CASE STUDY: Harbor Diversified (HRBR)

December 18, 2022

Harbor Diversified (HRBR) is the parent company of Air Wisconsin, a major U.S. regional airline.  HRBR just signed a new five-year agreement with American Airlines to provide regional airline services starting in early 2023.

Regional airlines are crucial partners to major global airlines and are cost-effective.  Regional airlines can hire pilots and crews at lower rates.  Regional airlines operate specialized fleets and save on repairs by having dedicated hangars and maintenance crews.

Regional airlines are like a captive supplier somewhat protected from fluctuations in consumer demand by their global airline partners.  Regional airlines operate 41% of all scheduled flights in the U.S. and did better than global airlines during the pandemic because regional airlines don’t rely as much on international or business-class fares.

Here are the current multiples:

    • EV/EBITDA = 0.48
    • P/E = 3.18
    • P/B = 0.44
    • P/CF = 2.27
    • P/S = 0.47

Insider ownership is 43.8%, which is excellent.  TL/TA (total liabilities/total assets) is 52.7%, which is good.  ROE is 19.2%, which is also good.

The Piotroski F_score is 8, which is very good.

Here’s a good writeup on Value Investors Club: https://valueinvestorsclub.com/idea/Harbor_Diversified_Air_Wisconsin/1643658552

Here’s another good writeup on MicroCapClub.com (subscription required): https://microcapclub.com/forums/topic/3093-harbor-diversified-inc-hrbr

Intrinsic value scenarios:

    • Low case: Book value per share is $4.94.  In the worse case scenario, the stock may be worth half of book value.  Half of book value is $2.47 per share.  That is 15% higher than today’s $2.15.
    • Mid case: Under normal circumstances, the stock is worth at least book value per share, which is $4.94.  That is 130% higher than today’s $2.15.
    • High case: The stock is probably worth at least 14x normalized earnings, which are about $20 million.  14 x $20 million comes to $280 million.  Then we add net cash of $67.7 million plus $20 million owed by United.  The total value of HRBR comes to $367.7 million, or $6.70 per share.  That is over 210% higher than today’s $2.15.

Risks

The main risk is that HRBR’s only customer will be American Airlines.  (HRBR’s current contract with United expires in early 2023.)  But the contract starts in early 2023 and lasts for five years.  Also, HRBR has worked with American in the past.  It is likely HRBR will get a new contract five years from now, if not from American than from another airline.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time.

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps.  Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals.  We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio.  The size of each position is determined by its rank.  Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost).  Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approaches intrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods.  We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net).  The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

CASE STUDY: Atlas Engineered Products (APEUF)


December 11, 2022

Atlas Engineered Products operates in Canada’s truss, wall panels, and engineered wood products industry. Atlas has acquired and improved 7 companies since going public in late 2017.

Atlas’s specialist design team uses cutting edge design and engineering technology to ensure that their clients get consistent, accurate, top-quality products.

Here is the company’s most recent investor presentation: https://www.atlasengineeredproducts.com/dist/assets/presentation/AEP_Investor_Deck_Aug_2022-min.pdf

Here is a good writeup on Value Investors Club: https://valueinvestorsclub.com/idea/ATLAS_ENGINEERED_PRODCTS_LTD/5737776840

The market for trusses, wall panels, and modular systems is local because it is too expensive to transport such large items over a long distance. As a result, this market is extremely fragmented. There are hundreds of small regional operators. Many of these operators need succession planning. Atlas thus has an opportunity to continue making acquisitions.

There are clear benefits for Atlas to consolidate this market. These include operational efficiencies, technological advances, advantages of scale in procurement, and expanded product distribution. (Many regional operators are not able to invest in technology and automation.)

Atlas focuses on the higher added value and most scalable products. It quickly winds down or sells lower margin businesses.

Here are the current multiples:

    • EV/EBITDA = 2.00
    • P/E = 5.25
    • P/B = 1.15
    • P/CF = 2.69
    • P/S = 0.80

Insider ownership is 17.7%, which is good. TL/TA (total liabilities/total assets) is 38.4%, which is also good. ROE is 41.1%, which is excellent.

The Piotroski F_score is 8, which is very good.

Intrinsic value scenarios:

    • Low case: During a recession, the stock could fall 50% from $0.54 to $0.27.
    • Mid case: The current EV/EBITDA is 2.0, but in a normal environment it should be at least 6.0. That would mean the stock is worth $1.62, which is 200% above today’s $0.54.
    • High case: Cash flow is likely to keep growing at 30% per year (or more). In five years, cash flow will be 270% higher. If price-to-cash flow doubles to 5.4, then the share price will reach $3.46, which is 540% higher than today’s $0.54.

