S&P 500. Remarkably, Singleton outperformed the index by over twelve times.

Thorndike observes that rational capital allocation was the key to Singleton’s success. Thorndike writes:

Basically, CEOs have five essential choices for deploying capital–investing in existing operations, acquiring other businesses, issuing dividends, paying down debt, or repurchasing stock–and three alternatives for raising it–tapping internal cash flow, issuing debt, or raising equity. Think of these options collectively as a tool kit. Over the long term, returns for shareholders will be determined largely by the decisions a CEO makes in choosing which tools to use (and which to avoid) among these various options. Stated simply, two companies with identical operating results and different approaches to allocating capital will derive two very different long-term outcomes for shareholders.

Warren Buffett has noted that most CEOs reach the top due to their skill in marketing, production, engineering, administration, or even institutional politics. Thus most CEOs have not been prepared to allocate capital.

Thorndike also points out that the outsider CEOs were iconoclastic, independent thinkers. But the outsider CEOs, while differing noticeably from industry norms, ended up being similar to one another. Thorndike says that the outsider CEOs understood the following principles:

  • Capital allocation is a CEO’s most important job.
  • What counts in the long run is the increase in per share value, not overall growth or size.
  • Cash flow, not reported earnings, is what determines long-term value.
  • Decentralized organizations release entrepreneurial energy and keep both costs and ‘rancor’ down.
  • Independent thinking is essential to long-term success, and interactions with outside advisers (Wall Street, the press, etc.) can be distracting and time-consuming.
  • Sometimes the best investment opportunity is your own stock.
  • With acquisitions, patience is vital… as is occasional boldness.

A red arrow is on top of many black arrows.

(Illustration by yiorgosgr)

Here are the sections in the blog post:

  • Introduction
  • Tom Murphy and Capital Cities Broadcasting
  • Henry Singleton and Teledyne
  • Bill Anders and General Dynamics
  • John Malone and TCI
  • Katharine Graham and The Washington Post Company
  • Bill Stiritz and Ralston Purina
  • Dick Smith and General Cinema
  • Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway
  • Radical Rationality

 

INTRODUCTION

Only two of the eight outsider CEOs had MBAs. And, writes Thorndike, they did not attract or seek the spotlight:

As a group, they shared old-fashioned, premodern values including frugality, humility, independence, and an unusual combination of conservatism and boldness. They typically worked out of bare-bones offices (of which they were inordinately proud), generally eschewed perks such as corporate plans, avoided the spotlight wherever possible, and rarely communicated with Wall Street or the business press. They also actively avoided bankers and other advisers, preferring their own counsel and that of a select group around them. Ben Franklin would have liked these guys.

Thorndike describes how the outsider CEOs were iconoclasts:

Like Singleton, these CEOs consistently made very different decisions than their peers did. They were not, however, blindly contrarian. Theirs was an intelligent iconoclasm informed by careful analysis and often expressed in unusual financial metrics that were distinctly different from industry or Wall Street conventions.

Thorndike compares the outsider CEOs to Billy Beane as described by Michael Lewis in Moneyball. Beane’s team, despite having the second-lowest payroll in the league, made the playoffs in four of his first six years on the job. Beane had discovered newand unorthodoxmetrics that were more correlated with team winning percentage.

Thorndike mentions a famous essay about Leo Tolstoy written by Isaiah Berlin. Berlin distinguishes between a “fox” who knows many things and a “hedgehog” who knows one thing extremely well. Thorndike continues:

Foxes… also have many attractive qualities, including an ability to make connections across fields and to innovate, and the CEOs in this book were definite foxes. They had familiarity with other companies and industries and disciplines, and this ranginess translated into new perspectives, which in turn helped them to develop new approaches that eventually translated into exceptional results.

A close up of a fox in tall grass

(Photo by mbridger68)

 

TOM MURPHY AND CAPITAL CITIES BROADCASTING

When Murphy became CEO of Capital Cities in 1966, CBS’ market capitalization was sixteen times than that of Capital Cities. Thirty years later, Capital Cities was three times as valuable as CBS. Warren Buffett has said that in 1966, it was like a rowboat (Capital Cities) against QE2 (CBS) in a trans-Atlantic race. And the rowboat won decisively!

Bill Paley, who ran CBS, used the enormous cash flow from its network and broadcast operations and undertook an aggressive acquisition program of companies in entirely unrelated fields. Paley simply tried to make CBS larger without paying attention to the return on invested capital (ROIC).

Without a sufficiently high ROIC, growth destroys shareholder value instead of creating it. But, like Paley, many business leaders at the time sought growth for its own sake. Even if growth destroys value (due to low ROIC), it does make the business larger, bringing greater benefits to the executives.

Murphy’s goal, on the other hand, was to make his company as valuable as possible. This meant maximizing profitability and ROIC:

…Murphy’s goal was to make his company more valuable… Under Murphy and his lieutenant, Dan Burke, Capital Cities rejected diversification and instead created an unusually streamlined conglomerate that focused laser-like on the media businesses it knew well. Murphy acquired more radio and TV stations, operated them superbly well, regularly repurchased his shares, and eventually acquired CBS’s rival broadcast network ABC.

A black and white logo of the abc television network.

(Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

Burke excelled in operations, while Murphy excelled in making acquisitions. Together, they were a great team–unmatched, according to Warren Buffett. Burke said his ‘job was to create free cash flow and Murphy’s was to spend it.’

During the mid-1970s, there was an extended bear market. Murphy aggressively repurchased shares, mostly at single-digit price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples.

Thorndike writes that in January 1986, Murphy bought the ABC Network and its related broadcasting assets for $3.5 billion with financing from his friend Warren Buffett. Thorndike comments:

Burke and Murphy wasted little time in implementing Capital Cities’ lean, decentralized approach–immediately cutting unnecessary perks, such as the executive elevator and the private dining room, and moving quickly to eliminate redundant positions, laying off fifteen hundred employees in the first several months after the transaction closed. They also consolidated offices and sold off unnecessary real estate, collecting $175 million for the headquarters building in midtown Manhattan…

In the nine years after the transaction, revenues and cash flows grew significantly in every major ABC business line, including the TV stations, the publishing assets, and ESPN. Even the network, which had been in last place at the time of the acquisition, was ranked number one in prime time ratings and was more profitable than either CBS or NBC.

In 1993, Burke retired. And in 1995, Murphy, at Buffett’s suggestion, met with Michael Eisner, the CEO of Disney. Over a few days, Murphy sold Capital Cities/ABC to Disney for $19 billion, which was 13.5 times cash flow and 28 times net income. Thorndike:

He left behind an ecstatic group of shareholders–if you had invested a dollar with Tom Murphy as he became CEO in 1966, that dollar would have been worth $204 by the time he sold the company to Disney. That’s a remarkable 19.9 percent internal rate of return over twenty-nine years, significantly outpacing the 10.1 percent return for the S&P 500 and 13.2 percent return for an index of leading media companies over the same period.

Thorndike points out that decentralization was one of the keys to success for Capital Cities. There was a single paragraph on the inside cover of every Capital Cities annual report:

‘Decentralization is the cornerstone of our philosophy. Our goal is to hire the best people we can and give them the responsibility and authority they need to perform their jobs. All decisions are made at the local level… We expect our managers… to be forever cost conscious and to recognize and exploit sales potential.’

Headquarters had almost no staff. There were no vice presidents in marketing, strategic planning, or human resources. There was no corporate counsel and no public relations department. The environment was ideal for entrepreneurial managers. Costs were minimized at every level.

Burke developed an extremely detailed annual budgeting process for every operation. Managers had to present operating and capital budgets for the coming year, and Burke (and his CFO, Ron Doerfler) went through the budgets line-by-line:

The budget sessions were not perfunctory and almost always produced material changes. Particular attention was paid to capital expenditures and expenses. Managers were expected to outperform their peers, and great attention was paid to margins, which Burke viewed as ‘a form of report card.’ Outside of these meetings, managers were left alone and sometimes went months without hearing from corporate.

High margins resulted not only from cost minimization, but also from Murphy and Burke’s focus on revenue growth and advertising market share. They invested in their properties to ensure leadership in local markets.

When it came to acquisitions, Murphy was very patient and disciplined. His benchmark ‘was a double-digit after-tax return over ten years without leverage.’ Murphy never won an auction as a result of his discipline. Murphy also had a unique negotiating style.

Murphy thought that, in the best transactions, everyone comes away happy. He believed in ‘leaving something on the table’ for the seller. Murphy would often ask the seller what they thought the property was worth. If Murphy thought the offer was fair, he would take it. If he thought the offer was high, he would counter with his best price. If the seller rejected his counter-offer, Murphy would walk away. He thought this approach saved time and avoided unnecessary friction.

Thorndike concludes his discussion of Capital Cities:

Although the focus here is on quantifiable business performance, it is worth noting that Murphy built a universally admired company at Capital Cities with an exceptionally strong culture and esprit de corps (at least two different groups of executives still hold regular reunions).

 

HENRY SINGLETON AND TELEDYNE

Singleton earned bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD degrees in electrical engineering from MIT. He programmed the first student computer at MIT. He won the Putnam Medal as the top mathematics student in the country in 1939. And he was 100 points away from being a chess grandmaster.

Singleton worked as a research engineer at North American Aviation and Hughes Aircraft in 1950. Tex Thornton recruited him to Litton Industries in the late 1950s, where Singleton invented an inertial guidance system–still in use–for commercial and military aircraft. By the end of the decade, Singleton had grown Litton’s Electronic Systems Group to be the company’s largest division with over $80 million in revenue.

Once he realized he wouldn’t succeed Thornton as CEO, Singleton left Litton and founded Teledyne with his colleague George Kozmetzky. After acquiring three small electronics companies, Teledyne successfully bid for a large naval contract. Teledyne became a public company in 1961.

A picture of the logo for teledyne technion.

(Photo of Teledyne logo by Piotr Trojanowski)

In the 1960’s, conglomerates had high price-to-earnings (P/E) ratios and were able to use their stock to buy operating companies at relatively low multiples. Singleton took full advantage of this arbitrage opportunity. From 1961 to 1969, he purchased 130 companies in industries from aviation electronics to specialty metals and insurance. Thorndike elaborates:

Singleton’s approach to acquisitions, however, differed from that of other conglomerateurs. He did not buy indiscriminately, avoiding turnaround situations, and focusing instead on profitable, growing companies with leading market positions, often in niche markets… Singleton was a very disciplined buyer, never paying more than twelve times earnings and purchasing most companies at significantly lower multiples. This compares to the high P/E multiple on Teledyne’s stock, which ranged from a low of 20 to a high of 50 over this period.

In mid-1969, Teledyne was trading at a lower multiple, while acquisition prices were increasing. So Singleton completely stopped acquiring companies.

Singleton ran a highly decentralized company. Singleton also did not report earnings, but instead focused on free cash flow (FCF)–what Buffett calls owner earnings. The value of any business is all future FCF discounted back to the present.

FCF = net income + DDA – capex

(There are also adjustments to FCF based on changes in working capital. DDA is depreciation, depletion, and amortization.)

At Teledyne, bonus compensation for all business unit managers was based on the maximization of free cash flow. Singleton–along with his roommate from the Naval Academy, George Roberts–worked to improve margins and significantly reduce working capital. Return on assets at Teledyne was greater than 20 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. Charlie Munger calls these results from Teledyne ‘miles higher than anybody else… utterly ridiculous.’ This high profitability generated a great deal of excess cash, which was sent to Singleton to allocate.

Starting in 1972, Singleton started buying back Teledyne stock because it was cheap. During the next twelve years, Singleton repurchased over 90 percent of Teledyne’s stock. Keep in mind that in the early 1970s, stock buybacks were seen as a lack of investment opportunity. But Singleton realized buybacks were far more tax-efficient than dividends. And buybacks done when the stock is noticeably cheap create much value. Whenever the returns from a buyback seemed higher than any alternative use of cash, Singleton repurchased shares. Singleton spent $2.5 billion on buybacks–an unbelievable amount at the time–at an average P/E multiple of 8. (When Teledyne issued shares, the average P/E multiple was 25.)

In the insurance portfolios, Singleton invested 77 percent in equities, concentrated on just a few stocks. His investments were in companies he knew well that had P/E ratios at or near record lows.

In 1986, Singleton started going in the opposite direction: deconglomerating instead of conglomerating. He was a pioneer of spinning off various divisions. And in 1987, Singleton announced the first dividend.

From 1963 to 1990, when Singleton stepped down as chairman, Teledyne produced 20.4 percent compound annual returns versus 8.0 percent for the S&P 500 and 11.6 percent for other major conglomerates. A dollar invested with Singleton in 1963 would have been worth $180.94 by 1990, nearly ninefold outperformance versus his peers and more than twelvefold outperformance versus the S&P 500.

 

BILL ANDERS AND GENERAL DYNAMICS

In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down and the U.S. defense industry’s business model had to be significantly downsized. The policy of Soviet containment had become obsolete almost overnight.

General Dynamics had a long history selling major weapons to the Pentagon, including the B-29 bomber, the F-16 fighter plane, submarines, and land vehicles (such as tanks). The company had diversified into missiles and space systems, as well as nondefense business including Cessna commercial planes.

A black background with red and white letters

(General Dynamics logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

When Bill Anders took over General Dynamics in January 1991, the company had $600 million in debt and negative cash flow. Revenues were $10 billion, but the market capitalization was just $1 billion. Many thought the company was headed into bankruptcy. It was a turnaround situation.

Anders graduated from the Naval Academy in 1955 with an electrical engineering degree. He was an airforce fighter pilot during the Cold War. In 1963 he earned a master’s degree in nuclear engineering and was chosen to join NASA’s elite astronaut corps. Thorndike writes:

As the lunar module pilot on the 1968 Apollo 8 mission, Anders took the now-iconic Earthrise photograph, which eventually appeared on the covers of Time, Life, and American Photography.

Anders was a major general when he left NASA. He was made the first chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Then he served as ambassador to Norway. After that, he worked at General Electric and was trained in their management approach. In 1984, Anders was hired to run the commercial operations of Textron Corporation. He was not impressed with the mediocre businesses and the bureaucratic culture. In 1989, he was invited to join General Dynamics as vice-chairman for a year before becoming CEO.

Anders realized that the defense industry had a great deal of excess capacity after the end of the Cold War. Following Welch’s approach, Anders concluded that General Dynamics should only be in businesses where it was number one or two. General Dynamics would stick to businesses it knew well. And it would exit businesses that didn’t meet these criteria.

Anders also wanted to change the culture. Instead of an engineering focus on ‘larger, faster, more lethal’ weapons, Anders wanted a focus on metrics such as return on equity (ROE). Anders concluded that maximizing shareholder returns should be the primary business goal. To help streamline operations, Anders hired Jim Mellor as president and COO. In the first half of 1991, Anders and Mellor replaced twenty-one of the top twenty-five executives.

Anders then proceeded to generate $5 billion in cash through the sales of noncore businesses and by a significant improvement in operations. Anders and Mellor created a culture focused on maximizing shareholder returns. Anders sold most of General Dynamics’ businesses. He also sought to grow the company’s largest business units through acquisition.

When Anders went to acquire Lockheed’s smaller fighter plane division, he met with a surprise: Lockheed’s CEO made a high counteroffer for General Dynamics’ F-16 business. Because the fighter plane division was a core business for General Dynamics–not to mention that Anders was a fighter pilot and still loved to fly–this was a crucial moment for Anders. He agreed to sell the business on the spot for a very high price of $1.5 billion. Anders’ decision was rational in the context of maximizing shareholder returns.

With the cash pile growing, Anders next decided not to make additional acquisitions, but to return cash to shareholders. First he declared three special dividends–which, because they were deemed ‘return of capital,’ were not subject to capital gains or ordinary income taxes. Next, Anders announced an enormous $1 billion tender offer for 30 percent of the company’s stock.

A dollar invested when Anders took the helm would have been worth $30 seventeen years later. That same dollar would have been worth $17 if invested in an index of peer companies and $6 if invested in the S&P.

 

JOHN MALONE AND TCI

While at McKinsey, John Malone came to realize how attractive the cable television business was. Revenues were very predictable. Taxes were low. And the industry was growing very fast. Malone decided to build a career in cable.

Malone’s father was a research engineer and his mother a former teacher. Malone graduated from Yale with degrees in economics and electrical engineering. Then Malone earned master’s and PhD degrees in operations research from Johns Hopkins.

Malone’s first job was at Bell Labs, the research arm of AT&T. After a couple of years, he moved to McKinsey Consulting. In 1970, a client, General Instrument, offered Malone the chance to run its cable television equipment division. He jumped at the opportunity.

After a couple of years, Malone was sought by two of the largest cable companies, Warner Communications and Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI). Malone chose TCI. Although the salary would be 60 percent lower, he would get more equity at TCI. Also, he and his wife preferred Denver to Manhattan.

A picture of the logo for tcp.

(TCI logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

The industry had excellent tax characteristics:

Prudent cable operators could successfully shelter their cash flow from taxes by using debt to build new systems and by aggressively depreciating the costs of construction. These substantial depreciation charges reduced taxable income as did the interest expense on the debt, with the result that well-run cable companies rarely showed net income, and as a result, rarely paid taxes, despite very healthy cash flows. If an operator then used debt to buy or build additional systems and depreciated the newly acquired assets, he could continue to shelter his cash flow indefinitely.

Just after Malone took over as CEO of TCI in 1973, the 1973-1974 bear market left TCI in a dangerous position. The company was on the edge of bankruptcy due to its very high debt levels. Malone spent the next few years meeting with bankers and lenders to keep the company out of bankruptcy. Also during this time, Malone instituted new discipline in operations, which resulted in a frugal, entrepreneurial culture. Headquarters was austere. Executives stayed together in motels while on the road.

Malone depended on COO J. C. Sparkman to oversee operations, while Malone focused on capital allocation. TCI ended up having the highest margins in the industry as a result. They earned a reputation for underpromising and overdelivering.

In 1977, the balance sheet was in much better shape. Malone had learned that the key to creating value in cable television was financial leverage and leverage with suppliers (especially programmers). Both types of leverage improved as the company became larger. Malone had unwavering commitment to increasing the company’s size.

The largest cost in a cable television system is fees paid to programmers (HBO, MTV, ESPN, etc.). Larger cable operators can negotiate lower programming costs per subscriber. The more subscribers the cable company has, the lower its programming cost per subscriber. This led to a virtuous cycle:

[If] you buy more systems, you lower your programming costs and increase your cash flow, which allows more financial leverage, which can then be used to buy more systems, which further improves your programming costs, and so on… no one else at the time pursued scale remotely as aggressively as Malone and TCI.

Malone also focused on minimizing reported earnings (and thus taxes). At the time, this was highly unconventional since most companies focused on earnings per share. TCI gained an important competitive advantage by minimizing earnings and taxes. Terms like EBITDA were introduced by Malone.

Between 1973 and 1989, the company made 482 acquisitions. The key was to maximize the number of subscribers. (When TCI’s stock dropped, Malone repurchased shares.)

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, after the introduction of satellite-delivered channels such as HBO and MTV, cable television went from primarily rural customers to a new focus on urban markets. The bidding for urban franchises quickly overheated. Malone avoided the expensive urban franchise wars, and stayed focused on acquiring less expensive rural and suburban subscribers. Thorndike:

When many of the early urban franchises collapsed under a combination of too much debt and uneconomic terms, Malone stepped forward and acquired control at a fraction of the original cost.

Malone also established various joint ventures, which led to a number of cable companies in which TCI held a minority stake. Over time, Malone created a great deal of value for TCI by investing in young, talented entrepreneurs.

From 1973 to 1998, TCI shareholders enjoyed a compound annual return of 30.3 percent, compared to 20.4 percent for other publicly traded cable companies and 14.3 percent for the S&P 500. A dollar invested in TCI at the beginning was worth over $900 by mid-1998. The same dollar was worth $180 if invested in other publicly traded cable companies and $22 if invested in the S&P 500.

Malone never used spreadsheets. He looked for no-brainers that could be understood with simple math. Malone also delayed capital expenditures, generally until the economic viability of the investment had been proved. When it came to acquisitions–of which there were many–Malone would only pay five times cash flow.

 

KATHARINE GRAHAM AND THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY

Katharine Graham was the daughter of financier Eugene Meyer. In 1940, she married Philip Graham, a brilliant lawyer. Meyer hired Philip Graham to run The Washington Post Company in 1946. He did an excellent job until his tragic suicide in 1963.

A black and white image of the word washington.

(The Washington Post logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

Katharine was unexpectedly thrust into the CEO role. At age forty-six, she had virtually no preparation for this role and she was naturally shy. But she ended up doing an amazing job. From 1971 to 1993, the compound annual return to shareholders was 22.3 percent versus 12.4 percent for peers and 7.4 percent for the S&P 500. A dollar invested in the IPO was worth $89 by the time she retired, versus $5 for the S&P and $14 for her peer group. These are remarkable margins of outperformance.

After a few years of settling into the new role, she began to take charge. In 1967, she replaced longtime editor in chief Russ Wiggins with the brash Ben Bradlee, who was forty-four years old.

In 1971, she took the company public to raise capital for acquisitions. This was what the board had recommended. At the same time, the newspaper encountered the Pentagon Papers crisis. The company was going to publish a highly controversial (and negative) internal Pentagon opinion of the war in Vietnam that a court had barred the New York Times from publishing. The Nixon administration threatened to challenge the company’s broadcast licenses if it published the report:

Such a challenge would have scuttled the stock offering and threatened one of the company’s primary profit centers. Graham, faced with unclear legal advice, had to make the decision entirely on her own. She decided to go ahead and print the story, and the Post’s editorial reputation was made. The Nixon administration did not challenge the TV licenses, and the offering, which raised $16 million, was a success.

In 1972, with Graham’s full support, the paper began in-depth investigations into the Republican campaign lapses that would eventually become the Watergate scandal. Bradlee and two young investigative reporters, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, led the coverage of Watergate, which culminated with Nixon’s resignation in the summer of 1974. This led to a Pulitzer for the Post–one of an astonishing eighteen during Bradlee’s editorship–and established the paper as the only peer of the New York Times. All during the investigation, the Nixon administration threatened Graham and the Post. Graham firmly ignored them.

In 1974, an unknown investor eventually bought 13 percent of the paper’s shares. The board advised Graham not to meet with him. Graham ignored the advice and met the investor, whose name was Warren Buffett. Buffett quickly became Graham’s business mentor.

In 1975, the paper faced a huge strike led by the pressmen’s union. Graham, after consulting Buffett and the board, decided to fight the strike. Graham, Bradlee, and a very small crew managed to get the paper published for 139 consecutive days. Then the pressmen finally agreed to concessions. These concessions led to significantly improved profitability for the paper. It was also the first time a major city paper had broken a strike.

Also on advice from Buffett, Graham began aggressively buying back stock. Over the next few years, she repurchased nearly 40 percent of the company’s stock at very low prices (relative to intrinsic value). No other major papers did so.

In 1981, the Post‘s rival, the Washington Star, ceased publication. This allowed the Post to significantly increase circulation. At the same time, Graham hired Dick Simmons as COO. Simmons successfully lowered costs and improved profits. Simmons also emphasized bonus compensation based on performance relative to peer newspapers.

In the early 1980s, the Post spent years not acquiring any companies, even though other major newspapers were making more deals than ever. Graham was criticized, but stuck to her financial discipline. In 1983, however, after extensive research, the Post bought cellular telephone businesses in six major markets. In 1984, the Post acquired the Stanley Kaplan test prep business. And in 1986, the paper bought Capital Cities’ cable television assets for $350 million. All of these acquisitions would prove valuable for the Post in the future.

In 1988, Graham sold the paper’s telephone assets for $197 million, a very high return on investment. Thorndike continues:

During the recession of the early 1990s, when her overleveraged peers were forced to the sidelines, the company became uncharacteristically acquisitive, taking advantage of dramatically lower prices to opportunistically purchase cable television systems, underperforming TV stations, and a few education businesses.

When Kay Graham stepped down as chairman in 1993, the Post Company was by far the most diversified among its major newspaper peers, earning almost half its revenues and profits from non-print sources. This diversification would position the company for further outperformance under her son Donald’s leadership.

 

BILL STIRITZ AND RALSTON PURINA

Bill Stiritz was at Ralston seventeen years before becoming CEO at age forty-seven.

This seemingly conventional background, however, masked a fiercely independent cast of mind that made him a highly effective, if unlikely, change agent. When Stiritz assumed the CEO role, it would have been impossible to predict the radical transformation he would effect at Ralston and the broader influence it would have on his peers in the food and packaged goods industries.

A red and white checkered square with a border.

(Purina logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

Stiritz attended the University of Arkansas for a year but then joined the navy for four years. While in the navy, he developed his poker skills enough so that poker eventually would pay for his college tuition. Stiritz completed his undergraduate degree at Northwestern, majoring in business. (In his mid-thirties, he got a master’s degree in European history from Saint Louis University.)

Stiritz first worked at the Pillsbury Company as a field rep putting cereal on store shelves. He was promoted to product manager and he learned about consumer packaged goods (CPG) marketing. Wanting to understand advertising and media better, he started working two years later at the Gardner Advertising agency in St. Louis. He focused on quantitative approaches to marketing such as the new Nielsen ratings service, which gave a detailed view of market share as a function of promotional spending.

In 1964, Stiritz joined Ralston Purina in the grocery products division (pet food and cereals). He became general manager of the division in 1971. While Stiritz was there, operating profits increased fiftyfold due to new product introductions and line extensions. Thorndike:

Stiritz personally oversaw the introduction of Purina Puppy and Cat Chow, two of the most successful launches in the history of the pet food industry. For a marketer, Stiritz was highly analytical, with a natural facility for numbers and a skeptical, almost prickly temperament.

Thorndike continues:

On assuming the CEO role in 1981, Stiritz wasted little time in aggressively restructuring the company. He fully appreciated the exceptionally attractive economics of the company’s portfolio of consumer brands and promptly reorganized the company around these businesses, which he believed offered an attractive combination of high margins and low capital requirements. He immediately began to remove the underpinnings of his predecessor’s strategy, and his first moves involved actively divesting businesses that did not meet his criteria for profitability and returns.

After a number of divestitures, Ralston was a pure branded products company. In the early 1980s, Stiritz began repurchasing stock aggressively. No other major branded products company was repurchasing stock at that time.

Stiritz then bought Continental Baking, the maker of Twinkies and Wonder Bread. He expanded distribution, cut costs, introduced new products, and increased cash flow materially, creating much value for shareholders.

Then in 1986, Stiritz bought the Energizer Battery division from Union Carbide for $1.5 billion. The business had been a neglected operation at Union Carbide. Stiritz thought it was undermanaged and also part of a growing duopoly market.

By the late 1980s, almost 90 percent of Ralston’s revenues were from consumer packaged goods. Pretax profit margins increased from 9 to 15 percent. ROE went from 15 to 37 percent. Since the share base was reduced by aggressive buybacks, earnings and cash flow per share increased dramatically. Stiritz continued making very careful acquisitions and divestitures, with each decision based on an in-depth analysis of potential returns for shareholders.

Stiritz also began spinning off some businesses he thought were not receiving the attention they deserved–either internally or from Wall Street. Spin-offs not only can highlight the value of certain business units. Spin-offs also allow the deferral of capital gains taxes.

Finally, Stiritz sold Ralston itself to Nestle for $10.4 billion, or fourteen times cash flow. This successfully concluded Stiritz’ career at Ralston. A dollar invested with Stiritz when he became CEO was worth $57 nineteen years later. The compound return was 20.0 percent versus 17.7 percent for peers and 14.7 percent for the S&P 500.

Stiritz didn’t like the false precision of detailed financial models. Instead, he focused only on the few key variables that mattered, including growth and competitive dynamics. When Ralston bought Energizer, Stiritz and his protégé Pat Mulcahy, along with a small group, took a look at Energizer’s books and then wrote down a simple, back of the envelope LBO model. That was it.

Since selling Ralston, Stiritz has energetically managed an investment partnership made up primarily of his own capital.

 

DICK SMITH AND GENERAL CINEMA

In 1922, Phillip Smith borrowed money from friends and family, and opened a theater in Boston’s North End. Over the next forty years, Smith built a successful chain of theaters. In 1961, Phillip Smith took the company public to raise capital. But in 1962, Smith passed away. His son, Dick Smith, took over as CEO. He was thirty-seven years old.

A logo of general cinemas

(General Cinema logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

Dick Smith demonstrated a high degree of patience in using the company’s cash flow to diversify away from the maturing drive-in movie business.

Smith would alternate long periods of inactivity with the occasional very large transaction. During his tenure, he would make three significant acquisitions (one in the late 1960s, one in the mid-1980s, and one in the early 1990s) in unrelated businesses: soft drink bottling (American Beverage Company), retailing (Carter Hawley Hale), and publishing (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). This series of transactions transformed the regional drive-in company into an enormously successful consumer conglomerate.

Dick Smith later sold businesses that he had earlier acquired. His timing was extraordinarily good, with one sale in the late 1980s, one in 2003, and one in 2006. Thorndike writes:

This accordion-like pattern of expansion and contraction, of diversification and divestiture, was highly unusual (although similar in some ways to Henry Singleton’s at Teledyne) and paid enormous benefits for General Cinema’s shareholders.

Smith graduated from Harvard with an engineering degree in 1946. He worked as a naval engineer during World War II. After the war, he didn’t want an MBA. He wanted to join the family business. In 1956, Dick Smith’s father made him a full partner.

Dick Smith recognized before most others that suburban theaters were benefitting from strong demographic trends. This led him to develop two new practices.

First, it had been assumed that theater owners should own the underlying land. But Smith realized that a theater in the right location could fairly quickly generate predictable cash flow. So he pioneered lease financing for new theaters, which significantly reduced the upfront investment.

Second, he added more screens to each theater, thereby attracting more people, who in turn bought more high-margin concessions.

Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, General Cinema was getting very high returns on its investment in new theaters. But Smith realized that such growth was not likely to continue indefinitely. He started searching for new businesses with better long-term prospects.

In 1968, Smith acquired the American Beverage Company (ABC), the largest, independent Pepsi bottler in the country. Smith knew about the beverage business based on his experience with theater concessions. Smith paid five times cash flow and it was a very large acquisition for General Cinema at the time. Thorndike notes:

Smith had grown up in the bricks-and-mortar world of movie theaters, and ABC was his first exposure to the value of businesses with intangible assets, like beverage brands. Smith grew to love the beverage business, which was an oligopoly with very high returns on capital and attractive long-term growth trends. He particularly liked the dynamics within the Pepsi bottler universe, which was fragmented and had many second- and third-generation owners who were potential sellers (unlike the Coke system, which was dominated by a smaller number of large independents). Because Pepsi was the number two brand, its franchises often traded at lower valuations than Coke’s.

ABC was a platform companyother companies could be added easily and efficiently. Smith could buy new franchises at seemingly high multiples of the seller’s cash flow and then quickly reduce the effective price through reducing expenses, minimizing taxes, and improving marketing. So Smith acquired other franchises.

Due to constant efforts to reduce costs by Smith and his team, ABC had industry-leading margins. Soon thereafter, ABC invested $20 million to launch Sunkist. In 1984, Smith sold Sunkist to Canada Dry for $87 million.

Smith sought another large business to purchase. He made a number of smaller acquisitions in the broadcast media business. But his price discipline prevented him from buying very much.

Eventually General Cinema bought Carter Hawley Hale (CHH), a retail conglomerate with several department store and specialty retail chains. Woody Ives, General Cinema’s CFO, was able to negotiate attractive terms:

Ives negotiated a preferred security that guaranteed General Cinema a 10 percent return, allowed it to convert its interest into 40 percent of the common stock if the business performed well, and included a fixed-price option to buy Waldenbooks, a wholly owned subsidiary of CHH…

Eventually General Cinema would exchange its 40 percent ownership in CHH shares for a controlling 60 percent stake in the company’s specialty retail division, whose primary asset was the Neiman Marcus chain. The long-term returns on the company’s CHH investment were an extraordinary 51.2 percent. The CHH transaction moved General Cinema decisively into retailing, a new business whose attractive growth prospects were not correlated with either the beverage or the theater businesses.

In the late 1980s, Smith noticed that a newly energetic Coke was attacking Pepsi in local markets. At the same time, beverage franchises were selling for much higher prices as their good economics were more widely recognized. So Smith sold the bottling business in 1989 to Pepsi for a record price. After the sale, General Cinema was sitting on $1 billion in cash. Smith started looking for another diversifying acquisition.

It didn’t take him long to find one. In 1991, after a tortuous eighteen-month process, Smith made his largest and last acquisition, buying publisher Harcourt Brace Jovanovich (HBJ) in a complex auction process and assembling General Cinema’s final third leg. HBJ was a leading educational and scientific publisher that also owned a testing business and an outplacement firm. Since the mid-1960s, the firm had been run as a personal fiefdom by CEO William Jovanovich. In 1986, the company received a hostile takeover bid from the renegade British publisher Robert Maxwell, and in response Jovanovich had taken on large amounts of debt, sold off HBJ’s amusement park business, and made a large distribution to shareholders.

General Cinema management concluded, after examining the business, that HBJ would fit their acquisition criteria. Moreover, General Cinema managers thought HBJ’s complex balance sheet would probably deter other buyers. Thorndike writes:

After extensive negotiations with the company’s many debt holders, Smith agreed to purchase the company for $1.56 billion, which represented 62 percent of General Cinema’s enterprise value at the time–an enormous bet. This price equaled a multiple of six times cash flow for HBJ’s core publishing assets, an attractive price relative to comparable transactions (Smith would eventually sell those businesses for eleven times cash flow).

Thorndike continues:

Following the HBJ acquisition in 1991, General Cinema spun off its mature theater business into a separate publicly traded entity, GC Companies (GCC), allowing management to focus its attention on the larger retail and publishing businesses. Smith and his management team proceeded to operate both the retail and the publishing businesses over the next decade. In 2003, Smith sold the HBJ publishing assets to Reed Elsevier, and in 2006 he sold Neiman Marcus, the last vestige of the General Cinema portfolio, to a consortium of private equity buyers. Both transactions set valuation records within their industries, capping an extraordinary run for Smith and General Cinema shareholders.

From 1962 to 1991, Smith had generated 16.1 percent compound annual return versus 9 percent for the S&P 500 and 9.8 percent for GE. A dollar invested with Dick Smith in 1962 would be worth $684 by 1991. The same dollar would $43 if invested in the S&P and $60 if invested in GE.

 

WARREN BUFFETT AND BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY

Buffett was first attracted to the old textile mill Berkshire Hathaway because its price was cheap compared to book value. Thorndike tells the story:

At the time, the company had only a weak market position in a brutally competitive commodity business (suit linings) and a mere $18 million in market capitalization. From this undistinguished start, unprecedented returns followed; and measured by long-term stock performance, the formerly crew-cut Nebraskan is simply on another planet from all other CEOs. These otherworldly returns had their origin in that aging New England textile company, which today has a market capitalization of $140 billion and virtually the same number of shares. Buffett bought his first share of Berkshire for $7; today it trades for over $120,000 share. [Value of Berkshire share as of 10/21/18: $517.2 billion market capitalization, or $314,477 a share]

A blue background with two black squares on it.

(Company logo, byBerkshire Hathaway Inc., via Wikimedia Commons)

Buffett was born in 1930 in Omaha, Nebraska. His grandfather ran a well-known local grocery store. His father was a stockbroker in downtown Omaha and later a congressman. Starting at age six, Buffett started various entrepreneurial ventures. He would buy a 6-pack of Coke for 25 cents and resell each one for 5 cents. He later had several paper routes and then pinball machines, too. Buffett attended Wharton, but didn’t feel he could learn much. So he returned to Omaha and graduated from the University of Nebraska at age 20.

He’d always been interested in the stock market. But it wasn’t until he was nineteen that he discovered The Intelligent Investor, by Benjamin Graham. Buffett immediately realized that value investing–as explained by Graham in simple terms–was the key to making money in the stock market.

Buffett was rejected by Harvard Business School, which was a blessing in that Buffett attended Columbia University where Graham was teaching. Buffett was the star in Graham’s class, getting the only A+ Graham ever gave in more than twenty years of teaching. Others in that particular course said the class was often like a conversation between Graham and Buffett.

Buffett graduated from Columbia in 1952. He applied to work for Graham, but Graham turned him down. At the time, Jewish analysts were having a hard time finding work on Wall Street, so Graham only hired Jewish people. Buffett returned to Omaha and worked as a stockbroker.

One idea Buffett had tried to pitch while he was a stockbroker was GEICO. He realized that GEICO had a sustainable competitive advantage: a permanently lower cost structure because GEICO sold car insurance direct, without agents or branches. Buffett had trouble convincing clients to buy GEICO, but he himself loaded up in his own account.

Meanwhile, Buffett regularly mailed investment ideas to Graham. After a couple of years, in 1954, Graham hired Buffett.

In 1956, Graham dissolved the partnership to focus on other interests. Buffett returned to Omaha and launched a small investment partnership with $105,000 under management. Buffett himself was worth $140,000 at the time (over $1 million today).

Over the next thirteen years, Buffett crushed the market averages. Early on, he was applying Graham’s methods by buying stocks that were cheap relative to net asset value. But in the mid-1960s, Buffett made two large investments–in American Express and Disney–that were based more on normalized earnings than net asset value. This was the beginning of a transition Buffett made from buying statistically cheap cigar butts to buying higher quality companies.

  • Buffett referred to deep value opportunities–stocks bought far below net asset value–as cigar butts. Like a soggy cigar butt found on a street corner, a deep value investment would often give “one free puff.” Such a cigar butt is disgusting, but that one puff is “all profit.”

Buffett started acquiring shares in Berkshire Hathaway–a cigar butt–in 1965. In the late 1960s, Buffett was having trouble finding cheap stocks, so he closed down the Buffett partnership.

After getting control of Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett put in a new CEO, Ken Chace. The company generated $14 million in cash as Chace reduced inventories and sold excess plants and equipment. Buffett used most of this cash to acquire National Indemnity, a niche insurance company. Buffett invested National Indemnity’s float quite well, buying other businesses like the Omaha Sun, a weekly newspaper, and a bank in Rockford, Illinois.

During this period, Buffett met Charlie Munger, another Omaha native who was then a brilliant lawyer in Los Angeles. Buffett convinced Munger to run his own investment partnership, which he did with excellent results. Later on, Munger became vice-chairman at Berkshire Hathaway.

Partly by reading the works of Phil Fisher, but more from Munger’s influence, Buffett realized that a wonderful company at a fair price was better than a fair company at a wonderful price. A wonderful company would have a sustainably high ROIC, which meant that its intrinsic value would compound over time. In order to estimate intrinsic value, Buffett now relied more on DCF (discounted cash flow) and private market value–methods well-suited to valuing good businesses (often at fair prices)–rather than an estimate of liquidation value–a method well-suited to valuing cigar butts (mediocre businesses at cheap prices).

In the 1970s, Buffett and Munger invested in See’s Candies and the Buffalo News. And they bought large stock positions in the Washington Post, GEICO, and General Foods.

In the first half of the 1980s, Buffett bought the Nebraska Furniture Mart for $60 million and Scott Fetzer, a conglomerate of niche industrial businesses, for $315 million. In 1986, Buffett invested $500 million helping his friend Tom Murphy, CEO of Capital Cities, acquire ABC.

Buffett then made no public market investments for several years. Finally in 1989, Buffett announced that he invested $1.02 billion, a quarter of Berkshire’s investment portfolio, in Coca-Cola, paying five times book value and fifteen times earnings. The return on this investment over the ensuing decade was 10x.

A red coca cola logo is shown on the side of a black background.

(Coca-Cola Company logo, via Wikimedia Commons)

Also in the late 1980s, Buffett invested in convertible preferred securities in Salomon Brothers, Gillette, US Airways, and Champion Industries. The dividends were tax-advantaged, and he could convert to common stock if the companies did well.

In 1991, Salomon Brothers was in a major scandal based on fixing prices in government Treasury bill auctions. Buffett ended up as interim CEO for nine months. Buffett told Salomon employees:

“Lose money for the firm and I will be understanding. Lose even a shred of reputation for the firm, and I will be ruthless.”

In 1996, Salomon was sold to Sandy Weill’s Travelers Corporation for $9 billion, which was a large return on investment for Berkshire.

In the early 1990s, Buffett invested–taking large positions–in Wells Fargo (1990), General Dynamics (1992), and American Express (1994). In 1996, Berkshire acquired the half of GEICO it didn’t own. Berkshire also purchased the reinsurer General Re in 1998 for $22 billion in Berkshire stock.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Buffett bought a string of private companies, including Shaw Carpets, Benjamin Moore Paints, and Clayton Homes. He also invested in the electric utility industry through MidAmerican Energy. In 2006, Berkshire announced its first international acquisition, a $5 billion investment in Iscar, an Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools and blades.

In early 2010, Berkshire purchased the nation’s largest railroad, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe, for $34.2 billion.

From June 1965, when Buffett assumed control of Berkshire, through 2011, the value of the company’s shares increased at a compound rate of 20.7 percent compared to 9.3 percent for the S&P 500. A dollar invested in Berkshire was worth $6,265 forty-five years later. The same dollar invested in the S&P 500 was worth $62.

The Nuts and Bolts

Having learned from Murphy, Buffett and Munger created Berkshire to be radically decentralized. Business managers are given total autonomy over everything except large capital allocation decisions. Buffett makes the capital allocation decisions, and Buffett is an even better investor than Henry Singleton.

Another key to Berkshire’s success is that the insurance and reinsurance operations are profitable over time, and meanwhile Buffett invests most of the float. Effectively, the float has an extremely low cost (occasionally negative) because the insurance and reinsurance operations are profitable. Buffett always reminds Berkshire shareholders that hiring Ajit Jain to run reinsurance was one of the best investments ever for Berkshire.

As mentioned, Buffett is in charge of capital allocation. He is arguably the best investor ever based on the longevity of his phenomenal track record.

Buffett and Munger have always believed in concentrated portfolios. It makes sense to take very large positions in your best ideas. Buffett invested 40 percent of the Buffett partnership in American Express after the salad oil scandal in 1963. In 1989, Buffett invested 25 percent of the Berkshire portfolio–$1.02 billion–in Coca-Cola.

Buffett and Munger still have a very concentrated portfolio. But sheer size requires them to have more positions than before. It also means that they can no longer look at most companies, which are too small to move the needle.

Buffett and Munger also believe in holding their positions for decades. Over time, this saves a great deal of money by minimizing taxes and transaction costs.

Thorndike:

Buffett’s approach to investor relations is also unique and homegrown. Buffett estimates that the average CEO spends 20 percent of his time communicating with Wall Street. In contrast, he spends no time with analysts, never attends investment conferences, and has never provided quarterly earnings guidance. He prefers to communicate with his investors through detailed annual reports and meetings, both of which are unique.

… The annual reports and meetings reinforce a powerful culture that values frugality, independent thinking, and long-term stewardship.

 

 

RADICAL RATIONALITY: THE OUTSIDER’S MINDSET

You’re neither right nor wrong because other people agree with you. You’re right because your facts are right and your reasoning is right–and that’s the only thing that makes you right. And if your facts and reasoning are right, you don’t have to worry about anybody else.– Warren Buffett

Thorndike sums up the outsider’s mindset:

  • Always Do the Math
  • The Denominator Matters
  • A Feisty Independence
  • Charisma is Overrated
  • A Crocodile-Like Temperament That Mixes Patience with Occasional Bold Action
  • The Consistent Application of a Rational, Analytical Approach to Decisions Large and Small
  • A Long-Term Perspective

Always Do the Math

The outsider CEOs always focus on the ROIC for any potential investment. They do the analysis themselves just using the key variables and without using a financial model. Outsider CEOs realize that it’s the assumptions about the key variables that really matter.