Risks

The housing market is cyclical. Economies are slowing down as interest rates rise. There will likely be a recession (which would slow down organic growth but increase acquisitions). But over the longer term, demographics are a tailwind.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time.

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

Compound Interest Can Change Your Life


December 4, 2023

Albert Einstein is reputed to have said:

Compound interest is the eighth wonder of the world. He who understands it, earns it; he who doesn’t, pays it.

If you invest today and stay invested, there are two factors that determine how much that investment will be worth in the future:

    • The length of time over which you invest.
    • The average annual rate of return on your investment.

The earlier you start investing, the more time you have to let the magic of compounding work for you.

Also, the higher the average annual rate of return you can get on your investment, the greater the sum you will have later.

 

WHAT IS COMPOUND INTEREST?

If you earn interest on an investment and then reinvest that interest; and if you then earn interest on the new balance (the original principal plus the reinvested interest); and if you then reinvest that interest, etc., that is compound interest.

For example, say you invest $1,000 and say you can earn 4% a year consistently for thirty years.

First, let’s say that you DO NOT reinvest interest.

    • That means each year you will get $40 in interest on your principal of $1,000.
    • At the end of thirty years, you will have gotten $40 in interest thirty times for a total of $1,200 in interest.
    • Your principal plus interest after thirty years will be $2,200.

Now, let’s say youDO reinvest interest.

    • At the end of the first year, you’ll get $40 in interest. Your principal plus interest will be $1,040.
    • Since you reinvest the $40, then in the second year, instead of getting 4% interest on $1,000, you’ll get 4% interest on $1,040. So instead of getting another $40 in interest (4% of $1,000), you’ll get $41.60 in interest (4% of $1,040).
    • At the end of the second year, instead of $1,080 ($1,o00 in principal plus $80 in interest), you’ll have $1,081.60 ($1,o00 in principal plus $81.60 in interest).
    • Since you reinvest the new $41.60, then in the third year, instead of getting $40 in interest (4% of $1,000), you’ll get $43.30 in interest (4% of $1,081.60).
    • At the end of the third year, instead of $1,120 ($1,000 in principal plus $120 in interest), you’ll have $1,124.90 ($1,000 in principal plus $124.90 in interest).
    • So it continues.
    • After thirty years of reinvesting the interest, instead of $1,200 in interest, you’ll have $2,243.40 in interest. So instead of a total of $2,200 ($1,000 in principal plus $1,200 in interest), you’ll have $3,243.40 ($1,000 in principal plus $2,243.40 in interest).

 

THE LENGTH OF TIME OVER WHICH YOU INVEST

The earlier you start investing–that is, the longer the period of time over which you invest–the greater the sum you will end up with.

Consider this example:

    • If you invest $50,000 at 10% a year for twenty years, you will end up with about $336,000.
    • If you invest $50,000 at 10% a year for thirty years, you will end up with about $872,000.

 

THE AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF RETURN

The higher the average annual rate of return you get, the greater the sum you will end up with.

Consider this example:

    • If you invest $50,000 at 10% a year for thirty years, we already saw that you will end up with about $872,000.
    • If you invest $50,000 at 20% a year for thirty years, you will end up with about $11,869,000.

$11.87 million vs. $872,000: This is a stunning difference.

 

WHERE CAN YOU GET 20% A YEAR?

If you invest in an S&P 500 index fund, then over the very long term, you can get approximately 9-10% a year. That is solid.

If you invest systematically in undervalued microcap stocks with improving fundamentals, then you can get approximately 18-20% a year. This is much better, especially if you invest over a long period of time. See: https://boolefund.com/how-to-get-rich/

Please contact me if you would like to learn more.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Psychology of Misjudgment


November 27, 2022

In order to reach our potential as human beings, we have to study our mistakes, including what causes or leads to those mistakes.

Psychologists have identified cognitive biases we all have (from evolution) that regularly lead to mistakes. Here’s a short list:https://boolefund.com/cognitive-biases/

Below is a longer, more comprehensive list of twenty-four psychological tendencies described by Charlie Munger in his talk, “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment.” See: https://fsmisc.s3.ca-central-1.amazonaws.com/great-talks/The+Psychology+of+Human+Misjudment.pdf

Bear in mind this comment by Munger:

Psychological tendencies tend to be both numerous and inseparably intertwined, now and forever, as they interplay in life.