The Denominator Matters

The outsider CEOs focus on maximizing value per share. Thus, the focus is not only on maximizing the numerator–the value–but also on minimizing the denominator–the number of shares. Outsider CEOs opportunistically repurchase shares when the shares are cheap. And they are careful when they finance investment projects.

A Feisty Independence

The outsider CEOs all ran very decentralized organizations. They gave people responsibility for their respective operations. But outsider CEOs kept control over capital allocation decisions. And when they did make decisions, outsider CEOs didn’t seek others’ opinions. Instead, they liked to gather all the information, and then think and decide with as much independence and rationality as possible.

Charisma Is Overrated

The outsider CEOs tended to be humble and unpromotional. They tried to spend the absolute minimum amount of time interacting with Wall Street. Outsider CEOs did not offer quarterly guidance and they did not participate in Wall Street conferences.

A Crocodile-Like Temperament That Mixes Patience With Occasional Bold Action

The outsider CEOs were willing to wait very long periods of time for the right opportunity to emerge.

Like Katharine Graham, many of them created enormous shareholder value by simply avoiding overpriced ‘strategic’ acquisitions, staying on the sidelines during periods of acquisition feeding frenzy.

On the rare occasions when there was something to do, the outsider CEOs acted boldly and aggressively. Tom Murphy made an acquisition of a company (ABC) larger than the one he managed (Capital Cities). Henry Singleton repeatedly repurchased huge amounts of stock at cheap prices, eventually buying back over 90 percent of Teledyne’s shares.

The Consistent Application of a Rational, Analytical Approach to Decisions Large and Small

The total value that any company creates over time is the cumulative difference between ROIC and the cost of capital. The outsider CEOs made every capital allocation decision in order to maximize ROIC over time, thereby maximizing long-term shareholder value.

These CEOs knew precisely what they were looking for, and so did their employees. They didn’t overanalyze or overmodel, and they didn’t look to outside consultants or bankers to confirm their thinking–they pounced.

A Long-Term Perspective

The outsider CEOs would make investments in their business as long as they thought that it would contribute to maximizing long-term ROIC and long-term shareholder value. The outsiders were always willing to take short-term pain for long-term gain:

[They] disdained dividends, made disciplined (occasionally large) acquisitions, used leverage selectively, bought back a lot of stock, minimized taxes, ran decentralized organizations, and focused on cash flow over reported net income.

Thorndike notes that the advantage the outsider CEOs had was temperament, not intellect (although they were all highly intelligent). They understood that what mattered was rationality and patience.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

Ten Attributes of Great Investors

November 5, 2023

Michael Mauboussin is the author of several excellent books, including More Than You Know and Think Twice.  I wrote about these books here:

He has also written numerous papers, including Thirty Years: Reflections on the Ten Attributes of Great Investorshttps://bit.ly/2zlaljc

When it comes to value investing, Mauboussin is one of the best writers in the world.  Mauboussin highlights market efficiency, competitive strategy analysis, valuation, and decision making as chief areas of focus for him the past couple of decades.  Mauboussin:

What we know about each of these areas today is substantially greater than what we did in 1986, and yet we have an enormous amount to learn.  As I like to tell my students, this is an exciting time to be an investor because much of what we teach in business schools is a work-in-progress.

A torn piece of paper with the words work in progress written on it.

(Image by magele-picture)

Here are the Ten Attributes of Great Investors:

  • Be numerate (and understand accounting).
  • Understand value (the present value of free cash flow).
  • Properly assess strategy (or how a business makes money).
  • Compare effectively (expectations versus fundamentals).
  • Think probabilistically (there are few sure things).
  • Update your views effectively (beliefs are hypotheses to be tested, not treasures to be protected).
  • Beware of behavioral biases (minimizing constraints to good thinking).
  • Know the difference between information and influence.
  • Position sizing (maximizing the payoff from edge).
  • Read (and keep an open mind).

 

BE NUMERATE (AND UNDERSTAND ACCOUNTING)

Mauboussin notes that there are two goals when analyzing a company’s financial statements:

  • Translate the financial statements into free cash flow.
  • Determine how the competitive strategy of the company creates value.

The value of any business is the future free cash flow it will produce discounted back to the present.

A paper that says free cash flow on top of some papers.

(Photo by designer491)

Free cash flow is cash earnings minus investments that must be made to grow future earnings.  Free cash flow represents what owners of the business receive.  Warren Buffett refers to free cash flow as owner earnings.

Earnings alone cannot give you the value of a company.  You can grow earnings without growing value.  Whether earnings growth creates value depends on how much money the company invests to generate that growth.  If the ROIC (return on invested capital) of the company’s investment is below the cost of capital, then the resulting earnings growth destroys value rather than creates it.

After calculating free cash flow, the next goal in financial statement analysis is to figure out how the company’s strategy creates value.  For the company to create value, the ROIC must exceed the cost of capital.  Analyzing the company’s strategy means determining precisely how the company can get ROIC above the cost of capital.

Mauboussin writes that one way to analyze strategy is to compare two companies in the same business.  If you look at how the companies spend money, you can start to understand competitive positions.

Another way to grasp competitive position is by analyzing ROIC.

A road with the words return on invested capital written in yellow paint.
Photo by stanciuc

You can break ROIC into two parts:

  • profitability (net operating profit after tax / sales)
  • capital velocity (sales / invested capital)

Companies with high profitability but low capital velocity are using a differentiation strategy.  Their product is positioned in such a way that the business can earn high profit margins.  (For instance, a luxury jeweler.)

Companies with high capital velocity but low profitability have adopted a cost leadership strategy.  These businesses may have very thin profit margins, but they still generate high ROIC because their capital velocity is so high.  (Wal-Mart is a good example.)

Understanding how the company makes money can lead to insight about how long the company can maintain a high ROIC (if ROIC is high) or what the company must do to improve (if ROIC is low).

 

UNDERSTAND VALUE (THE PRESENT VALUE OF FREE CASH FLOW)

Mauboussin:

Great fundamental investors focus on understanding the magnitude and sustainability of free cash flow.  Factors that an investor must consider include where the industry is in its life cycle, a company’s competitive position within its industry, barriers to entry, the economics of the business, and management’s skill at allocating capital.

It’s worth repeating: The value of any business (or any financial asset) is the future free cash flow it will produce discounted back to the present.  Successful investors understand the variables that impact free cash flow.

A free cash flow diagram with arrows and icons.
Illustration by OpturaDesign

 

PROPERLY ASSESS STRATEGY (OR HOW A COMPANY MAKES MONEY)

Mauboussin says this attribute has two elements:

  • How does the company make money?
  • Does the company have a sustainable competitive advantage, and if so, how durable is it?

To see how a business makes money, you have to figure out the basic unit of analysis.  Mauboussin points out that the basic unit of analysis for a retailer is store economics:  How much does it cost to build a store?  What revenues will it generate?  What are the profit margins?

Regarding sustainable competitive advantage, Warren Buffett famously said:

The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.

If a company has a sustainable competitive advantage, then ROIC (return on invested capital) is above the cost of capital.  To assess the durability of that advantage, you have to analyze the industry and how the company fits in.  Looking at the five forces that determine industry attractiveness is a common step.  You should also examine potential threats from disruptive innovation.

Mauboussin:

Great investors can appreciate what differentiates a company that allows it to build an economic moat around its franchise that protects the business from competitors.  The size and longevity of the moat are significant inputs into any thoughtful valuation.

A bridge leading to a castle with a sky background
Bodiam Castle, Photo by valeryegorov

Buffett popularized the term economic moat to refer to a sustainable competitive advantage.  Here’s what Buffett said at the Berkshire annual meeting in 2000:

So we think in terms of that moat and the ability to keep its width and its impossibility of being crossed as the primary criterion of a great business.  And we tell our managers we want the moat widened every year.  That doesn’t necessarily mean the profit will be more this year than it was last year because it won’t be sometimes.  However, if the moat is widened every year, the business will do very well.

 

COMPARE EFFECTIVELY (EXPECTATIONS VERSUS FUNDAMENTALS)

Mauboussin:

Perhaps the most important comparison an investor must make, and one that distinguishes average from great investors, is between fundamentals and expectations.  Fundamentals capture a sense of a company’s future financial performance.  Value drivers including sales growth, operating profit margins, investment needs, and return on investment shape fundamentals.  Expectations reflect the financial performance implied by the stock price.

Mauboussin mentions pari-mutuel betting, specifically horse racing.

A group of people riding horses on top of grass.

(Photo by Elshaneo)

Fundamentals are how fast the horse will run, while expectations are the odds.

  • If a company has good fundamentals, but the stock price already reflects that, then you can’t expect to beat the market by investing in the stock.
  • If a company has bad fundamentals, but the stock price is overly pessimistic, then you can expect to beat the market by investing in the stock.

The best business in the world will not bring excess returns if the stock price already fully reflects the high quality of the business.  Similarly, a terrible business can produce excess returns if the stock price indicates that investors have overreacted.

To make money by investing in a stock, you have to have what great investor Michael Steinhardt calls a variant perception“”a view at odds with the consensus view (as reflected in the stock price).  And you have to be right.

Mauboussin observes that humans are quick to compare but aren’t good at it.  This includes reasoning by analogy, e.g., asking whether a particular turnaround is similar to some other turnaround.  However, it’s usually better to figure out the base rate:  What percentage of all turnarounds succeed?  (Not a very high number, which is why Buffett quipped, “Turnarounds seldom turn.”)

Another limitation of humans making comparisons is that people tend to see similarities when they’re looking for similarities, but they tend to see differences when they’re looking for differences.  For instance, Amos Tversky did an experiment in which the subjects were asked which countries are more similar, West Germany and East Germany, or Nepal and Ceylon?  Two-thirds answered West Germany and East Germany.  But then the subjects were asked which countries seemed more different.  Logic says that they would answer Nepal and Ceylon, but instead subjects again answered West Germany and East Germany.

 

THINK PROBABILISTICALLY (THERE ARE FEW SURE THINGS)

Great investors are always seeking an edge, where the price of an asset misrepresents the probabilities or the outcomes.  By similar logic, great investors evaluate each investment decision based on the process used rather than based on the outcome.

  • A good investment decision is one that if repeatedly made would be profitable over time.
  • A bad investment decision is one that if repeatedly made would lead to losses over time.

However, a good decision will sometimes lead to a bad outcome, while a bad decision will sometimes lead to a good outcome.  Investing is similar to other forms of betting in that way.

A person holding two aces on top of cards.
Photo by annebel146

Furthermore, what matters is not how often an investor is right, but rather how much the investor makes when he is right versus how much he loses when he is wrong.  In other words, what matters is not batting average but slugging percentage.  This is hard to put into practice due to loss aversion“”the fact that as humans we feel a loss at least twice as much as an equivalent gain.

There are three ways of determining probabilities.  Subjective probability is a number that corresponds with your state of knowledge or belief.  Mauboussin gives an example:  You might come up with a probability that two countries will go to war.  Propensity is usually based on the physical properties of the system.  If a six-sided die is a perfect cube, then you know that the odds of a particular side coming up must be one out of six.  Frequency is the third approach.  Frequency””also called the base rate“”is measured by looking at the outcomes of a proper reference class.  How often will a fair coin land on heads?  If you gather all the records you can of a fair coin being tossed, you’ll find that it lands on heads 50 percent of the time.  (You could run your own trials, too, by tossing a fair coin thousands or millions of times.)

Often subjective probabilities are useful as long as you remain open to new information and properly adjust your probabilities based on that information.  (The proper way to update such beliefs is using Bayes’s theorem.)  Subjective probabilities are useful when there’s no clear reference class””no relevant base rate.

When you’re looking at corporate performance””like sales or profit growth””it’s usually best to look at frequencies, i.e., base rates.

An investment decision doesn’t have to be complicated.  In fact, most good investment decisions are simple.  Mauboussin quotes Warren Buffett:

Take the probability of loss times the amount of possible loss from the probability of gain times the amount of possible gain.  That is what we’re trying to do.  It’s imperfect, but that’s what it’s all about.

Buffett again:

Investing is simple, but not easy.

 

UPDATE YOUR VIEWS EFFECTIVELY (BELIEFS ARE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED, NOT TREASURES TO BE PROTECTED)

We have a strong preference for consistency when it comes to our own beliefs.  And we expect others to be consistent.  The problem is compounded by confirmation bias, the tendency to look for and see only information that confirms our beliefs, and the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a way that supports our beliefs.  As long as we feel like our beliefs are both consistent and correct””and, as a default psychological setting, most of us feel this way most of the time””we’ll feel comfortable and we won’t challenge our beliefs.

A word cloud of many words related to confirmation bias.
Illustration by intheskies

Great investors seek data and arguments that challenge their views.  Great investors also update their beliefs when they come across evidence that suggests they should.  The proper way to update beliefs is using Bayes’s theorem.  To see Bayes’s theorem and also a clear explanation and example, see: https://boolefund.com/the-signal-and-the-noise/

Mauboussin:

The best investors among us recognize that the world changes constantly and that all of the views that we hold are tenuous.  They actively seek varied points of view and update their beliefs as new information dictates.  The consequence of updated views can be action: changing a portfolio stance or weightings within a portfolio.  Others, including your clients, may view this mental flexibility as unsettling.  But good thinking requires maintaining as accurate a view of the world as possible.

 

BEWARE OF BEHAVIORAL BIASES (MINIMIZING CONSTRAINTS TO GOOD THINKING)

Mauboussin:

Keith Stanovich, a professor of psychology, likes to distinguish between intelligence quotient (IQ), which measures mental skills that are real and helpful in cognitive tasks, and rationality quotient (RQ), the ability to make good decisions.  His claim is that the overlap between these abilities is much lower than most people think.  Importantly, you can cultivate your RQ.

Rationality is only partly genetic.  You can train yourself to be more rational.

Great investors relentlessly train themselves to be as rational as possible.  Typically they keep an investment journal in which they write down the reasoning for every investment decision.  Later they look back on their decisions to analyze what they got right and where they went wrong.

Great investors also undertake a comprehensive study of cognitive biases.  For a list of cognitive biases, see these two blog posts:

It’s rarely enough just to know about cognitive biases.  Great investors take steps””like using a checklist””designed to mitigate the impact that innate cognitive biases have on investment decision-making.

A red pen is marking the checkboxes on a checklist.
Photo by Kenishirotie

 

KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE

A stock price generally represents the collective wisdom of investors about how a given company will perform in the future.  Most of the time, the crowd is more accurate than virtually any individual investor.

A group of people with their heads in the air

(Illustration by Marrishuanna)

However, periodically a stock price can get irrational.  (If this weren’t the case, great value investors could not exist.)  People regularly get carried away with some idea.  For instance, as Mauboussin notes, many investors got rich on paper by investing in dot-com stocks in the late 1990’s.  Investors who didn’t own dot-com stocks felt compelled to jump on board when they saw their neighbor getting rich (on paper).

Mauboussin mentions the threshold model from Mark Granovetter, a professor of sociology at Stanford University.  Mauboussin:

Imagine 100 potential rioters milling around in a public square.  Each individual has a “riot threshold,” the number of rioters that person would have to see in order to join the riot.  Say one person has a threshold of 0 (the instigator), one has a threshold of 1, one has a threshold of 2, and so on up to 99.  This uniform distribution of thresholds creates a domino effect and ensures that a riot will happen.  The instigator breaks a window with a rock, person one joins in, and then each individual piles on once the size of the riot reaches his or her threshold.  Substitute “buy dotcom stocks” for “join the riot” and you get the idea.

The point is that very few of the individuals, save the instigator, think that rioting is a good idea.  Most would probably shun rioting.  But once the number of others rioting reaches a threshold, they will jump in.  This is how the informational value of stocks is set aside and the influential component takes over.

Great investors are not influenced much at all by the behavior of other investors.  Great investors know that the collective wisdom reflected in a stock price is usually right, but sometimes wrong.  These investors can identify the occasional mispricing and then make an investment while ignoring the crowd.

 

POSITION SIZING (MAXIMIZING THE PAYOFF FROM EDGE)

Great investors patiently wait for situations where they have an edge, i.e., where the odds are in their favor.  Many investors understand the need for an edge.  However, fewer investors pay much attention to position sizing.

If you know the odds, there’s a formula””the Kelly criterion””that tells you exactly how much to bet in order to maximize your long-term returns.  The Kelly criterion can be written as follows:

  • F = p ““ [q/o]

where

  • F = Kelly criterion fraction of current capital to bet
  • o = Net odds, or dollars won per $1 bet if the bet wins (e.g., the bet may pay 5 to 1, meaning you win $5 per each $1 bet if the bet wins)
  • p = probability of winning
  • q = probability of losing = 1 ““ p

The Kelly criterion has a unique mathematical property: if you know the probability of winning and the net odds (payoff), then betting exactly the percentage determined by the Kelly criterion leads to the maximum long-term compounding of capital.  (This assumes that you’re going to make a long series of bets.)  Betting any percentage that is not equal to that given by the Kelly criterion will inevitably lead to lower compound growth over a long period of time.

Mauboussin adds:

Proper portfolio construction requires specifying a goal (maximize sum for one period or parlayed bets), identifying an opportunity set (lots of small edge or lumpy but large edge), and considering constraints (liquidity, drawdowns, leverage).   Answers to these questions suggest an appropriate policy regarding position sizing and portfolio construction.

In brief, most investors are ineffective at position sizing, but great investors are good at it.

 

READ (AND KEEP AN OPEN MIND)

Great investors generally read a ton.  They also read widely across many disciplines.  Moreover, as noted earlier, great investors seek to learn about the arguments of people who disagree with them.  Mauboussin:

Berkshire Hathaway’s Charlie Munger said that he really liked Albert Einstein’s point that “success comes from curiosity, concentration, perseverance and self-criticism. And by self-criticism, he meant the ability to change his mind so that he destroyed his own best-loved ideas.”  Reading is an activity that tends to foster all of those qualities.

A pile of books sitting on top of each other.

(Photo by Lapandr)

Mauboussin continues:

Munger has also said, “In my whole life, I have known no wise people (over a broad subject matter area) who didn’t read all the time””none, zero.”  This may be hyperbolic, but seems to be true in the investment world as well.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time.  See the historical chart here:  https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps.  Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals.  We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio.  The size of each position is determined by its rank.  Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost).  Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approaches intrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods.  We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net).  The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

One Up On Wall Street


October 29, 2023

Peter Lynch is one of the great investors. When Lynch managed Fidelity Magellan from 1977 to 1990, the fund averaged 29.2% per year–more than doubling the annual return of the S&P 500 Index–making it the best performing mutual fund in the world.

In One Up On Wall Street: How to Use What You Already Know to Make Money in the Market (Fireside, 1989 and 2000), Lynch offers his best advice to individual investors.

Lynch explains how to find tenbaggers–stocks that increase by 10x–by looking among stocks that are too small for most professionals. Lynch also suggests that you pay attention to small businesses you may come across in your daily life. If you notice a company that seems to be doing well, then you should research its earnings prospects, financial condition, competitive position, and so forth, in order to determine if the stock is a bargain.

Moreover, Lynch notes that his biggest winners–tenbaggers, twentybaggers, and even a few hundredbaggers–typically have taken at least three to ten years to play out.

The main idea is that a stock tracks the earnings of the underlying company over time. If you can pay a cheap price relative to earnings, and if those earnings increase over subsequent years, then you can get some fivebaggers, tenbaggers, and even better as long as you hold the stock while the story is playing out.

Lynch also writes that being right six out of ten times on average works well over time. A few big winners will overwhelm the losses from stocks that don’t work out.

Don’t try to time the market. Focus on finding cheap stocks. Some cheap stocks do well even when the market is flat or down. But over the course of many years, the economy grows and the market goes higher. If you try to dance in and out of stocks, eventually you’ll miss big chunks of the upside.

Here are the sections in this blog post:

    • Introduction: The Advantages of Dumb Money
    • The Making of a Stockpicker
    • The Wall Street Oxymorons
    • Is This Gambling, or What?
    • Personal Qualities It Takes to Succeed
    • Is This a Good Market? Please Don’t Ask
    • Stalking the Tenbagger
    • I’ve Got It, I’ve Got It–What Is It?
    • The Perfect Stock, What a Deal!
    • Stocks I’d Avoid
    • Earnings, Earnings, Earnings
    • The Two-Minute Drill
    • Getting the Facts
    • Some Famous Numbers
    • Rechecking the Story
    • The Final Checklist
    • Designing a Portfolio
    • The Best Time to Buy and Sell

 

INTRODUCTION: THE ADVANTAGES OF DUMB MONEY

Lynch writes that two decades as a professional investor have convinced him that the ordinary individual investor can do just as well as–if not better than–than the average Wall Street expert.

Dumb money is only dumb when it listens to the smart money.

Lynch makes it clear that if you’ve already invested in a mutual fund with good long-term performance, then sticking with it makes sense. His point is that if you’ve decided to invest in stocks directly, then it’s possible to do as well as–if not better than–the average professional investor. This means ignoring hot tips and doing your own research on companies.

There are at least three good reasons to ignore what Peter Lynch is buying: (1) he might be wrong! (A long list of losers from my own portfolio constantly reminds me that the so-called smart money is exceedingly dumb about 40 percent of the time); (2) even if he’s right, you’ll never know when he’s changed his mind about a stock and sold; and (3) you’ve got better sources, and they’re all around you…

If you stay half-alert, you can pick the spectacular performers right from your place of business or out of the neighborhood shopping mall, and long before Wall Street discovers them… and if you work in the industry, so much the better. This is where you’ll find the tenbaggers. I’ve seen it happen again and again from my perch at Fidelity.

You can find tenbaggers even in weak markets, writes Lynch. If you have ten positions at 10% each, then one tenbagger will cause your total portfolio to increase 90% if the other nine positions are flat. If the other nine positions collectively lose 50% (perhaps in weak market), then your overall portfolio will still be up 45% if you have one tenbagger.

Most often, tenbaggers are in companies like Dunkin’ Donuts rather than in penny stocks that depend on a scientific breakthrough. Lynch also mentions La Quinta Motor Inns–a tenbagger from 1973 to 1983. (La Quinta modeled itself on Holiday Inn, but with 30% lower costs and 30% lower prices. If you’ve attended a Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders meeting in the past decade, you may have stayed at La Quinta along with a bunch of other frugal Berkshire shareholders.)

  • Note: When considering examples Lynch gives in his book, keep in mind that he first wrote the book in 1989. The examples are from that time period.

Lynch says he came across many of his best investment ideas while he was out and about:

Taco Bell, I was impressed with the burrito on a trip to California; La Quinta Motor Inns, somebody at the rival Holiday Inn told me about it; Volvo, my family and friends drive this car; Apple Computer, my kids had one at home and then the systems manager bought several for the office; Service Corporation International, a Fidelity electronics analyst… found on a trip to Texas; Dunkin’ Donuts, I loved the coffee…

Many individual investors think the big winners must be technology companies, but very often that’s not the case:

Among amateur investors, for some reason it’s not considered sophisticated practice to equate driving around town eating donuts with the initial phase of an investigation into equities. People seem more comfortable investing in something about which they are entirely ignorant. There seems to be an unwritten rule on Wall Street: If you don’t understand it, then put your life savings into it. Shun the enterprise around the corner, which can at least be observed, and seek out the one that manufactures an incomprehensible product.

Lynch is quick to point out that finding a promising company is only the first step. You then must conduct the research.

 

THE MAKING OF A STOCKPICKER

Lynch describes his experience at Boston College:

As I look back on it now, it’s obvious that studying history and philosophy was much better preparation for the stock market than, say, studying statistics. Investing in stocks is an art, not a science, and people who’ve been trained to rigidly quantify everything have a big disadvantage.

Granted, since Lynch first wrote this book in 1989, more quantitative investors–using computer-based models–have come along. But when it comes to picking stocks that can do well if held for many years, the majority of successful investors still follow a much more traditional process: gathering information through observation, massive reading, and scuttlebutt, and then making investment decisions that are often partly qualitative in nature. Here is a partial list of successful stockpickers:

  • Bill Ackman, David Abrams, Lee Ainslie, Chuck Akre, Bruce Berkowitz, Christopher Browne, Warren Buffett, Michael Burry, Leon Cooperman, Christopher Davis, David Einhorn, Jean-Marie Eveillard, Thomas Gayner, Glenn Greenberg, Joel Greenblatt, Mason Hawkins, Carl Icahn, Seth Klarman, Stephen Mandel, Charlie Munger, Bill Nygren, Mohnish Pabrai, Michael Price, Richard Pzena, Robert Rodriguez, Stephen Romick, Thomas Russo, Walter Schloss, Lou Simpson, Guy Spier, Arnold Van Den Berg, Prem Watsa, Wallace Weitz, and Donald Yacktman.

 

THE WALL STREET OXYMORONS

Lynch observes that professional investors are typically not able to invest in most stocks that become tenbaggers. Perhaps the most important reason is that most professional investors never invest in microcap stocks, stocks with market caps below $500 million. Assets under management (AUM) for many professional investors are just too large to be able to invest in microcap companies. Moreover, even smaller funds usually focus on small caps instead of micro caps. Often that’s a function of AUM, but sometimes it’s a function of microcap companies being viewed as inherently riskier.

There are thousands of microcap companies. And many micro caps are good businesses with solid revenues and earnings, and with healthy balance sheets. These are the companies you should focus on as an investor. (There are some microcap companies without good earnings or without healthy balance sheets. Simply avoid these.)

If you invest in a portfolio of solid microcap companies, and hold for at least 10 years, then the expected returns are far higher than would you get from a portfolio of larger companies. There is more volatility along the way, but if you can just focus on the long-term business results, then shorter term volatility is generally irrelevant. Real risk for value investors is not volatility, or a stock that goes down temporarily. Real risk is the chance of suffering a permanent loss–when the whole portfolio declines and is unable to bounce back.

Fear of volatility causes many professional investors only to look at stocks that have already risen a great deal, so that they’re no longer micro caps. You’ll miss a lot of tenbaggers and twentybaggers if you can’t even look at micro caps. That’s a major reason why individual investors have an advantage over professional investors. Individual investors can look at thousands of microcap companies, many of which are in very good shape.

Furthermore, even if a professional investor could look at microcap stocks, there are still strong incentives not to do so. Lynch explains:

…between the chance of making an unusually large profit on an unknown company and the assurance of losing only a small amount on an established company, the normal mutual-fund manager, pension-fund manager, or corporate-portfolio manager would jump at the latter. Success is one thing, but it’s more important not to look bad if you fail.

As Lynch says, if you’re a professional investor and you invest in a blue chip like General Electric which doesn’t work, clients and bosses will ask, ‘What is wrong with GE?’ But if you invest in an unknown microcap company and it doesn’t work, they’ll ask, ‘What is wrong with you?’

Lynch sums it up the advantages of the individual investor:

You don’t have to spend a quarter of your waking hours explaining to a colleague why you are buying what you are buying. [Also, you can invest in unknown microcap companies…] There’s nobody to chide you for buying back a stock at $19 that you earlier sold at $11–which may be a perfectly sensible move.

 

IS THIS GAMBLING, OR WHAT?

In general, stocks have done better than bonds over long periods of time.

Historically, investing in stocks is undeniably more profitable than investing in debt. In fact, since 1927, common stocks have recorded gains of 9.8 percent a year on average, as compared to 5 percent for corporate bonds, 4.4 percent for government bonds, and 3.4 percent for Treasury bills.

The long-term inflation rate, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, is 3 percent a year, which gives common stocks a real return of 6.8 percent a year. The real return on Treasury bills, known as the most conservative and sensible of all places to put money, has been nil. That’s right. Zippo.

Many people get scared out of stocks whenever there is a large drop of 20-40% (or more). But both the U.S. economy and U.S. stocks are very resilient and have always bounced back quickly. This is especially true since the Great Depression, which was a prolonged period of deep economic stagnation caused in large part by policy errors. A large fiscal stimulus and/or a huge program of money-printing (monetary stimulus) would have significantly shortened the Great Depression.

Lynch defines good investing as a system of making bets when the odds are in your favor. If you’re right 60% of the time and you have a good system, then you should do fine over time. Lynch compares investing to stud poker:

You can never be certain what will happen, but each new occurrence–a jump in earnings, the sale of an unprofitable subsidiary, the expansion into new markets–is like turning up another card. As long as the cards suggest favorable odds of success, you stay in the hand.

…Consistent winners raise their bets as their position strengthens, and they exit the game when the odds are against them…

Consistent winners also resign themselves to the fact that they’ll occasionally be dealt three aces and bet the limit, only to lose to a hidden royal flush. They accept their fate and go on to the next hand, confident that their basic method will reward them over time. People who succeed in the stock market also accept periodic losses, setbacks, and unexpected occurrences. Calamitous drops do not scare them out of the game… They realize the stock market is not pure science, and not like chess, where the superior position always wins. If seven out of ten of my stocks perform as expected, then I’m delighted. If six out of ten of my stocks perform as expected, then I’m thankful. Six out of ten is all it takes to produce on enviable record on Wall Street.

Lynch concludes the chapter by saying that investing is more like 70-card poker than 7-card poker. If you have ten positions, it’s like playing ten 70-card hands at once.

 

PERSONAL QUALITIES IT TAKES TO SUCCEED

Lynch writes:

It seems to me the list of qualities ought to include patience, self-reliance, common sense, a tolerance for pain, open-mindedness, detachment, persistence, humility, flexibility, a willingness to do independent research, an equal willingness to admit mistakes, and the ability to ignore general panic…

It’s also important to be able to make decisions without complete or perfect information. Things are almost never clear on Wall Street, or when they are, then it’s too late to profit from them. The scientific mind that needs to know all the data will be thwarted here.

And finally, it’s crucial to be able to resist your human nature and your ‘gut feelings.’ It’s the rare investor who doesn’t secretly harbor the conviction that he or she has a knack for divining stock prices or gold prices or interest rates, in spite of the fact that most of us have been proven wrong again and again. It’s uncanny how often people feel most strongly that stocks are going to go up or the economy is going to improve just when the opposite occurs. This is borne out by the popular investment-advisory newsletter services, which themselves tend to turn bullish and bearish at inopportune moments.

According to information published by Investor’s Intelligence, which tracks investor sentiment via the newsletters, at the end of 1972, when stocks were about to tumble, optimism was at an all-time high, with only 15 percent of the advisors bearish. At the beginning of the stock market rebound in 1974, investor sentiment was at an all-time low, with 65 percent of the advisors fearing the worst was yet to come…. At the start of the 1982 sendoff into a great bull market, 55 percent of the advisors were bears, and just prior to the big gulp of October 19, 1987, 80 percent of the advisors were bulls again.

…Does the success of Ravi Batra’s book The Great Depression of 1990 almost guarantee a great national prosperity?

Lynch summarizes:

…The trick is not to learn to trust your gut feelings, but rather to discipline yourself to ignore them. Stand by your stocks as long as the fundamental story of the company hasn’t changed.

 

IS THIS A GOOD MARKET? PLEASE DON’T ASK

Lynch:

There’s another theory that we have recessions every five years, but it hasn’t happened that way so far… Of course, I’d love to be warned before we do go into a recession, so I could adjust my portfolio. But the odds of my figuring it out are nil. Some people wait for these bells to go off, to signal the end of a recession or the beginning of an exciting new bull market. The trouble is the bells never go off. Remember, things are never clear until it’s too late.

… No matter how we arrive at the latest financial conclusion, we always seem to be preparing ourselves for the last thing that’s happened, as opposed to what’s going to happen next. This penultimate preparedness is our way of making up for the fact that we didn’t see the last thing coming along in the first place.

Lynch continues:

I don’t believe in predicting markets. I believe in buying great companies–especially companies that are undervalued and/or underappreciated.

Lynch explains that the stock market itself is irrelevant. What matters is the current and future earnings of the individual business you’re considering. Lynch:

Several of my favorite tenbaggers made their biggest moves during bad markets. Taco Bell soared through the last two recessions.

Focus on specific companies rather than the market as a whole. Because you’re not restricted as an individual investor–you can look at microcap companies and you can look internationally–there are virtually always bargains somewhere.

A few good quotes from Warren Buffett on forecasting:

Market forecasters will fill your ear but never fill your wallet.

We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen.

Charlie and I never have an opinion on the market because it wouldn’t be any good and it might interfere with the opinions we have that are good.

 

STALKING THE TENBAGGER

If you work in a particular industry, this can give you an edge:

If you work in the chemical industry, then you’ll be among the first to realize that demand…is going up, prices are going up, and excess inventories are going down. You’ll be in a position to know that no new competitors have entered the market and no new plants are under construction, and that it takes two to three years to build one.

Lynch also argues that if you’re a consumer of particular products, then you may be able to gain insight into companies that sell those products. Again, you still need to study the financial statements in order to understand earnings and the balance sheet. But noticing products that are doing well is a good start.

 

I’VE GOT IT, I’VE GOT IT–WHAT IS IT?

Most of the biggest moves–from tenbaggers to hundredbaggers–occur in smaller companies. Microcap companies are the best place to look for these multi-baggers, while small-cap companies are the second best place to look.

Lynch identifies six general categories: slow growers, stalwarts, fast growers, cyclicals, asset plays, and turnarounds. (Slow growers and stalwarts tend to be larger companies.)

Slow Growers

Many large companies grow slowly, but are relatively dependable and may pay dividends. A conservative investor may consider this category.

Stalwarts

These companies tend to grow annual earnings at 10 to 12 percent a year. If you buy the stock when it’s a bargain, you can make 30 to 50 percent, then sell and repeat the process. This is Lynch’s approach to Stalwarts. Also, Stalwarts can offer decent protection during weak markets.

Fast Growers

Some small, aggressive new companies can grow at 20 to 25 percent a year:

If you choose wisely, this is the land of the 10- to 40-baggers, and even the 200-baggers.

Of course, you have to be careful to identify the risks. Many younger companies may grow too quickly or be underfinanced. So look for the fast growers with good balance sheets and good underlying profitability.

Cyclicals

A cyclical is a company whose sales and profits rise and fall regularly. If you can buy when the company and the industry are out of favor–near the bottom of the cycle–then you can do well with a cyclical. (You also need to sell when the company and the industry are doing well again unless you think it’s a good enough company to hold for a decade or longer.)

Some cyclical stocks–like oil stocks–tend to have a low level of correlation with the broader stock market. This can help a portfolio, especially when the broader stock market offers few bargains.

Turnarounds

Lynch:

Turnaround stocks make up lost ground very quickly… The best thing about investing in successful turnarounds is that of all the categories of stocks, their ups and downs are least related to the general market.

Again, a low correlation with the broader market is especially an advantage when the broader market is overvalued. You do have to be careful with turnarounds, though. As Buffett has said, ‘Turnarounds seldom turn.’

Asset Plays

A company may have something valuable that the market has overlooked. It may be as simple as a pile of cash. Sometimes it’s real estate. It may be unrecognized intellectual property. Or it could be resources in the ground.

 

THE PERFECT STOCK, WHAT A DEAL!

Similar to Warren Buffett, Lynch prefers simple businesses:

Getting the story on a company is a lot easier if you understand the basic business. That’s why I’d rather invest in panty hose than in communications satellites, or in motel chains than in fiber optics. The simpler it is, the better I like it. When somebody says, ‘Any idiot could run this joint,’ that’s a plus as far as I’m concerned, because sooner or later any idiot probably is going to be running it.

… For one thing, it’s easier to follow. During a lifetime of eating donuts or buying tires, I’ve developed a feel for the product line that I’ll never have with laser beams or microprocessors.

Lynch then names thirteen attributes that are important to look for:

It Sounds Dull–Or, Even Better, Ridiculous

Lynch says a boring name is a plus, because that helps a company to stay neglected and overlooked, often causing the stock to be cheap. Bob Evans Farms is an example of a perfect name.

It Does Something Dull

Crown, Cork, and Seal makes cans and bottle caps, says Lynch. The more boring the business, the better. Again, this will help keep the stock neglected, often causing the stock to be cheap.

It Does Something Disagreeable

Safety-Kleen provides gas stations with a machine that washes greasy auto parts. Gas stations love it. But it’s a bit disgusting, which can cause the stock to be neglected and thus possibly cheap.

It’s a Spinoff

Large companies tend to make sure that divisions they spin off are in good shape. Generally spinoffs are neglected by most professional investors, often because the market cap of the spinoff is too small for them to consider.

The Institutions Don’t Own It, and the Analysts Don’t Follow It

With no institutional ownership, the stock may be neglected and possibly cheap. With no analyst coverage, the chance of neglect and cheapness is even higher. It’s not only microcap companies that are neglected. When popular stocks fall deeply out of favor, they, too, can become neglected.

Rumors Abound: It’s Involved with Toxic Waste

Waste Management, Inc. was a hundredbagger. People are so disturbed by sewage and waste that they tend to neglect such stocks.

There’s Something Depressing About It

Funeral home companies tend to be neglected and the stocks can get very cheap at times.

It’s a No-Growth Industry

In a no-growth industry, there’s much less competition. This gives companies in the industry room to grow.

It’s Got a Niche

The local rock pit has a niche. Lynch writes that if you have the only rock pit in Brooklyn, you have a virtual monopoly. A rival two towns away is not going to transport rocks into your territory because the mixed rocks only sell for $3 a ton.

People Have to Keep Buying It

Drugs, soft drinks, razor blades, etc., are products that people need to keep buying.

It’s a User of Technology

A company may be in a position to benefit from ongoing technological improvements.

The Insiders Are Buyers

Insider buying usually means the insiders think the stock is cheap.

Also, you want insiders to own as much stock as possible so that they are incentivized to maximize shareholder value over time. If executive salaries are large compared to stock ownership, then executives will focus on growth instead of on maximizing shareholder value (i.e., profitability).

The Company Is Buying Back Shares

If the shares are cheap, then the company can create much value through buybacks.

 

STOCKS I’D AVOID

Lynch advises avoiding the hottest stock in the hottest industry. Usually a stock like that will be trading at an extremely high valuation, which requires a great deal of future growth for the investor just to break even. When future growth is not able to meet lofty expectations, typically the stock will plummet.

Similarly, avoid the next something. If a stock is touted as the next IBM, the next Intel, or the next Disney, avoid it because very probably it will not be the next thing.

Avoid diworseifications: Avoid the stock of companies that are making foolish acquisitions of businesses in totally different industries. Such diworseifications rarely work out for shareholders. Two-thirds of all acquisitions do not create value. This is even more true when acquisitions are diworseifications.

Beware whisper stocks, which are often technological long shots or whiz-bang stories such as miracle drugs. Lynch notes that he’s lost money on every single whisper stock he’s ever bought.

One trick to avoiding whisper stocks is to wait until they have earnings. You can still get plenty of tenbaggers from companies that have already proven themselves. Buying long shots before they have earnings rarely works. This is a good rule for buying microcap stocks in general: Wait until the company has solid earnings and a healthy balance sheet.

 

EARNINGS, EARNINGS, EARNINGS

Lynch writes that a stock eventually will track the earnings of the business:

Analyzing a company’s stock on the basis of earnings and assets is no different from analyzing a local Laundromat, drugstore, or apartment building that you might want to buy. Although it’s easy to forget sometimes, a share of stock is not a lottery ticket. It’s part ownership of a business.

Lynch gives an example:

And how about Masco Corporation, which developed the single-handle ball faucet, and as a result enjoyed thirty consecutive years of up earnings through war and peace, inflation and recession, with the earnings rising 800-fold and the stock rising 1,300-fold between 1958 and 1987? What would you expect from a company that started out with the wonderfully ridiculous name of Masco Screw Products?

Lynch advises not to invest in companies with high price-to-earnings (p/e) ratios:

If you remember nothing else about p/e ratios, remember to avoid stocks with excessively high ones. You’ll save yourself a lot of grief and a lot of money if you do. With few exceptions, an extremely high p/e ratio is a handicap to a stock, in the same way that extra weight in the saddle is a handicap to a racehorse.

Future earnings may not be predictable, but you can at least check how the company plans to increase future earnings. Lynch:

There are five basic ways a company can increase earnings: reduce costs; raise prices; expand into new markets; sell more of its product in the old markets; or revitalize, close, or otherwise dispose of a losing operation. These are the factors to investigate as you develop the story. If you have an edge, this is where it’s going to be most helpful.

 

THE TWO-MINUTE DRILL

Warren Buffett has said that he would have been a journalist if he were not an investor. Buffett says his job as an investor is to write the story for the company in question. Lynch has a similar view. He explains:

Before buying a stock, I like to be able to give a two-minute monologue that covers the reasons I’m interested in it, what has to happen for the company to succeed, and the pitfalls that stand in its path. The two-minute monologue can be muttered under your breath or repeated out loud to colleagues who happen to be standing within earshot. Once you’re able to tell the story of a stock to your family, your friends, or the dog… and so that even a child could understand it, then you have a proper grasp of the situation.

Usually there are just a few key variables for a given investment idea. As value investor Bruce Berkowitz has said:

We’ve always done very well when we can use sixth-grade math on the back of a postcard to show how inexpensive something is relative to its free cash.

One good way to gain insight is to ask the executive of a company what he or she thinks the competition is doing right. Lynch discovered La Quinta Motor Inns while he was talking to the vice president of United Inns, a competitor.

Lynch later learned that La Quinta’s strategy was simple: to have both costs and prices that are 30% lower than Holiday Inn. La Quinta had everything exactly the same as at a Holiday Inn–same size rooms, same size beds, etc. However:

La Quinta had eliminated the wedding area, the conference rooms, the large reception area, the kitchen area, and the restaurant–all excess space that contributed nothing to the profits but added substantially to the costs. La Quinta’s idea was to install a Denny’s or some similar 24-hour place next door to every one of its motels. La Quinta didn’t even have to own the Denny’s. Somebody else could worry about the food. Holiday Inn isn’t famous for its cuisine, so it’s not as if La Quinta was giving up a major selling point… It turns out that most hotels and motels lose money on their restaurants, and the restaurants cause 95 percent of the complaints.

 

GATHERING THE FACTS

If it’s a microcap business, then you may be able to speak with a top executive simply by calling the company. For larger companies, often you will only reach investor relations. Either way, you want to check the story you’ve developed–your investment thesis–against the facts you’re able to glean through conversation (and through reading the financial statements, etc.).

If you don’t have a story developed enough to check, there are two general questions you can always ask, notes Lynch:

  • What are the positives this year?
  • What are the negatives?

Often your ideas will not be contradicted. But occasionally you’ll learn something unexpected, that things are either better or worse than they appear. Such unexpected information can be very profitable because it is often not yet reflected in the stock price. Lynch says he comes across something unexpected in about one out of every ten phone calls he makes.

Lynch also often will visit headquarters. The goal, he says, is to get a feel for the place. What Lynch really appreciates is when headquarters is obviously shabby, indicating that the executives are keeping costs as low as possible. When headquarters is very nice and fancy, that’s generally a bad signal about management.

Kicking the tires can help. It’s not a substitute for studying the financial statements or for asking good questions. But it can help you check out the practical side of the investment thesis. Lynch used to make a point of checking out as many companies as possible this way.

Finally, in addition to reading the financial statements, Lynch recommends Value Line.

 

SOME FAMOUS NUMBERS

If you’re looking at a particular product, then you need to know what percent of sales that particular product represents.

Lynch then notes that you can compare the p/e and the growth rate:

If the p/e of Coca-Cola is 15, you’d expect the company to be growing at about 15 percent a year, etc. But if the p/e ratio is less than the growth rate, you may have found yourself a bargain. A company, say, with a growth rate of 12 percent a year… and a p/e of 6 is a very attractive prospect. On the other hand, a company with a growth rate of 6 percent a year and a p/e ratio of 12 is an unattractive prospect and headed for a comedown.

In general, a p/e that’s half the growth rate is very positive, and one that’s twice the growth rate is very negative.

You can do a similar calculation by taking earnings, adding dividends, and comparing that sum to the growth rate.

High debt-to-equity is something to avoid. Turnarounds with high debt tend to work far less often than turnarounds with low debt.

Free cash flow is important. Free cash flow equals net income plus depreciation, depletion, and amortization, minus capital expenditures. (There may also be adjustments for changes in working capital.)

The important point is that some companies and some industries–such as steel or autos–are far more capital-intensive than others. Some companies have to spend most of their incoming cash on capital expenditures just to maintain the business at current levels. Other companies have far lower reinvestment requirements; this means a much higher return on invested capital. The value that any given company creates over time is the cumulative difference between the return on invested capital and the cost of capital.

Another thing to track is inventories. If inventories have been piling up recently, that’s not a good sign. When inventories are growing faster than sales, that’s a red flag. Lynch notes that if sales are up 10 percent, but inventories are up 30 percent, then you should be suspicious.

Like Buffett, Lynch observes that a company that can raise prices year after year without losing customers can make for a terrific investment. Such a company will tend to have high free cash flow and high return on invested capital over time.

A last point Lynch makes is about the growth rate of earnings:

All else being equal, a 20-percent grower selling as 20 times earnings (a p/e of 20) is a much better buy than a 10-percent grower selling at 10 times earnings (a p/e of 10). This may sound like an esoteric point, but it’s important to understand what happens to the earnings of the faster growers that propels the stock price.

Lynch gives an example. Assume Company A and Company B both start with earnings of $1.00 per share. But assume that Company A grows at 20 percent a year while Company B grows at 10 percent a year. (So the stock of Company A starts at $20, while the stock of Company B is at $10.) What happens after 10 years, assuming the growth rates stay the same? Company A will be earning $6.19 while Company B will be earning $2.59.

If the multiples haven’t changed, then the stock of Company A will be at $123.80, while the stock of Company B will only be at $26. Even if the p/e for Company A falls to 15 instead of 20, the stock will still be at $92. Going from $20 to $92 (or $123.80) is clearly better than going from $10 to $26.

One last point. In the case of a successful turnaround, the stock of a relatively low-profit margin (and perhaps also high debt) company will do much better than the stock of a relatively high-profit margin (and low debt) company. It’s just a matter of leverage.

For a long-term stock that you’re going to hold through good times and bad, you want high profit margins and low debt. If you’re going to invest in a successful turnaround, then you want low profit margins and high debt, all else equal. (In practice, most turnarounds don’t work, and high debt should be avoided unless you want to specialize in equity stubs.)

 

RECHECKING THE STORY

Every few months, you should check in on the company. Are they on track? Have they made any adjustments to their plan? How are sales? How are the earnings? What are industry conditions? Are their products still attractive? What are their chief challenges? Et cetera. Basically, writes Lynch, have any new cards been turned over?

In the case of a growth company, Lynch holds that there are three phases. In the start-up phase, the company may still be working the kinks out of the business. This is the riskiest phase because the company isn’t yet established. The second phase is rapid expansion. This is generally the safest phase, and also where you can make the most money as an investor. The third phase is the mature phase, or the saturation phase, when growth has inevitably slowed down. The third phase can be the most problematic, writes Lynch, since it gets increasingly difficult to grow earnings.

 

THE FINAL CHECKLIST

Lynch offers a brief checklist.

  • The p/e ratio. Is it high or low for this particular company and for similar companies in the same industry.
  • The percentage of institutional ownership. The lower the better.
  • Whether insiders are buying and whether the company itself is buying back its own shares. Both are positive signs.
  • The record of earnings growth to date and whether the earnings are sporadic or consistent. (The only category where earnings may not be important is in the asset play.)
  • Whether the company has a strong balance sheet or a weak balance sheet (high debt-to-equity ratio) and how it’s rated for financial strength.
  • The cash position. With $16 in net cash, I know Ford is unlikely to drop below $16 a share.

Lynch also gives a checklist for each of the six categories. Then he gives a longer checklist summarizes all the main points (which have already been mentioned in the previous sections).

 

DESIGNING A PORTFOLIO

Some years you’ll make 30 percent, other years you’ll make 2 percent, and occasionally you’ll lose 20 or 30 percent. It’s important to stick to a disciplined approach and not get impatient. Stick with the long-term strategy through good periods and bad. (Even great investors have periods of time when their strategy trails the market, often even several years in a row.)

Regarding the number of stocks to own, Lynch mentions a couple of stocks in which he wouldn’t mind investing his entire portfolio. But he says you need to analyze each stock one at a time:

…The point is not to rely on any fixed number of stocks but rather to investigate how good they are, on a case-by-case basis.

In my view it’s best to own as many stocks as there are situations in which: (a) you’ve got an edge; and (b) you’ve uncovered an exciting prospect that passes all the tests of research. Maybe it’s a single stock, or maybe it’s a dozen stocks. Maybe you’ve decided to specialize in turnarounds or asset plays and you buy several of those; or perhaps you happen to know something special about a single turnaround or a single asset play. There’s no use diversifying into unknown companies just for the sake of diversity. A foolish diversity is the hobgoblin of small investors.

Lynch then recommends, for small portfolios, owning between 3 and 10 stocks. It makes sense to concentrate on your best ideas and on what you understand best. At the same time, it often happens that the tenbagger comes–unpredictably–from your 8th or 9th best idea. The value investor Mohnish Pabrai has had this experience.

  • Important Note: One of the best edges you can have as an individual investor–in addition to being able to focus on microcap companies–is that you can have at least a 3- to 5-year holding period. Because so many investors focus on shorter periods of time, very often the best bargains are stocks that are cheap relative to earnings in 3 to 5 years.

Lynch advises against selling winners and holding on to losers, which is like pulling out the flowers and watering the weeds. But Lynch’s real point is that price movements are often random. Just because a stock has gone up or down doesn’t mean the fundamental value of the business has changed.

If business value has increased–or if fundamentals have improved–then it often makes sense to add to a stock even if it’s gone from $11 to $19.

If business value has not declined, or has improved, then it often makes sense to add to a stock that has declined. On the other hand, if business value has decreased–or if fundamentals have deteriorated–then it often makes sense to sell, regardless of whether the stock has gone up or down.

In general, as long as the investment thesis is intact and business value is sufficiently high, you should hold a stock for at least 3 to 5 years:

If I’d believed in ‘Sell when it’s a double,’ I would never have benefited from a single big winner, and I wouldn’t have been given the opportunity to write a book. Stick around to see what happens–as long as the original story continues to make sense, or gets better–and you’ll be amazed at the results in several years.

 

THE BEST TIME TO BUY AND SELL

Often there is tax loss selling near the end of the year, which means it can be a good time to buy certain stocks.

As mentioned, you should hold for at least 3 to 5 years as long as the investment thesis is intact and normalized business value is sufficiently high. Be careful not to listen to negative nellies who yell ‘Sell!’ way before it’s time:

Even the most thoughtful and steadfast investor is susceptible to the influence of skeptics who yell ‘Sell’ before it’s time to sell. I ought to know. I’ve been talked out of a few tenbaggers myself.

Lynch took a big position in Toys ‘R’ Us in 1978. He had done his homework, and he loaded up at $1 per share:

…By 1985, when Toys ‘R’ Us hit $25, it was a 25-bagger for some. Unfortunately, those some didn’t include me, because I sold too soon. I sold too soon because somewhere along the line I’d read that a smart investor named Milton Petrie, one of the deans of retailing, had bought 20 percent of Toys ‘R’ Us and that his buying was making the stock go up. The logical conclusion, I thought, was that when Petrie stopped buying, the stock would go down. Petrie stopped buying at $5.

I got in at $1 and out at $5 for a fivebagger, so how can I complain? We’ve all been taught the same adages: ‘Take profits when you can,’ and ‘A sure gain is always better than a possible loss.’ But when you’ve found the right stock and bought it, all the evidence tells you it’s going higher, and everything is working in your direction, then it’s a shame if you sell.

Lynch continues by noting that individual investors are just as susceptible to selling early as are professional investors:

Maybe you’ve received the ‘Congratulations: Don’t Be Greedy’ announcement. That’s when the broker calls to say: ‘Congratulations, you’ve doubled your money on ToggleSwitch, but let’s not be greedy. Let’s sell ToggleSwitch and try KinderMind.’ So you sell ToggleSwitch and it keeps going up, while KinderMind goes bankrupt, taking all of your profits with it.

One major problem for all investors is that there are so many market, economic, and political forecasts. Market forecasts and economic forecasts can be very expensive if you follow them, as Buffett has often noted. The only thing you can really know is the individual company in which you’ve invested, and what its long-term business value is. Everything else is noise that can only interfere with your ability to focus on long-term business value.

I quoted Buffett earlier. Now let’s quote the father of value investing, Buffett’s teacher and mentor, Ben Graham:

… if I have noticed anything over these 60 years on Wall Street, it is that people do not succeed in forecasting what’s going to happen to the stock market.

Of course, there could be a bear market and/or recession at any time. But even then, there will be at least a few stocks somewhere in the world that perform well if bought cheaply enough.

The main point made by Graham and Buffett is that repeatedly buying stocks at bargain levels relative to business value can work very well over time if you’re patient and disciplined. Market forecasting can only distract you from what works.

What works is investing in businesses you can understand at sensible prices, and holding each one for at least 3 to 5 years, if not 10 years or longer, as long as the thesis is intact. Lynch:

Frankly, I’ve never been able to predict which stocks will go up tenfold, or which will go up fivefold. I try to stick with them as long as the story’s intact, hoping to be pleasantly surprised. The success of a company isn’t the surprise, but what the shares bring often is. I remember buying Stop & Shop as a conservative, dividend-paying stock, and then the fundamentals kept improving and I realized I had a fast grower on my hands.

It’s important to note that sometimes years can go by while the stock does nothing. That, in itself, doesn’t tell you anything. If the business continues to make progress, and long-term business value is growing (or is sufficiently high), then you should stick with it or perhaps add to the position:

Here’s something else that’s certain to occur: If you give up on a stock because you’re tired of waiting for something wonderful to happen, then something wonderful will begin to happen the day after you get rid of it. I call this the postdiverstiture flourish.

…Most of the money I make is in the third or fourth year that I’ve owned something… If all’s right with the company, and whatever attracted me in the first place hasn’t changed, then I’m confident that sooner or later my patience will be rewarded.

…It takes remarkable patience to hold on to a stock in a company that excites you, but which everybody else seems to ignore. You begin to think everybody else is right and you are wrong. But where the fundamentals are promising, patience is often rewarded…

Lynch again later:

… my biggest winners continue to be stocks I’ve held for three and even four years.

Lynch offers much commentary on a long list of macro concerns that are going to sink stocks. (Remember he was writing in 1989.) Here is a snipet:

I hear every day that AIDS will do us in, the drought will do us in, inflation will do us in, recession will do us in, the budget deficit will do us in, the trade deficit will do us in, and the weak dollar will do us in. Whoops. Make that the strong dollar will do us in. They tell me real estate prices are going to collapse. Last month people started worrying about that. This month they’re worrying about the ozone layer. If you believe the old investment adage that the stock market climbs a ‘wall of worry,’ take note that the worry wall is fairly good-sized now and growing every day.

Like Buffett, Lynch is very optimistic about America and long-term investing in general. Given the strengths of America, and all the entrepreneurial and scientific energy creating ongoing innovation, it seems to me that Buffett and Lynch are right to be long-term optimists. That’s not to say there won’t be setbacks, recessions, bear markets, and other problems. But such setbacks will be temporary. Over the long term, innovation will amaze, profits will grow, and stocks will follow profits higher.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

More Than You Know


October 22, 2023

To boost our productivity–including our ability to think and make decisions–nothing beats continuous learning. Broad study makes us better people. See:https://boolefund.com/lifelong-learning/

Michael Mauboussin is a leading expert in the multidisciplinary study of businesses and markets. His book–More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places–has been translated into eight languages.

Each chapter in Mauboussin’s book is meant to stand on its own. I’ve summarized most of the chapters below.

Here’s an outline:

  • Process and Outcome in Investing
  • Risky Business
  • Are You an Expert?
  • The Hot Hand in Investing
  • Time is on my Side
  • The Low Down on the Top Brass
  • Six Psychological Tendencies
  • Emotion and Intuition in Decision Making
  • Beware of Behavioral Finance
  • Importance of a Decision Journal
  • Right from the Gut
  • Weighted Watcher
  • Why Innovation is Inevitable
  • Accelerating Rate of Industry Change
  • How to Balance the Long Term with the Short Term
  • Fitness Landscapes and Competitive Advantage
  • The Folly of Using Average P/E’s
  • Mean Reversion and Turnarounds
  • Considering Cooperation and Competition Through Game Theory
  • The Wisdom and Whim of the Collective
  • Vox Populi
  • Complex Adaptive Systems
  • The Future of Consilience in Investing

A statue of a man in a robe and beard.

(Photo: Statue of Leonardo da Vinci in Italy, by Raluca Tudor)

 

PROCESS AND OUTCOME IN INVESTING

A word cloud of words related to decision making.

(Image by Amir Zukanovic)

Individual decisions can be badly thought through, and yet be successful, or exceedingly well thought through, but be unsuccessful, because the recognized possibility of failure in fact occurs. But over time, more thoughtful decision-making will lead to better overall results, and more thoughtful decision-making can be encouraged by evaluating decisions on how well they were made rather than on outcome.

Robert Rubin made this remark in his Harvard Commencement Address in 2001. Mauboussin points out that the best long-term performers in any probabilistic field–such as investing, bridge, sports-team management, and pari-mutuel betting–all emphasize process over outcome.

Mauboussin also writes:

Perhaps the single greatest error in the investment business is a failure to distinguish between the knowledge of a company’s fundamentals and the expectations implied by the market price.

If you don’t understand why your view differs from the consensus, and why the consensus is likely to be wrong, then you cannot reasonably expect to beat the market. Mauboussin quotes horse-race handicapper Steven Crist:

The issue is not which horse in the race is the most likely winner, but which horse or horses are offering odds that exceed their actual chances of victory… This may sound elementary, and many players may think that they are following this principle, but few actually do. Under this mindset, everything but the odds fades from view. There is no such thing as “liking” a horse to win a race, only an attractive discrepancy between his chances and his price.

Robert Rubin’s four rules for probabilistic decision-making:

  • The only certainty is that there is no certainty. It’s crucial not to be overconfident, because inevitably that leads to big mistakes. Many of the biggest hedge fund blowups resulted when people were overconfident about particular bets.
  • Decisions are a matter of weighing probabilities. Moreover, you also have to consider payoffs. Probabilities alone are not enough if the payoffs are skewed. A high probability of winning does not guarantee that it’s a positive expected value bet if the potential loss is far greater than the potential gain.
  • Despite uncertainty, we must act. Often in investing and in life, we have to make decisions based in imperfect or incomplete information.
  • Judge decisions not only on results, but also on how they were made. If you’re making decisions under uncertainty–probabilistic decisions–you have to focus on developing the best process you can. Also, you must accept that some good decisions will have bad outcomes, while some bad decisions will have good outcomes.

Rubin again:

It’s not that results don’t matter. They do. But judging solely on results is a serious deterrent to taking risks that may be necessary to making the right decision. Simply put, the way decisions are evaluated affects the way decisions are made.

 

RISKY BUSINESS

A group of dominoes on the ground with one missing

(Photo by Shawn Hempel)

Mauboussin:

So how should we think about risk and uncertainty? A logical starting place is Frank Knight’s distinction: Risk has an unknown outcome, but we know what the underlying outcome distribution looks like. Uncertainty also implies an unknown outcome, but we don’t know what the underlying distribution looks like. So games of chance like roulette or blackjack are risky, while the outcome of a war is uncertain. Knight said that objective probability is the basis for risk, while subjective probability underlies uncertainty.

Mauboussin highlights three ways to get a probability, as suggested by Gerd Gigerenzer inCalculated Risks:

  • Degrees of belief. Degrees of belief are subjective probabilities and are the most liberal means to translate uncertainty into a probability. The point here is that investors can translate even onetime events into probabilities provided they satisfy the laws of probability–the exhaustive and exclusive set of alternatives adds up to one. Also, investors can frequently update probabilities based on degrees of belief when new, relevant information becomes available.
  • Propensities. Propensity-based probabilities reflect the properties of the object or system. For example, if a die is symmetrical and balanced, then you have a one-in-six probability of rolling any particular side… This method of probability assessment does not always consider all the factors that may shape an outcome (such as human error).
  • Frequencies. Here the probability is based on a large number of observations in an appropriate reference class. Without an appropriate reference class, there can be no frequency-based probability assessment. So frequency users would not care what someone believes the outcome of a die roll will be, nor would they care about the design of the die. They would focus only on the yield of repeated die rolls.

When investing in a stock, we try to figure out the expected value by delineating possible scenarios along with a probability for each scenario. This is the essence of what top value investors like Warren Buffett strive to do.

 

ARE YOU AN EXPERT?

In 1996, Lars Edenbrandt, a Lund University researcher, set up a contest between an expert cardiologist and a computer. The task was to sort a large number of electrocardiograms (EKGs) into two piles–heart attack and no heart attack.

A blue image of a face with binary numbers.

(Image by Johannes Gerhardus Swanepoel)

The human expert was Dr. Hans Ohlin, a leading Swedish cardiologist who regularly evaluated as many as 10,000 EKGs per year. Edenbrandt, an artificial intelligence expert, trained his computer by feeding it thousands of EKGs. Mauboussin describes:

Edenbrandt chose a sample of over 10,000 EKGs, exactly half of which showed confirmed heart attacks, and gave them to machine and man. Ohlin took his time evaluating the charts, spending a week carefully separating the stack into heart-attack and no-heart-attack piles. The battle was reminiscent of Garry Kasparov versus Deep Blue, and Ohlin was fully aware of the stakes.

As Edenbrandt tallied the results, a clear-cut winner emerged: the computer correctly identified the heart attacks in 66 percent of the cases, Ohlin only in 55 percent. The computer proved 20 percent more accurate than a leading cardiologist in a routine task that can mean the difference between life and death.

Mauboussin presents a table illustrating that expert performance depends on the problem type:

Domain Description (Column) Expert Performance Expert Agreement Examples
Rules based: Limited Degrees of Freedom Worse than computers High (70-90%)
  • Credit scoring
  • Simple medical diagnosis
Rules based: High Degrees of Freedom Generally better than computers Moderate (50-60%)
  • Chess
  • Go
Probabilistic: Limited Degrees of Freedom Equal to or worse than collectives Moderate/ Low (30-40%)
  • Admissions officers
  • Poker
Probabilistic: High Degrees of Freedom Collectives outperform experts Low (<20%)
  • Stock market
  • Economy

For rules-based systems with limited degrees of freedom, computers consistently outperform individual humans; humans perform well, but computers are better and often cheaper, says Mauboussin. Humans underperform computers because humans are influenced by suggestion, recent experience, and how information is framed. Also, humans fail to weigh variables well. Thus, while experts tend to agree in this domain, computers outperform experts, as illustrated by the EKG-reading example.

In the next domain–rules-based systems with high degrees of freedom–experts tend to add the most value. However, as computing power continues to increase, eventually computers will outperform experts even here, as illustrated by Chess and Go. Eventually, games like Chess and Go are “solvable.” Once the computer can check every single possible move within a reasonable amount of time–which is inevitable as long as computing power continues to increase–no human will be able to match such a computer.

In probabilistic domains with limited degrees of freedom, experts are equal to or worse than collectives. Overall, the value of experts declines compared to rules-based domains.

A group of people standing next to each other.

(Image by Marrishuanna)

In probabilistic domains with high degrees of freedom, experts do worse than collectives. For instance, stock market prices aggregate many guesses from individual investors. Stock market prices typically are more accurate than experts.

 

THE HOT HAND IN INVESTING

Sports fans and athletes believe in the hot hand in basketball. A player on a streak is thought to be “hot,” or more likely to make his or her shots. However, statistical analysis of streaks shows that the hot hand does not exist.

A neon sign that reads " hot streak ".

(Illustration by lbreakstock)

Long success streaks happen to the most skillful players in basketball, baseball, and other sports. To illustrate this, Mauboussin asks us to consider two basketball players, Sally Swish and Allen Airball. Sally makes 60 percent of her shot attempts, while Allen only makes 30 percent of his shot attempts.

What are the probabilities that Sally and Allen make five shots in a row? For Sally, the likelihood is (0.6)^5, or 7.8 percent. Sally will hit five in a row about every thirteen sequences. For Allen, the likelihood is (0.3)^5, or 0.24 percent. Allen will hit five straight once every 412 sequences. Sally will have far more streaks than Allen.

In sum, long streaks in sports or in money management indicate extraordinary luck imposed on great skill.

 

TIME IS ON MY SIDE

The longer you’re willing to hold a stock, the more attractive the investment. For the average stock, the chance that it will be higher is (almost) 100 percent for one decade, 72 percent for one year, 56 percent for one month, and 51 percent for one day.

A green sticky note with the words " good things take time ".
(Illustration by Marek)

The problem isloss aversion. We feel the pain of a loss 2 to 2.5 times more than the pleasure of an equivalent gain. If we check a stock price daily, there’s nearly a 50 percent chance of seeing a loss. So checking stock prices daily is a losing proposition. By contrast, if we only check the price once a year or once every few years, then investing in a stock is much more attractive.

A fund with a high turnover ratio is much more short-term oriented than a fund with a low turnover ratio. Unfortunately, most institutional investors have a much shorter time horizon than what is needed for the typical good strategy to pay off. If portfolio managers lag over shorter periods of time, they may lose their jobs even if their strategy works quite well over the long term.

 

THE LOW DOWN ON THE TOP BRASS

A pile of paper with the word leadership written on it.

(Illustration by Travelling-light)

It’s difficult to judge leadership, but Mauboussin identifies four things worth considering:

  • Learning
  • Teaching
  • Self-awareness
  • Capital allocation

Mauboussin asserts:

A consistent thirst to learn marks a great leader. On one level, this is about intellectual curiosity–a constant desire to build mental models that can help in decision making. A quality manager can absorb and weigh contradictory ideas and information as well as think probabilistically…

Another critical facet of learning is a true desire to understand what’s going on in the organization and to confront the facts with brutal honesty. The only way to understand what’s going on is to get out there, visit employees and customers, and ask questions and listen to responses. In almost all organizations, there is much more information at the edge of the network–the employees in the trenches dealing with the day-to-day issues–than in the middle of the network, where the CEO sits. CEOs who surround themselves with managers seeking to please, rather than prod, are unlikely to make great decisions.

A final dimension of learning is creating an environment where everyone in the organization feels they can voice their thoughts and opinions without the risk of being rebuffed, ignored, or humiliated. The idea here is not that management should entertain all half-baked ideas but rather that management should encourage and reward intellectual risk taking.

Teaching involves communicating a clear vision to the organization. Mauboussin points out that teaching comes most naturally to those leaders who are passionate. Passion is a key driver of success.

Self-awareness implies a balance between confidence and humility. We all have strengths and weaknesses. Self-aware leaders know their weaknesses and find colleagues who are strong in those areas.

Finally, capital allocation is a vital leadership skill. Regrettably, many consultants and investment bankers give poor advice on this topic. Most acquisitions destroy value for the acquirer, regardless of whether they are guided by professional advice.

Mauboussin quotes Warren Buffett:

The heads of many companies are not skilled in capital allocation. Their inadequacy is not surprising. Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing, production, engineering, administration or, sometimes, institutional politics.

Once they become CEOs, they face new responsibilities. They now must make capital allocation decisions, a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered. To stretch the point, it’s as if the final step for a highly talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but, instead, to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter: After ten years on the job, a CEO whose company annually retains earnings equal to 10% of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60% of all the capital at work in the business. CEOs who recognize their lack of capital-allocation skills (which not all do) will often try to compensate by turning to their staffs, management consultants, or investment bankers. Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such “help.” On balance, we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital-allocation problem than to solve it.

In the end, plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America. (That’s why you hear so much about “restructuring.”)

 

SIX PSYCHOLOGICAL TENDENCIES

A magnifying glass is on top of a wooden wall.

(Image by Andreykuzmin)

The psychologist Robert Cialdini, in his bookInfluence: The Psychology of Persuasion, mentions six psychological tendencies that cause people to comply with requests:

  • Reciprocation. There is no human society where people do not feel the obligation to reciprocate favors or gifts. That’s why charitable organizations send free address labels and why real estate companies offer free house appraisals. Sam Walton was smart to forbid all of his employees from accepting gifts from suppliers, etc.
  • Commitment and consistency. Once we’ve made a decision, and especially if we’ve publicly committed to that decision, we’re highly unlikely to change. Consistency allows us to stop thinking and also to avoid further action.
  • Social validation. One of the chief ways we make decisions is by observing the decisions of others. In an experiment by Solomon Asch, eight people in a room are shown three lines of clearly unequal lengths. Then they are shown a fourth line that has the same length as one of the three lines. They are asked to match the fourth line to the one with equal length. The catch is that only one of the eight people in the room is the actual subject of the experiment. The other seven people are shills who have been instructed to choose an obviously incorrect answer. About 33 percent of the time, the subject of the experiment ignores the obviously right answer and goes along with the group instead.
  • Liking. We all prefer to say yes to people we like–people who are similar to us, who compliment us, who cooperate with us, and who we find attractive.
  • Authority. Stanley Milgram wanted to understand why many seemingly decent people–including believing Lutherans and Catholics–went along with the great evils perpetrated by the Nazis. Milgram did a famous experiment. A person in a white lab coat stands behind the subject of the experiment. The subject is asked to give increasingly severe electric shocks to a “learner” in another room whenever the learner gives an incorrect answer to a question. (Unknown to the subject, the learner in the other room is an actor and the electric shocks are not really given.) Roughly 60 percent of the time, the subject of the experiment gives a fatal shock of 450 volts to the learner. This is a terrifying result. See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment
  • Scarcity. Items or data that are scarce or perceived to be scarce automatically are viewed as more attractive. That’s why companies frequently offer services or products for a limited time only.

These innate psychological tendencies are especially powerful when they operate in combination. Charlie Munger calls this lollapalooza effects.

Mauboussin writes that investors are often influenced by commitment and consistency, social validation, and scarcity.

Psychologists discovered that after bettors at a racetrack put down their money, they are more confident in the prospects of their horses winning than immediately before they placed their bets. After making a decision, we feel both internal and external pressure to remain consistent to that view even if subsequent evidence questions the validity of the initial decision.

So an investor who has taken a position in a particular stock, recommended it publicly, or encouraged colleagues to participate, will feel the need to stick with the call. Related to this tendency is the confirmation trap: postdecision openness to confirming data coupled with disavowal or denial of disconfirming data. One useful technique to mitigate consistency is to think about the world in ranges of values with associated probabilities instead of as a series of single points. Acknowledging multiple scenarios provides psychological shelter to change views when appropriate.

There is a large body of work about the role of social validation in investing. Investing is an inherently social activity, and investors periodically act in concert…

Finally, scarcity has an important role in investing (and certainly plays a large role in the minds of corporate executives). Investors in particular seek informational scarcity. The challenge is to distinguish between what is truly scarce information and what is not. One means to do this is to reverse-engineer market expectations–in other words, figure out what the market already thinks.

 

EMOTION AND INTUITION IN DECISION MAKING

A series of words that are written in wood blocks.

(Photo by Marek Uliasz)

Humans need to be able to experience emotions in order to make good decisions. Mauboussin writes about an experiment conducted by Antonio Damasio:

…In one experiment, he harnessed subjects to a skin-conductance-response machine and asked them to flip over cards from one of four decks; two of the decks generated gains (in play money) and the other two were losers. As the subjects turned cards, Damasio asked them what they thought was going on. After about ten turns, the subjects started showing physical reactions when they reached for a losing deck. About fifty cards into the experiment, the subjects articulated a hunch that two of the four decks were riskier. And it took another thirty cards for the subjects to explain why their hunch was right.

This experiment provided two remarkable decision-making lessons. First, the unconscious knew what was going on before the conscious did. Second, even the subjects who never articulated what was going on had unconscious physical reactions that guided their decisions.

 

BEWARE OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE

Individual agents can behave irrationally but the market can still be rational.

…Collective behavior addresses the potentially irrational actions of groups. Individual behavior dwells on the fact that we all consistently fall into psychological traps, including overconfidence, anchoring and adjustment, improper framing, irrational commitment escalation, and the confirmation trap.

Here’s my main point: markets can still be rational when investors are individually irrational. Sufficient investor diversity is the essential feature in efficient price formation. Provided the decision rules of investors are diverse–even if they are suboptimal–errors tend to cancel out and markets arrive at appropriate prices. Similarly, if these decision rules lose diversity, markets become fragile and susceptible to inefficiency.

Mauboussin continues:

In case after case, the collective outperforms the individual. A full ecology of investors is generally sufficient to assure that there is no systematic way to beat the market. Diversity is the default assumption, and diversity breakdowns are the notable (and potentially profitable) exceptions.

A group of people connected to each other with an idea.

(Illustration by Trueffelpix)

Mauboussin writes about an interesting example of how the collective can outperform individuals (including experts).

On January 17, 1966, a B-52 bomber and a refueling plane collided in midair while crossing the Spanish coastline. The bomber was carrying four nuclear bombs. Three were immediately recovered. But the fourth was lost and its recovery became a national security priority.

Assistant Security of Defense Jack Howard called a young naval officer, John Craven, to find the bomb. Craven assembled a diverse group of experts and asked them to place bets on where the bomb was. Shortly thereafter, using the probabilities that resulted from all the bets, the bomb was located. The collective intelligence in this example was superior to the intelligence of any individual expert.

 

IMPORTANCE OF A DECISION JOURNAL

In investing and in general, it’s wise to keep a journal of our decisions and the reasoning behind them.

A pen and notebook on top of a table.

(Photo by Leerobin)

We all suffer from hindsight bias. We are unable to recall what we actually thought before making a decision or judgment.

  • If we decide to do something and it works out, we tend to underestimate the uncertainty that was present when we made the decision. “I knew I made the right decision.”
  • If we decide to do something and it doesn’t work, we tend to overestimate the uncertainty that was present when we made the decision. “I suspected that it wouldn’t work.”
  • If we judge that event X will happen, and then it does, we underestimate the uncertainty that was present when we made the judgment. “I knew that would happen.”
  • If we judge that event X will happen, and it doesn’t, we overestimate the uncertainty that was present when we made the judgment. “I was fully aware that it was unlikely.”

See:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias

As Mauboussin notes, keeping a decision journal gives us a valuable source of objective feedback. Otherwise, we won’t recall with any accuracy the uncertainty we faced or the reasoning we used.

 

RIGHT FROM THE GUT

Robert Olsen has singled out five conditions that are present in the context of naturalistic decision making.

  • Ill-structured and complex problems. No obvious best procedure exists to solve a problem.
  • Information is incomplete, ambiguous, and changing. Because stock picking relates to future financial performance, there is no way to consider all information.
  • Ill-defined, shifting, and competing goals. Although long-term goals may be clearer, goals can change over shorter horizons.
  • Stress because of time constraints, high stakes, or both. Stress is clearly a feature of investing.
  • Decisions may involve multiple participants.

Mauboussin describes three key characteristics of naturalistic decision makers. First, they rely heavily on mental imagery and simulation in order to assess a situation and possible alternatives. Second, they excel at pattern matching. (For instance, chess masters can glance at a board and quickly recognize a pattern.)

A person writing on the wall with words.

(Photo by lbreakstock)

Third, naturalistic decision makers reason through analogy. They can see how seemingly different situations are in fact similar.

 

WEIGHTED WATCHER

Mauboussin describes how we develop a “degree of belief” in a specific hypothesis:

Our degree of belief in a particular hypothesis typically integrates two kinds of evidence: the strength, or extremeness, of the evidence and the weight, or predictive validity. For instance, say you want to test the hypothesis that a coin in biased in favor of heads. The proportion of heads in the sample reflects the strength, while the sample size determines the weight.

Probability theory describes rules for how to combine strength and weight correctly. But substantial experimental data show that people do not follow the theory. Specifically, the strength of evidence seems to dominate the weight of evidence in people’s minds.

This bias leads to a distinctive pattern of over- and underconfidence. When the strength of evidence is high and the weight is low–which accurately describes the outcome of many Wall Street-sponsored surveys–people tend to be overconfident. In contrast, when the strength is low and the evidence is high, people tend to be underconfident.

Two dice with the letters probabilities on a table.

(Photo by Michele Lombardo)

Does survey-based research lead to superior stock selection? Mauboussin responds that the answer is ambiguous. First, the market adjusts to new information rapidly. It’s difficult to gain an informational edge, especially when it comes to what is happening now or what will happen in the near future. In contrast, it’s possible to gain an informational edge if you focus on the longer term. That’s because many investors don’t focus there.

The second issue is that understanding the fundamentals about a company or industry is very different from understanding the expectations built into a stock price. The question is not just whether the information is new to you, but whether the information is also new to the market. In the vast majority of cases, the information is already reflected in the current stock price.

Mauboussin sums it up:

Seeking new information is a worthy goal for an investor. My fear is that much of what passes as incremental information adds little or no value, because investors don’t properly weight new information, rely on unsound samples, and fail to recognize what the market already knows. In contrast, I find that thoughtful discussions about a firm’s or an industry’s medium- to long-term competitive outlook extremely rare.

 

WHY INNOVATION IS INEVITABLE

A blurry image of many different icons and symbols.

(Image: Innovation concept, by Daniil Peshkov)

Mauboussin quotes Andrew Hargadon’sHow Breakthroughs Happen:

All innovations represent some break from the past–the lightbulb replaced the gas lamp, the automobile replaced the horse and cart, the steamship replaced the sailing ship. By the same token, however, all innovations are built from pieces of the past–Edison’s system drew its organizing principles from the gas industry, the early automobiles were built by cart makers, and the first steam ships added steam engines to existing sailing ships.

Mauboussin adds:

Investors need to appreciate the innovation process for a couple of reasons. First, our overall level of material well-being relies heavily on innovation. Second, innovation lies at the root of creative destruction–the process by which new technologies and businesses supersede others. More rapid innovation means more rapid success and failure for companies.

Mauboussin draws attention to three interrelated factors that continue to drive innovation at an accelerating rate:

  • Scientific advances
  • Information storage capacity
  • Gains in computing power

 

ACCELERATING RATE OF INDUSTRY CHANGE

A close up of the face of a bug with orange socks.

(Photo: Drosophila Melanogaster, by Tomatito26)

Mauboussin mentions the common fruit fly,Drosophila melanogaster, which geneticists and other scientists like to study because its life cycle is only two weeks.

Why should businesspeople care aboutDrosophila? A sound body of evidence now suggests that the average speed of evolution is accelerating in the business world. Just as scientists have learned a great deal about evolutionary change from fruit flies, investors can benefit from understanding the sources and implications of accelerated business evolution.

The most direct consequence of more rapid business evolution is that the time an average company can sustain a competitive advantage–that is, generate an economic return in excess of its cost of capital–is shorter than it was in the past. This trend has potentially important implications for investors in areas such as valuation, portfolio turnover, and diversification.

Mauboussin refers to research by Robert Wiggins and Timothy Ruefli on the sustainability of economic returns. They put forth four hypotheses. The first three were supported by the data, while the fourth one was not:

  • Periods of persistent superior economic performance are decreasing in duration over time.
  • Hypercompetition is not limited to high-technology industries but will occur through most industries.
  • Over time, firms increasingly seek to sustain competitive advantage by concatenating a series of short-term competitive advantages.
  • Industry concentration, large market share, or both are negatively correlated with chance of loss of persistent superior economic performance in an industry.

Mauboussin points out that faster product and process life cycles means that historical multiples are less useful for comparison. Also, the terminal valuation in discounted cash-flow models in many cases has to be adjusted to reflect shorter periods of sustainable competitive advantage.

A chalkboard with the words " what is my sustainable competitive advantage ?" written on it.

(Image by Marek Uliasz)

Furthermore, while portfolio turnover on average is too high, portfolio turnover could be increased for those investors who have historically had a portfolio turnover of 20 percent (implying a holding period of 5 years). Similarly, shorter periods of competitive advantage imply that some portfolios should be more diversified. Lastly, faster business evolution means that investors must spend more time understanding the dynamics of organizational change.

 

HOW TO BALANCE THE LONG TERM WITH THE SHORT TERM

A chess board with pieces on it

(Photo by Michael Maggs, via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin notes the lessons emphasized by chess master Bruce Pandolfini:

  • Don’t look too far ahead. Most people believe that great players strategize by thinking far into the future, by thinking 10 or 15 moves ahead. That’s just not true. Chess players look only as far into the future as they need to, and that usually means looking just a few moves ahead. Thinking too far ahead is a waste of time: The information is uncertain.
  • Develop options and continuously revise them based on the changing conditions: Great players consider their next move without playing it. You should never play the first good move that comes into your head. Put that move on your list, and then ask yourself if there’s an even better move. If you see a good idea, look for a better one–that’s my motto. Good thinking is a matter of making comparisons.
  • Know your competition: Being good at chess also requires being good at reading people. Few people think of chess as an intimate, personal game. But that’s what it is. Players learn a lot about their opponents, and exceptional chess players learn to interpret every gesture that their opponents make.
  • Seek small advantages: You play for seemingly insignificant advantages–advantages that your opponent doesn’t notice or that he dismisses, thinking, “Big deal, you can have that.” It could be slightly better development, or a slightly safer king’s position. Slightly, slightly, slightly. None of those “slightlys” mean anything on their own, but add up seven or eight of them, and you have control.

Mauboussin argues that companies should adopt simple, flexible long-term decision rules. This is the “strategy as simple rules” approach, which helps us from getting caught in the short term versus long term debate.

Moreover, simple decision rules help us to be consistent. Otherwise we will often reach different conclusions from the same data based on moods, suggestion, recency bias, availability bias, framing effects, etc.

 

FITNESS LANDSCAPES AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

A 3 d graph with lines and dots in the middle.

(Image: Fitness Landscape, by Randy Olsen, via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin:

What does a fitness landscape look like? Envision a large grid, with each point representing a different strategy that a species (or a company) can pursue. Further imagine that the height of each point depicts fitness. Peaks represent high fitness, and valleys represent low fitness. From a company’s perspective, fitness equals value-creation potential. Each company operates in a landscape full of high-return peaks and value-destructive valleys. The topology of the landscape depends on the industry characteristics.

As Darwin noted, improving fitness is not about strength or smarts, but rather about becoming more and more suited to your environment–in a word, adaptability. Better fitness requires generating options and “choosing” the “best” ones. In nature, recombination and mutation generate species diversity, and natural selection assures that the most suitable options survive. For companies, adaptability is about formulating and executing value-creating strategies with a goal of generating the highest possible long-term returns.

Since a fitness landscape can have lots of peaks and valleys, even if a species reaches a peak (a local optimum), it may not be at the highest peak (a global optimum). To get a higher altitude, a species may have to reduce its fitness in the near term to improve its fitness in the long term. We can say the same about companies…

Mauboussin remarks that there are three types of fitness landscape:

  • Stable. These are industries where the fitness landscape is reasonably stable. In many cases, the landscape is relatively flat, and companies generate excess economic returns only when cyclical forces are favorable. Examples include electric and telephone utilities, commodity producers (energy, paper, metals), capital goods, consumer nondurables, and real estate investment trusts. Companies within these sectors primarily improve their fitness at the expense of their competitors. These are businesses that tend to have structural predictability (i.e., you’ll know what they look like in the future) at the expense of limited opportunities for growth and new businesses.
  • Coarse. The fitness landscape is in flux for these industries, but the changes are not so rapid as to lack predictability. The landscape here is rougher. Some companies deliver much better economic performance than do others. Financial services, retail, health care, and more established parts of technology are illustrations. These industries run a clear risk of being unseated (losing fitness) by a disruptive technology.
  • Roiling. This group contains businesses that are very dynamic, with evolving business models, substantial uncertainty, and ever-changing product offerings. The peaks and valleys are constantly changing, ever spastic. Included in this type are many software companies, the genomics industry, fashion-related sectors, and most start-ups. Economic returns in this group can be (or can promise to be) significant but are generally fleeting.

Mauboussin indicates that innovation, deregulation, and globalization are probably causing the global fitness landscape to become even more contorted.

Companies can make short, incremental jumps towards a local maximum. Or they can make long, discontinuous jumps that may lead to a higher peak or a lower valley. Long jumps include investing in new potential products or making meaningful acquisitions in unrelated fields. The proper balance between short jumps and long jumps depends on a company’s fitness landscape.

Mauboussin adds that the financial tool for valuing a given business depends on the fitness landscape that the business is in. A business in a stable landscape can be valued using discounted cash-flow (DCF). A business in a course landscape can be valued using DCF plus strategic options. A business in a roiling landscape can be valued using strategic options.

 

THE FOLLY OF USING AVERAGE P/E’S

Bradford Cornell:

For past averages to be meaningful, the data being averaged have to be drawn from the same population. If this is not the case–if the data come from populations that are different–the data are said to be nonstationary. When data are nonstationary, projecting past averages typically produces nonsensical results.

Nonstationarity is a key concept in time-series analysis, such as the study of past data in business and finance. If the underlying population changes, then the data are nonstationary and you can’t compare past averages to today’s population.

A red and blue graph is shown on the black background.

(Image: Time Series, by Mike Toews via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin gives three reasons why past P/E data are nonstationary:

  • Inflation and taxes
  • Changes in the composition of the economy
  • Shifts in the equity-risk premium

Higher taxes mean lower multiples, all else equal. And higher inflation also means lower multiples. Similarly, low taxes and low inflation both cause P/E ratios to be higher.

The more companies rely on intangible capital rather than tangible capital, the higher the cash-flow-to-net-income ratio. Overall, the economy is relying increasingly on intangible capital. Higher cash-flow-to-net-income ratios, and higher returns on capital, mean higher P/E ratios.

 

MEAN REVERSION AND TURNAROUNDS

Growth alone does not create value. Growth creates value only if the return on invested capital exceeds the cost of capital. Growth actually destroys value if the return on invested capital is less than the cost of capital.

A person is writing on paper with papers and calculator.

(Illustration by Teguh Jati Prasetyo)

Over time, a company’s return on capital moves towards its cost of capital. High returns bring competition and new capital, which drives the return on capital toward the cost of capital. Similarly, capital exits low-return industries, which lifts the return on capital toward the cost of capital.

Mauboussin reminds us that a good business is not necessarily a good investment, just as a bad business is not necessarily a bad investment. What matters is the expectations embedded in the current price. If expectations are overly low for a bad business, it can represent a good investment. If expectations are too high for a good business, it may be a poor investment.

On the other hand, some cheap stocks deserve to be cheap and aren’t good investments. And some expensive-looking stocks trading at high multiples may still be good investments if high growth and high return on capital can persist long enough into the future.

 

CONSIDERING COOPERATION AND COMPETITION THROUGH GAME THEORY

A picture of the player and defect squares.

(Illustration: Concept of Prisoner’s Dilemma, by CXJ Jensen via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin quotes Robert Axelrod’sThe Complexity of Cooperation:

What the Prisoner’s Dilemma captures so well is the tension between the advantages of selfishness in the short run versus the need to elicit cooperation from the other player to be successful over the longer run. The very simplicity of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is highly valuable in helping us to discover and appreciate the deep consequences of the fundamental processes involved in dealing with this tension.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma shows that the rational response for an individual company is not necessarily optimal for the industry as a whole.

If the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is going to be repeated many times, then the best strategy is tit-for-tat. Whatever your competitor’s latest move was, copy that for your next move. So if your competitor deviates one time and then cooperates, you deviate one time and then cooperate. Tit-for-tat is both the simplest strategy and also the most effective.

When it comes to market pricing and capacity decisions, competitive markets need not be zero sum. A tit-for-tat strategy is often optimal, and by definition it includes a policing component if your competitor deviates.

 

THE WISDOM AND WHIM OF THE COLLECTIVE

Mauboussin quotes Robert D. Hanson’sDecision Markets:

[Decision markets] pool the information that is known to diverse individuals into a common resource, and have many advantages over standard institutions for information aggregation, such as news media, peer review, trials, and opinion polls. Speculative markets are decentralized and relatively egalitarian, and can offer direct, concise, timely, and precise estimates in answer to questions we pose.

Mauboussin then writes about bees and ants, ending with this comment:

What makes the behavior of social insects like bees and ants so amazing is that there is no central authority, no one directing traffic. Yet the aggregation of simple individuals generates complex, adaptive, and robust results. Colonies forage efficiently, have life cycles, and change behavior as circumstances warrant. These decentralized individuals collectively solve very hard problems, and they do it in a way that is very counterintuitive to the human predilection to command-and-control solutions.

A black and white picture of some electronic circuitry.

(Illustration: Swarm Intelligence, by Farbentek)

Mauboussin again:

Why do decision markets work so well? First, individuals in these markets think they have some edge, so they self-select to participate. Second, traders have an incentive to be right–they can take money from less insightful traders. Third, these markets provide continuous, real-time forecasts–a valuable form of feedback. The result is that decision markets aggregate information across traders, allowing them to solve hard problems more effectively than any individual can.

 

VOX POPULI

A painting of an old man sitting at a table

(Painting: Sir Francis Galton, by Charles Wellington Furse, via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin tells of an experiment by Francis Galton:

Victorian polymath Francis Galton was one of the first to thoroughly document this group-aggregation ability. In a 1907Nature article, “Vox Populi,” Galton describes a contest to guess the weight of an ox at the West of England Fat Stock and Poultry Exhibition in Plymouth. He collected 787 participants who each paid a sixpenny fee to participate. (A small cost to deter practical joking.) According to Galton, some of the competitors were butchers and farmers, likely expert at guessing the weight. He surmised that many others, though, were guided by “such information as they might pick up” or “by their own fancies.”

Galton calculated the median estimate–the vox populi–as well as the mean. He found that the median guess was within 0.8 percent of the correct weight, and that the mean of the guesses was within 0.01 percent. To give a sense of how the answer emerged, Galton showed the full distribution of answers. Simply stated, the errors cancel out and the result is distilled information.

Subsequently, we have seen the vox populi results replicated over and over. Examples include solving a complicated maze, guessing the number of jellybeans in a jar, and finding missing bombs. In each case, the necessary conditions for information aggregation to work include an aggregation mechanism, an incentive to answer correctly, and group heterogeneity.

 

COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS

A diagram of complex adaptive behaviour and emergence.

(Illustration by Acadac, via Wikimedia Commons)

Complex adaptive systems exhibit a number of essential properties and mechanisms, writes Mauboussin:

  • Aggregation. Aggregation is the emergence of complex, large-scale behavior from the collective interactions of many less-complex agents.
  • Adaptive decision rules. Agents within a complex adaptive system take information from the environment, combine it with their own interaction with the environment, and derive decision rules. In turn, various decision rules compete with one another based on their fitness, with the most effective rules surviving.
  • Nonlinearity. In a linear model, the whole equals the sum of the parts. In nonlinear systems, the aggregate behavior is more complicated than would be predicted by totaling the parts.
  • Feedback loops. A feedback system is one in which the output of one iteration becomes the input of the next iteration. Feedback loops can amplify or dampen an effect.

Governments, many corporations, and capital markets are all examples of complex adaptive systems.

Humans have a strong drive to invent a cause for every effect. This has been biologically advantageous for the vast majority of human history. In the past, if we heard a rustling in the grass, we immediately sought safety. There was always some cause for the noise. It virtually never made sense to wait around to see if it was a predator or not.

However, in complex adaptive systems like the stock market, typically there is no simple cause and effect relationship that explains what happens.

For many big moves in the stock market, there is no identifiable cause. But people have such a strong need identify a cause that they make up causes. The press delivers to people what they want: explanations for big moves in the stock market. Usually these explanations are simply made up. They’re false.

 

THE FUTURE OF CONSILIENCE IN INVESTING

A painting of galileo galilei holding his telescope.

(Painting: Galileo Galilei, by Justus Sustermans, via Wikimedia Commons)

Mauboussin, following Charlie Munger, argues that cross-disciplinary research is likely to produce the deepest insights into the workings of companies and markets. Here are some examples:

  • Decision making and neuroscience. Prospect theory–invented by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky–describes how people suffer from cognitive biases when they make decisions under uncertainty. Prospect theory is extremely well-supported by countless experiments. But prospect theory still doesn’t explain why people make the decisions they do. Neuroscience will help with this.
  • Statistical properties of markets–from description to prediction? Stock price changes are not normally distributed–along a bell-shaped curve–but rather follow a power law. The statistical distribution has fat tails, which means there are more extreme moves than would occur under a normal distribution. Once again, a more accurate description is progress. But the next step involves a greater ability to explain and predict the phenomena in question.
  • Agent-based models. Individual differences are important in market outcomes. Feedback mechanisms are also central.
  • Network theory and information flows. Network research involves epidemiology, psychology, sociology, diffusion theory, and competitive strategy. Much progress can be made.
  • Growth and size distribution. There are very few large firms and many small ones. And all large firms experience significantly slower growth once they reach a certain size.
  • Flight simulator for the mind? One of the biggest challenges in investing is that long-term investors don’t get nearly enough feedback. Statistically meaningful feedback for investors typically takes decades to produce.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

How the Greatest Economist Defied Convention and Got Rich


October 15, 2023

John Maynard Keynes is one of the greatest economists of all time. But when he tried to invest on the basis of macroeconomic predictions, he failed. Twice. When he embraced focused value investing, he was wildly successful.

It is well known that Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are two of the greatest value investors, and that they both favor a focused approach. What is not as well known is that the world’s most famous economist, John Maynard Keynes, independently embraced a value investing approach similar to that used by Buffett and Munger.

The story of Keynes’ evolution as an investor has been told many times. One book in particular – Justyn Walsh’s Keynes and the Market (Wiley, 2008) – does a great job.

Keynes did very well over decades as a focused value investor. His best advice:

  • Buy shares when they are cheap in relation to probable intrinsic value;
  • Ignore macro and market predictions, and stay focused on a few individual businesses that you understand and whose management you believe in;
  • Hold those businesses for many years as long as the investment theses are intact;
  • Try to have negatively correlated investments (for example, the stock of a gold miner, says Keynes).

Now for a brief summary of the book.

 

INTELLECTUAL BEGINNINGS

Keynes was born in 1883 in the university town of Cambridge, where his father was an economics fellow and his mother was one of its first female graduates. After attending Eton, in 1902 Keynes won a scholarship to King’s College at Cambridge. There, he became a member of a secret society known as “the Apostles,” which included E. M. Forster, Bertrand Russell, and Wittgenstein. The group was based on principles expressed in G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica. Moore believed the following:

By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.

Upon graduation, Keynes decided to become a Civil Servant, and ended up as a junior clerk in the India Office in 1906. Keynes was also part of the Bloomsbury group, which included artists, writers, and philosophers who met at the house of Virginia Woolf and her siblings. Walsh quotes a Bloomsbury:

We found ourselves living in the springtime of a conscious revolt against the social, political, moral, intellectual, and artistic institutions, beliefs, and standards of our fathers and grandfathers.

 

WORLD WAR I – PEACE TERMS

Keynes strongly disagreed with the proposed peace terms following the conclusion of World War I. He wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace, which was translated into eleven languages. Keynes predicted that the vengeful demands of France (and others) against their enemies would inevitably lead to another world war far worse than the first one. Unfortunately, Keynes was ignored and his prediction turned out to be roughly correct.

 

KEYNES THE SPECULATOR

After resigning from Treasury, Keynes needed a source of income. Given his background in economics and government, he decided that he could make money by speculating on currencies (and later commodities). After a couple of large ups and downs, Keynes ended up losing more than 80% of his net worth in 1928 to 1929 – from 44,000 pounds to 8,000 pounds. His speculative bets on rubber, corn, cotton, and tin declined massively in 1928. Eventually he realized that value investing was a much better way to succeed as an investor.

Keynes made a clear distinction between speculation and value investing. He described speculation as like the newspaper competitions where one had to pick out the faces that the average would pick as the prettiest:

It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice fourth, fifth and higher degrees.

 

KEYNES THE ECONOMIST

Another famous economist, Irving Fisher, who had also done well in business, made his famous prediction in mid-October 1929:

Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau…. I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher… within a few months.

After the initial crash that began in late October 1929, Fisher continued to predict a recovery.

Keynes, on the other hand, was quick to recognize both the deep problems posed by the economic downturn and the necessity for aggressive fiscal policy (contrary to the teachings of classical economics). Keynes said:

The fact is – a fact not yet recognized by the great public – that we are now in the depths of a very severe international slump, a slump which will take its place in history amongst the most acute ever experienced. It will require not merely passive movements of bank rates to lift us out of a depression of this order, but a very active and determined policy.

Keynes argued that the economy was at an underemployment equilibrium, with a large amount of wasted resources. Only aggressive fiscal policy could increase aggregate demand, thereby bringing the economy back to a healthy equilibrium. Classical economists at the time – who disagreed forcefully with Keynes – thought that the economy was like a household: when income declines, one must spend less until the situation corrects itself. Keynes referred to the classical economists as “liquidationists,” because their position implied that everything should be liquidated (at severely depressed and irrational prices) until the economy corrected itself.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt seemed to agree with Keynes. Roosevelt said “this Nation asks for action, and action now.” Roosevelt argued that, if necessary, he would seek “broad Executive power… as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”

In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes disagreed with the conventional doctrine that free markets always produce optimal results. Much later, even Keynes’ opponents agreed with him and admitted that “we are all Keynesians now.”

In the 1970’s, however, when stagflation (slow growth and rising prices) reared its ugly head, neoclassical economics was revived and Keynesian economics became less popular. But by the late 1970’s, another part of Keynes’ views – “animal spirits” – became important in the new field of behavioral economics.

 

KEYNES THE VALUE INVESTOR

Keynes held that there is an irreducible uncertainty regarding most of the future. In the face of great uncertainty, “animals spirits” – or “the spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” – leads people to make decisions and move forward.

Because the future is so uncertain, many investors extrapolate the recent past into the future, which often causes them to make investment mistakes. Moreover, many investors overweight the near term, leading to stock price volatility far in excess of the long-term earnings and dividends produced by the underlying companies. Keynes remarked:

Day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing investments, which are obviously of an ephemeral and non-significant character, tend to have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the market.

Keynes lamented the largely random daily price fluctuations upon which so many investors uselessly focus. Of these fluctuating daily prices, Keynes said that they gave:

… a frequent opportunity to the individual… to revise his commitments. It is as though a farmer, having tapped his barometer after breakfast, could decide to remove his capital from the farming business between 10 and 11 in the morning and reconsider whether he should return to it later in the week.

Warren Buffett has often quoted this statement by Keynes. Indeed, in discussing speculators as opposed to long-term value investors, Keynes sounds a lot like Ben Graham and Warren Buffett. Keynes:

It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public.

Keynes also noted:

… it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism, wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his behavior that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy.

Because many fund managers are judged over shorter periods of time – even a few months – they typically worry more about not underperforming than they do about outperforming. With so many investors – both professional and non-professional – focused on short-term price performance, it’s no surprise that the stock market often overreacts to new information – especially if it’s negative. (The stock market can often underreact to positive information.) Nor is it a surprise that the typical stock price moves around far more than the company’s underlying intrinsic value – asset value or earnings power.

In a nutshell, investor psychology can cause a stock to be priced almost anywhere in the short term, regardless of the intrinsic value of the underlying company. Keynes held that value investors should usually simply ignore these random fluctuations and stay focused on the individual businesses in which they have invested. As Ben Graham, the father of value investing, said in The Intelligent Investor:

Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

Graham also wrote:

The market is fond of making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks. Even a mere lack of interest or enthusiasm may impel a price decline to absurdly low levels. Thus we have what appear to be two major sources of undervaluation: (1) currently disappointing results and (2) protracted neglect or unpopularity.

Or as Buffett said:

Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist.

Buffett later observed that Keynes “began as a market-timer… and converted, after much thought, to value investing.” Whereas the speculator attempts to predict price swings, the value investor patiently waits until irrational price swings have made a stock unusually cheap with respect to probable future earnings. Keynes:

… I am generally trying to look a long way ahead and am prepared to ignore immediate fluctuations, if I am satisfied that the assets and earnings power are there.

 

MARGIN OF SAFETY

Ben Graham, the father of value investing and Warren Buffett’s teacher and mentor, wrote the following in Chapter 20 of The Intelligent Investor:

In the old legend the wise men finally boiled down the history of mortal affairs into the single phrase, ‘This too will pass.’ Confronted with a like challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY.

Keynes used the phrase “safety first” instead of “margin of safety.” Moreover, he had a similar definition of intrinsic value: an estimate based on the probable earnings power of the assets. Keynes realized that a lower price paid relative to intrinsic value simultaneously reduces risk and increases probable profit. The notion that a larger margin of safety means larger profits in general is directly opposed to what is still taught in modern finance: higher investment returns are only achievable through higher risk.

Moreover, Keynes emphasized the importance of non-quantitative factors relevant to investing. Keynes is similar to Graham, Buffett, and Munger in this regard. Munger:

… practically everybody (1) overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and (2) doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important.

Or as Ben Graham stated:

… the combination of precise formulas with highly imprecise assumptions can be used to establish, or rather to justify, practically any value one wishes… in the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics the more uncertain and speculative are the conclusions we draw therefrom.

 

UNCERTAINTY AND PESSIMISM CREATE BARGAINS

The value investor often gains an advantage by having a 3- to 5-year investment time horizon. Because the future is always uncertain, and because so many investors are focused on the next 6 months, numerous bargains become available for long-term investors. As Keynes mentioned:

Very few American investors buy any stock for the sake of something which is going to happen more than six months hence, even though its probability is exceedingly high; and it is out of taking advantage of this psychological peculiarity that most money is made.

Pessimism also creates bargains. During the 1973-1974 bear market, many stocks became ridiculously cheap relative to asset value or earnings power. Buffett has explained the case of The Washington Post Company:

In ’74 you could have bought The Washington Post when the whole company was valued at $80 million. Now at that time the company was debt free, it owned The Washington Post newspaper, it owned Newsweek, it owned the CBS stations in Washington, D.C. and Jacksonville, Florida, the ABC station in Miami, the CBS station in Hartford/New Haven, a half interest in 800,000 acres of timberland in Canada, plus a 200,000-ton-a-year mill up there, a third of the International Herald Tribune, and probably some other things I forgot. If you asked any one of thousands of investment analysts or media specialists about how much those properties were worth, they would have said, if they added them up, they would have come up with $400, $500, $600 million.

 

MARKET LEADERS OR HIGHER QUALITY COMPANIES

Keynes had a policy of buying the best within each chosen investment category:

It is generally a good rule for an investor, having settled on the class of security he prefers – … bank shares or oil shares, or investment trusts, or industrials, or debentures, preferred or ordinary, whatever it may be – to buy only the best within that category.

Buffett, partly through the influence of Charlie Munger, evolved from an investor in quantitatively cheap stocks to an investor in higher quality companies. Munger explains the logic:

Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return than the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns 6 percent on capital over 40 years and you hold if for… 40 years, you’re not going to make much different than 6 percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns 18 percent on capital over 20 or 30 years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with a fine result.

 

FOCUSED AND PATIENT

Keynes was a “focused” value investor in the sense of believing in a highly concentrated portfolio. This is similar to Buffett and Munger (especially when they were managing smaller amounts of money).

Keynes was criticized for taking large positions in his best ideas. Here is one of his responses:

Sorry to have gone too large in Elder Dempster… I was… suffering from my chronic delusion that one good share is safer than ten bad ones, and I am always forgetting that hardly anyone else shares this particular delusion.

If you can understand specific businesses – which is easier to do if you focus on tiny microcap companies – Keynes, Buffett, and Munger all believed that you should take large positions in your best ideas. Keynes called these opportunities “ultra favourites” or “stunners,” while Buffett called them “superstars” and “grand-slam home runs.” As Keynes concluded late in his career:

… it is out of these big units of the small number of securities about which one feels absolutely happy that all one’s profits are made… Out of the ordinary mixed bag of investments nobody ever makes anything.

One way that the best ideas of Keynes, Buffett, and Munger become even larger positions in their portfolios over time is if the investment theses are essentially correct, which eventually leads the stocks to move much higher. Many investors ask: if your best idea becomes an even larger part of the portfolio, shouldn’t you rebalance? Here is Buffett’s response:

To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his portfolio is akin to suggesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan because he has become so important to the team.

The decision about whether to hold a stock should depend only upon your current investment thesis about the company. It doesn’t matter what you paid for it, or whether the stock has increased or decreased recently. What matters is how much free cash flow you think the company will produce over time, and how cheap the stock is now relative to that future free cash flow. What also matters is how cheap the stock is relative to your other ideas.

Keynes again on concentration:

To suppose that safety-first consists in having a small gamble in a large number of different directions…, as compared with a substantial stake in a company where one’s information is adequate, strikes me as a travesty of investment policy.

As time goes on I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence.

Conducting research on a relatively short list of candidates and then concentrating your portfolio on the best ideas, is a form of specialization. Often the stocks in a specific sector will get very cheap when that sector is out of favor. If you’re willing to invest the time to understand the stocks in that sector, you may be able to gain an edge.

Moreover, if you’re an individual investor, it makes sense to focus on tiny microcap companies, which are generally easier to understand and can get extremely cheap because most investors completely ignore them.

Ben Graham often pointed out that patience and courage are essential for contrarian value investing. Cheap stocks are usually neglected or hated because they have terrible short-term problems affecting their earnings and cash flows. Similarly, Keynes held that huge short-term price fluctuations are often irrational with respect to long-term earnings and dividends. Keynes:

… the modern organization of the capital market requires for the holder of quoted equities much more nerve, patience, and fortitude than from the holder of wealth in other forms.

 

SUMMARY

Keynes’ experiences on the stock market read like some sort of morality play – an ambitious young man, laboring under the ancient sin of hubris, loses almost everything in his furious pursuit of wealth; suitably humbled, our protagonist, now wiser for the experience, applies his considerable intellect to the situation and discovers what he believes to be the one true path to stock market success.

Keynes realized that focused value investing is the best way to compound wealth over time. Ignore market and macro predictions, and focus on a few businesses that you can understand and in whose management you believe.

In 1938, in a memorandum written for King’s College Estates Committee, Keynes gave a concise summary of his investment philosophy:

  • A careful selection of a few investments (or a few types of investment) having regard to their cheapness in relation to their probable actual and potential intrinsic value over a period of years ahead and in relation to alternative investments at the time;
  • A steadfast holding of these in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for several years, until either they have fulfilled their promise or it is evident that they were purchased on a mistake;
  • A balanced investment position, i.e., a variety of risks in spite of individual holdings being large, and if possible opposed risks (e.g., a holding of gold shares amongst other equities, since they are likely to move in opposite directions when there are general fluctuations).

Walsh writes that Keynes followed six key investment rules:

  1. Focus on the estimated intrinsic value of a stock – as represented by the projected earnings of the particular security – rather than attempt to divine market trends.
  2. Ensure that a sufficiently large margin of safety – the difference between a stock’s assessed intrinsic value and price – exists in respect of purchased stocks.
  3. Apply independent judgment in valuing stocks, which may often imply a contrarian investment policy.
  4. Limit transaction costs and ignore the distractions of constant price quotation by maintaining a steadfast holding of stocks.
  5. Practice a policy of portfolio concentration by committing relatively large sums of capital to stock market “stunners.”
  6. Maintain the appropriate temperament by balancing “equanimity and patience” with the ability to act decisively.

The importance of temperament and the ability to maintain inner peace should not be overlooked. As Buffett points out:

Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with the 130 IQ… Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing.

Walsh summarizes Keynes’ performance as a value investor:

Taking 1931 as the base year – admittedly a relatively low point in the Fund’s fortunes, but also on the assumption that Keynes’ value investment style began around this time – the Chest Fund recorded a roughly tenfold increase in value in the fifteen years to 1945, compared with a virtual nil return for the Standard & Poor’s 500 Average and a mere doubling of the London industrial index over the same period.

What’s even more impressive is that this performance does not include the income generated by the Chest Fund, all of which was spent on college building works and repayment of loans.

One small mistake Keynes made was holding his “stunners” even when they were overvalued. Keynes made this mistake because he was an optimist. (Buffett made a similar mistake in the late 1990’s.) Here is Keynes (sounding like Buffett) on the future:

There is nothing to be afraid of. On the contrary. The future holds in store for us far more wealth and economic freedom and possibilities of personal life than the past has ever offered.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

A Few Lessons from Sherlock Holmes


September 24, 2023

Peter Bevelin is the author of the great book, Seeking Wisdom: From Darwin to Munger. I wrote about this book here: https://boolefund.com/seeking-wisdom/

Bevelin also wrote a shorter book, A Few Lessons from Sherlock Holmes. I’m a huge fan of Sherlock Holmes. Robert Hagstrom has written an excellent book on Holmes calledThe Detective and the Investor. Here’s my summary of Hagstrom’s book: https://boolefund.com/invest-like-sherlock-holmes/

I highly recommend Hagstrom’s book. But if you’re pressed for time, Bevelin’sA Few Lessons from Sherlock Holmes is worth reading.

Belevin’s book is a collection of quotations. Most of the quotes are from Holmes, but there are also quotes from others, including:

    • Joseph Bell, a Scottish professor of clinical surgery who was Arthur Conan Doyle’s inspiration for Sherlock Holmes
    • Dr. John Watson, Holmes’s assistant
    • Dr. John Evelyn Thorndike, a fictional detective and forensic scientist in stories by R. Austin Freeman
    • Claude Bernard, a French physiologist
    • Charles Darwin, the English naturalist
    • Thomas McRae, an American professor of medicine and colleague of Sir William Osler
    • Michel de Montaigne, a French statesman and philosopher
    • William Osler, a Canadian physician
    • Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., an American physician and author

Sherlock Holmes:

Life is infinitely stranger than anything which the mind of man could invent.

A black and white picture of a man smoking a pipe.

(Illustration of Sherlock Holmes by Sidney Paget, via Wikimedia Commons)

Here’s an outline for this blog post:

    • Some Lessons
    • On Solving a Case–Observation and Inference
    • Observation–Start with collecting facts and follow them where they lead
    • Deduction–What inferences can we draw from our observations and facts?
    • Test Our Theory–If it disagrees with the facts it is wrong
    • Some Other Tools

 

SOME LESSONS

Bevelin quotes the science writer Martin Gardner on Sherlock Holmes:

Like the scientist trying to solve a mystery of nature, Holmes first gathered all the evidence he could that was relevant to his problem. At times, he performed experiments to obtain fresh data. He then surveyed the total evidence in the light of his vast knowledge of crime, and/or sciences relevant to crime, to arrive at the most probable hypothesis. Deductions were made from the hypothesis; then the theory was further tested against new evidence, revised if need be, until finally the truth emerged with a probability approaching certainty.

Bevelin quotes Holmes on the qualities needed to be a good detective:

He has the power of observation and that of deduction. He is only wanting in knowledge, and that may come in time.

It’s important to take a broad view. Holmes:

One’s ideas must be as broad as Nature if they are to interpret Nature.

However, focus only on what is useful. Bevelin quotes Dr. Joseph Bell:

He [Doyle] created a shrewd, quick-sighted, inquisitive man… with plenty of spare time, a retentive memory, and perhaps with the best gift of all–the power of unloading the mind of all burden of trying to remember unnecessary details.

Knowledge of human nature is obviously important. Holmes:

Human nature is a strange mixture, Watson. You see that even a villain and murderer can inspire such affection that his brother turns to suicide when he learns his neck is forfeited.

Holmes again:

Jealousy is a strange transformer of characters.

Bevelin writes that the most learned are not the wisest. Knowledge doesn’t automatically make us wise. Bevelin quotes Montaigne:

Judgment can do without knowledge but not knowledge without judgment.

Learning is lifelong. Holmes:

Like all other arts, the Science of Deduction and Analysis is one which can only be acquired by long and patient study, nor is life long enough to allow any mortal to attain the highest possible perfection in it.

A room filled with lots of books and tables.
Interior view of the famous The Sherlock Holmes Museum on Nov. 14, 2015 in London

 

ON SOLVING A CASE–Observation and Inference

Bevelin quotes Dr. John Evelyn Thorndyke, a fictional detective in stories by R. Austin Freeman:

…I make it a rule, in all cases, to proceed on the strictly classical lines on inductive inquiry–collect facts, make hypotheses, test them and seek for verification. And I always endeavour to keep a perfectly open mind.

Holmes:

We approached the case… with an absolutely blank mind, which is always an advantage. We had formed no theories. We were there simply to observe and to draw inferences from our observations.

Appearances can be deceiving. If someone is likeable, that can cloud one’s judgment. If someone is not likeable, that also can be misleading. Holmes:

It is of the first importance… not to allow your judgment to be biased by personal qualities… The emotional qualities are antagonistic to clear reasoning. I can assure you that the most winning woman I ever knew was hanged for poisoning three little children for their insurance-money, and the most repellant man of my acquaintence is a philanthropist who has spent nearly a quarter of a million on the London poor.

Holmes talking to Watson:

You remember that terrible murderer, Bert Stevens, who wanted us to get him off in ’87? Was there ever a more mild-mannered, Sunday-school young man?

 

OBSERVATION–Start with collecting facts and follow them where they lead

Bevelin quotes Thomas McCrae, an American professor of medicine and colleague of Sir William Osler:

More is missed by not looking than not knowing.

That said, to conduct an investigation one must have a working hypothesis. Bevelin quotes the French physiologist Claude Bernard:

A hypothesis is… the obligatory starting point of all experimental reasoning. Without it no investigation would be possible, and one would learn nothing: one could only pile up barren observations. To experiment without a preconceived idea is to wander aimlessly.

A man sitting in a chair wearing a suit and tie.

(Charles Darwin, Photo by Maull and Polyblank (1855), via Wikimedia Commons)

Bevelin also quotes Charles Darwin:

About thirty years ago there was much talk that geologists ought only to observe and not theorise; and I well remember someone saying that at this rate a man might as well go into a gravel-pit and count the pebbles and describe the colors. How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service!

Holmes:

Let us take that as a working hypothesis and see what it leads us to.

It’s crucial to make sure one has the facts clearly in mind. Bevelin quotes the French statesman and philosopher Montaigne:

I realize that if you ask people to account for “facts,” they usually spend more time finding reasons for them than finding out whether they are true…

Deception, writes Bevelin, has many faces. Montaigne again:

If falsehood, like truth, had only one face, we would be in better shape. For we would take as certain the opposite of what the liar said. But the reverse of truth has a hundred thousand shapes and a limitless field.

Consider why someone might be lying. Holmes:

Why are they lying, and what is the truth which they are trying so hard to conceal? Let us try, Watson, you and I, if we can get behind the lie and reconstruct the truth.

It’s often not clear–especially near the beginning of an investigation–what’s relevant and what’s not. Nonetheless, it’s vital to try to focus on what’s relevant because otherwise one can get bogged down by unnecessary detail. Holmes:

The principal difficulty in your case… lay in the fact of their being too much evidence. What was vital was overlaid and hidden by what was irrelevant. Of all the facts which were presented to us we had to pick just those which we deemed to be essential, and then piece them together in order, so as to reconstruct this very remarkable chain of events.

Holmes again:

It is of the highest importance in the art of detection to be able to recognize out of a number of facts which are incidental and which are vital. Otherwise your energy and attention must be dissipated instead of being concentrated.

Bevelin quotes the Canadian physician William Osler:

The value of experience is not in seeing much, but in seeing wisely.

Observation is a skill one must develop. Most of us are not observant. Holmes:

The world is full of obvious things which nobody by any chance ever observes.

A man in a long coat and tie standing.

(Illustration of Sherlock Holmes by Sidney Paget (1891), via Wikimedia Commons)

Holmes again:

I see no more than you, but I have trained myself to notice what I see.

Small things can have the greatest importance. Several quotes from Holmes:

    • The smallest point may be the most essential.
    • It has long been an axiom of mine that the little things are infinitely the most important.
    • What seems strange to you is only so because you do not follow my train of thought or observe the small facts upon which large inferences may depend.
    • It is just these very simple things which are extremely liable to be overlooked.
    • Never trust general impressions, my boy, but concentrate yourself upon details.

Belevin also quotes Dr. Joseph Bell:

I always impressed over and over again upon all my scholars–Conan Doyle among them–the vast importance of little distinctions, the endless significance of trifles.

Belevin points out that it’s easy to overlook relevant facts. It’s important always to ask if one has overlooked something.

 

DEDUCTION–What inferences can we draw from our observations and facts?

Most people reason forward, predicting what will happen next. But few people reason backward, inferring the causes of the effects one has observed. Holmes:

Most people, if you describe a chain of events to them, will tell you what the result would be. They can put those events together in their minds, and argue from them that something will come to pass. There are few people, however, who, if you told them a result, would be able to evolve from their own inner consciousness what the steps were which led up to that result. This power is what I mean when I talk of reasoning backward, or analytically.

Often the solution is simple. Holmes:

The case has been an interesting one… because it serves to show very clearly how simple the explanation may be of an affair which at first sight seems to be almost inexplicable.

History frequently repeats. Holmes:

They lay all the evidence before me, and I am generally able, by the help of my knowledge of the history of crime, to set them straight. There is a strong family resemblance about misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can’t unravel the thousand and first.

Holmes:

There is nothing new under the sun. It has all been done before.

That said, some cases are unique and different to an extent. But bizarre cases tend to be easier to solve. Holmes:

As a rule… the more bizarre a thing is the less mysterious it proves to be. It is your commonplace, featureless crimes which are really puzzling, just as a commonplace face is the most difficult to identify.

A man is reading a newspaper while another man sits in front of him.

(Illustration of Sherlock Holmes by Sidney Paget, via Wikimedia Commons)

Holmes again:

It is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery. The most commonplace crime is often the most mysterious, because it presents no new or special features from which deductions may be drawn.

If something we expect to see doesn’t happen, that in itself can be a clue. There was one case of a race horse stolen during the night. When Holmes gathered evidence, he learned that the dog didn’t bark. This means the midnight visitor must have been someone the dog knew well.

Moreover, many seemingly isolated facts could provide a solution if they are taken together. Holmes:

You see all these isolated facts, together with many minor ones, all pointed in the same direction.

After enough facts have been gathered, then one can consider each possible hypothesis one at a time. In practice, there are many iterations: new facts are discovered along the way, and new hypotheses are constructed. By carefully excluding each hypothesis that is not possible, eventually one can deduce the hypothesis that is true. Holmes:

That process… starts upon the supposition that when you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth. It may well be that several explanations remain, in which case one tries test after test until one or other of them has a convincing amount of support.

 

TEST OUR THEORY–If it disagrees with the facts it is wrong

What seems obvious can be very misleading. Holmes:

There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact.

“Truth is stranger than fiction,” said Mark Twain. Holmes:

Life is infinitely stranger than anything which the mind of many could invent.

Holmes again:

One should always look for a possible alternative and provide against it. It is the first rule of criminal investigation.

A man sitting on the ground smoking a pipe.

(Illustration of Sherlock Holmes by Sidney Paget, via Wikimedia Commons)

It’s vital to take time to think things through. Watson:

Sherlock Holmes was a man… who, when he had an unsolved problem upon his mind, would go for days, and even for a week, without rest, turning it over, rearranging his facts, looking at it from every point of view until he had either fathomed it or convinced himself that his data were insufficient.

Sometimes doing nothing–or something else–is best when one is waiting for more evidence. Holmes:

I gave my mind a thorough rest by plunging into a chemical analysis. One of our greatest statesmen has said that a change of work is the best rest. So it is.

 

SOME OTHER TOOLS

Bevelin observes the importance of putting oneself in another’s shoes. Holmes:

You’ll get results, Inspector, by always putting yourself in the other fellow’s place, and thinking what you would do yourself. It takes some imagination, but it pays.

Others may be of help. Holmes:

If you will find the facts, perhaps others may find the explanation.

Watson was a great help to Holmes. Watson:

I was a whetstone for his mind. I stimulated him. He liked to think aloud in my presence. His remarks could hardly be said to be made to me–many of them would have been as appropriately addressed to his bedstead–but nonetheless, having formed the habit, it had become in some way helpful that I should register and interject. If I irritated him by a certain methodical slowness in my mentality, that irritation served only to make his own flame-like intuitions and impressions flash up the more vividly and swiftly. Such was my humble role in our alliance.

A man sitting in a chair with another man.

(Illustration of Sherlock Holmes and John Watson by Sidney Paget, via Wikimedia Commons)

Different lines of thought can approximate the truth. Bevelin quotes Dr. Joseph Bell:

There were two of us in the hunt, and when two men set out to find a golf ball in the rough, they expect to come across it where the straight lines marked in their minds’ eye to it, from their original positions, crossed. In the same way, when two men set out to investigate a crime mystery, it is where their researches intersect that we have a result.

Holmes makes the same point:

Now we will take another line of reasoning. When you follow two separate chains of thought, Watson, you will find some point of intersection which should approximate to the truth.

It’s essential to be open to contradictory evidence. Bevelin quotes Charles Darwin:

I have steadily endeavoured to keep my mind free so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved… as soon as facts are shown to be opposed to it.

Mistakes are inevitable. Holmes:

Because I made a blunder, my dear Watson–which is, I am afraid, a more common occurrence than anyone would think who only knew me through your memoirs.

Holmes remarks that every mortal makes mistakes. But the best are able to recognize their mistakes and take corrective action:

Should you care to add the case to your annals, my dear Watson… it can only be as an example of that temporary eclipse to which even the best-balanced mind may be exposed. Such slips are common to all mortals, and the greatest is he who can recognize and repair them.

Bevelin quotes the physician Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.:

The best part of our knowledge is that which teaches us where knowledge leaves off and ignorance begins.

A drawing of an old man in a suit.

(Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., via Wikimedia Commons)

In the investment world, the great investors Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger use the term circle of competence. Here’s Buffett:

What an investor needs is the ability to correctly evaluate selected businesses. Note that word “selected”: You don’t have to be an expert on every company, or even many. You only have to be able to evaluate companies within your circle of competence. The size of that circle is not very important; knowing its boundaries, however, is vital.

Buffett again:

What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don’t know.

Munger:

Knowing what you don’t know is more useful than being brilliant.

Finally, here’s Tom Watson, Sr., the founder of IBM:

I’m no genius. I’m smart in spots–but I stay around those spots.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville


September 17, 2023

According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), stock prices reflect all available information and are thus fairly valued. It’s impossible to get investment results better than the market except by luck.

However, Warren Buffett, arguably the greatest investor of all time and a value investor, has argued that he knows a group of value investors, all of whom have done better than the market over time. Buffett argues that there’s no way every investor in this group could have gotten lucky at the same time. Also, Buffett didn’t pick this group of investors after they already had produced superior performance. Rather, he identified them ahead of time. The only thing these investors had in common was that they believed in the value investing framework, according to which sometimes the price of a stock can be far below the intrinsic value of the business in question.

Buffett presented his argument in 1984. But the logic still holds today. The title of Buffett’s speech was The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville. The speech is still available as an essay here: https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/columbia-business/superinvestors

Despite the unassailable logic and evidence of Buffett’s argument, still today many academic economists and theorists continue to argue that the stock market is efficient and therefore impossible to beat except by luck. These academics therefore argue that investors such as Warren Buffett just got lucky.

Let’s examine Buffett’s essay.

Buffett first says to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. 225 million Americans (the population in 1984) get up at sunrise and bet one dollar on the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called incorrectly. Each day the losers drop out. And the winners bet again the following morning, putting cumulative winnings on the line.

After ten straight days, there will be approximately 220,000 Americans who correctly called ten coin tosses in a row. Each of these participants will have a little more than $1,000.

Buffett writes hilariously:

Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this, human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is, and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.

After another ten days of this daily contest, there will be approximately 215 flippers left who correctly called twenty coin tosses in a row. Each of these contestants will have turned a dollar into $1 million.

Buffett continues:

By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they’ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, “If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”

By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same – 215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.

But then Buffett says:

I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is; if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he’s feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.

Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer – with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States – and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.

Buffett adds:

I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.

Buffett then argues:

In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by random chance…

The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this: they search for discrepancies between thevalueof a business and theprice of small pieces of that business in the market… Our Graham & Dodd investors, needless to say, do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.

As Ben Graham said:

Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis argues that the current value of any stock is already reflected in the price. Value investors, however, don’t believe that. Value investors believe that stock prices areusually correct – the market is usually efficient – butnot always.

Buffett speculates on why there have been so many academic studies of stock prices:

I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior, the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers, there are almost endless data available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the data are there and academicians have worked hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Buffett then proceeds to discuss the group of value investors that he had selected decades before 1984. Why is it that the value investors whom Buffett had identified decades ago before ended up far outperforming the market? The one thing they had in common was that they distinguished between price and value, and they only bought when price was far below value. Other than that, these investors had very little in common. They bought very different stocks from one another and they also had different methods of portfolio construction, with some like Charlie Munger having very concentrated portfolios and others like Walter Schloss having very diversified portfolios.

Buffett shows the records for Walter Schloss, Tom Knapp, Warren Buffett (himself), Bill Ruane, Charlie Munger, Rick Guerin, Stan Perlmeter, and two others. For details on the track records of the value investors Buffett had previously identified, see here: https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/columbia-business/superinvestors

While discussing Rick Guerin, Buffett offered the following interesting comments:

One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn’t take at all. It’s like an inoculation. If it doesn’t grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn’t make any difference. They just don’t seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he’s applying it five minutes later. I’ve never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn’t seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It’s instant recognition, or it is nothing.

And when discussing Stan Perlmeter, Buffett says:

Perlmeter does not own what Walter Schloss owns. He does not own what Bill Ruane owns. These are records made independently. But every time Perlmeter buys a stock it’s because he’s getting more for his money than he’s paying. That’s the only thing he’s thinking about. He’s not looking at quarterly earnings projections, he’s not looking at next year’s earnings, he’s not thinking about what day of the week it is, he doesn’t care what investment research from any place says, he’s not interested in price momentum, volume, or anything. He’s simply asking: What is the business worth?

Buffett then comments on the nine track records he mentioned:

So these are nine records of “coin-flippers” from Graham-and-Doddsville. I haven’t selected them with hindsight from among thousands. It’s not like I am reciting to you the names of a bunch of lottery winners – people I had never heard of before they won the lottery. I selected these men years ago based upon their framework for investment decision-making. I knew what they had been taught and additionally I had some personal knowledge of their intellect, character, and temperament. It’s very important to understand that this group has assumed far less risk than average; note their record in years when the general market was weak. While they differ greatly in style, these investors are, mentally, always buying the business, not buying the stock. A few of them sometimes buy whole businesses far more often they simply buy small pieces of businesses. Their attitude, whether buying all or a tiny piece of a business, is the same. Some of them hold portfolios with dozens of stocks; others concentrate on a handful. But all exploit the difference between the market price of a business and its intrinsic value.

I’m convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

Buffett then discusses risk versus reward. When you are practicing value investing, the lower the price is relative to probable intrinsic value, theless risk there is but simultaneously thegreater upside there is. As Buffett puts it, if you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it’s riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expected reward is greater in the latter case.

Speaking of risk versus reward, Buffett gives an example:

The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million, probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post,Newsweek, plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.

Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it’s riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million.

Buffett adds that you also want to be sure that the managers of the business are reasonably competent. But this is a very doable task.

Buffett concludes his essay by saying that people may wonder why he is writing it in the first place, given that it may create more competitors using value investing. Buffett observes that the secret has been out since 1934, when Ben Graham and David Dodd publishedSecurity Analysis, and yet there has been no trend towards value investing.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

CASE STUDY UPDATE: Atlas Engineered Products (APEUF)


August 27, 2023

I first wrote about Atlas Engineered Products (APEUF) on December 11, 2022, here: https://boolefund.com/case-study-atlas-engineered-products-apeuf/

Since then, the stock has increased 63%, from $0.54 to $0.88. However, the stock is still undervalued and it seems to have a sustainably high ROE (return on equity) of between 26% and 40%, which should allow the business and the stock to compound over time.

Atlas Engineered Products is a leading Canadian manufacturer of engineered wood products, including roof systems and roof trusses, floor systems and floor trusses, and wall panels.

Atlas’s specialist design team uses cutting edge design and engineering technology to ensure that their clients get consistent, accurate, top-quality products.

Atlas has acquired and improved 8 companies since going public in late 2017.

The market for roof systems and trusses, floor systems and trusses, and wall panels, is local because it is too expensive to transport such large items over a long distance. As a result, this market is extremely fragmented. There are hundreds of small regional operators with sales in the range of $3 to $15 million. Many of these operators need succession planning. Atlas thus has an opportunity to continue making acquisitions.

Atlas is providing an opportunity for many of these small operators for succession planning purposes.

At the same time, Atlas can profit from operational efficiences, technological advances, advantages of scale in procurement, and expanded product distribution. (Most small regional operators are unable or unwilling to invest in technology and automation.)

Atlas focuses on the higher added value and most scalable products. It quickly winds down or sells lower margin businesses.

The company aims to sell all of its products at all of its locations. In addition to the core product offering, Atlas is focused on complementary product lines chiefly related to engineered wood. The company also has an ongoing program of equipment upgrade and automation at all of its locations. Moreover, Atlas continues to expand its sales team.

Here is the company’s most recent investor presentation: https://www.atlasengineeredproducts.com/dist/assets/presentation/Investor-Deck-May-2023-Rev-2.3.8-compressed.pdf

Clients choose Atlas Engineered Products:

    • To save money: Atlas is cost effective and efficient, with national buying power and best-in-class design, production, and automation technology.
    • To save time: Offsite customized manufactured roof and floor trusses, and wall panels, can be installed onsite up to 5x’s faster than traditional stick frame construction.
    • For expanded product offerings: Roof, wall, and floor systems, and engineered wood products, offers customers a one-stop product delivery.
    • Atlas is environmentally friendly: it uses less energy to manufacture, and has fewer emissions and waste.

Here are the current multiples:

    • EV/EBITDA = 3.49
    • P/E = 9.16
    • P/B = 2.33
    • P/CF = 3.99
    • P/S = 1.24

Insider ownership is 18.7%, which is very good. TL/TA (total liabilities/total assets) is 41.5%, which is decent.

ROE is 26%, which is quite good. Normalized ROE is likely higher, although ROE would temporarily dip during a recession or slowdown (but Atlas would probably then have more good acquisition opportunities).

Over the longer term, demographics are a tailwind, as the Canadian government plans to admit 500,000 immigrants per year by 2025.

The Piotroski F_score is 7, which is good.

Intrinsic value scenarios:

    • Low case: During a recession and/or a bear market, the stock could fall 50% from $0.88 to $0.44.
    • Mid case: The current EV/EBITDA is 3.49, but in a normal environment it should be at least 6.0. That would mean the stock is worth $1.52, which is 72% above today’s $0.88.
    • High case: If the company can maintain its ROE of between 26% and 40%, while reinvesting most of its profits into both inorganic and organic growth, then Atlas’ profits and stock could continue to compound at a high rate over time.

Risks

The housing market is cyclical. Economies are slowing down as interest rates rise. There will likely be a recession (which would slow down organic growth but increase acquisitions) and/or a bear market.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time.

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.