Here are the twenty-four psychological tendencies Munger discusses:

  1. Reward and Punishment Superresponse Tendency
  2. Liking/Loving Tendency
  3. Disliking/Hating Tendency
  4. Doubt-Avoidance Tendency
  5. Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency
  6. Curiosity Tendency
  7. Kantian Fairness Tendency
  8. Envy/Jealousy Tendency
  9. Reciprocation Tendency
  10. Influence-from-Mere Association Tendency
  11. Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial
  12. Excessive Self-Regard Tendency
  13. Overoptimism Tendency
  14. Deprival Superreaction Tendency
  15. Social-Proof Tendency
  16. Contrast-Misreaction Tendency
  17. Stress-Influence Tendency
  18. Availability-Misweighing Tendency
  19. Use-It-or-Lose-It Tendency
  20. Drug-Misinfluence Tendency
  21. Senescence-Misinfluence Tendency
  22. Authority-Misinfluence Tendency
  23. Twaddle-Tendency
  24. Reason-Respecting Tendency

(At the end, Munger gives his answers to a couple of excellent questions, plus a list of good examples to remember.)

 

Introduction

Munger introduces his discussion:

Some psychology professors like to demonstrate the inadequacy of contrast-based perception by having students put one hand in a bucket of hot water and one hand in a bucket of cold water. They are then suddenly asked to remove both hands and place them in a single bucket of room-temperature water. Now, with both hands in the same water, one hand feels as if it has just been put in cold water and the other hand feels as if it has just been placed in hot water. When one thus sees perception so easily fooled by mere contrast, where a simple temperature gauge would make no error, and realizes that cognition mimics perception in being misled by mere contrast, he is well on the way toward understanding, not only how magicians fool one, but also how life will fool one. This can occur, through deliberate human manipulation or otherwise, if one doesn’t take certain precautions against often-wrong effects from generally useful tendencies in his perception and cognition. (pg. 4)

Our psychological tendencies are generally useful, being the result of evolution. But in some situations, these tendencies lead to errors.

 

(1) Reward and Punishment Superresponse Tendency

Munger observes that hardly a year passes when he does not get some surprise from how powerful incentives are.

Never, ever think about something else when you should be thinking about incentives.

Munger:

One of the most important consequences of incentive superpower is what I call ‘incentive caused bias.’ A man has an acculturated nature making him a pretty decent fellow, and yet, driven both consciously and subconsciously by incentives, he drifts into immoral behavior in order to get what he wants, a result he facilitates by rationalizing his bad behavior, like the salesmen at Xerox who harmed customers in order to maximize their sales commissions. (pg. 6)

Munger gives an example of a surgeon who “over the years sent bushel baskets full of normal gall bladders down to the pathology lab in the leading hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska.” One of the doctors who participated in the removals was a family friend (of the Mungers), so Munger asked him if the surgeon in question thought, ‘Here’s a way for me to exercise my talents and make a high living by doing a few maimings and murders every year in the course of routine fraud.’ Munger’s friend answered: ‘Hell no, Charlie. He thought that the gall bladder was the source of all medical evil, and, if you really loved your patients, you couldn’t get that organ out rapidly enough.’

Munger comments:

Now that’s an extreme case, but in lesser strength, the cognitive drift of that surgeon is present in every profession and in every human being. And it causes perfectly terrible behavior. Consider the presentations of brokers selling commercial real estate and businesses. I’ve never seen one that I thought was even with hailing distance of objective truth….

On the other hand, you can use the power of incentives – even using as rewards things you already possess! – to manipulate your own behavior for the better. The business version of ‘Granny’s Rule’ is to force yourself daily to do the unpleasant and necessary tasks first, before rewarding yourself by proceeding to the pleasant tasks.

 

(2) Liking/Loving Tendency

Munger:

One very practical consequence of Liking/Loving Tendency is that it acts as a conditioning device that makes the liker or lover tend (1) to ignore faults of, and comply with wishes of, the object of his affection, (2) to favor people, products, and actions merely associated with the object of his affection (as we shall see when we get to ‘Influence-from-Mere-Association Tendency,’) and (3) to distort other facts to facilitate love. (pg. 9)

We’re naturally biased, so we have to be careful in some situations.

On the other hand, Munger points out that loving admirable persons and ideas can be very beneficial.

…a man who is so constructed that he loves admirable persons and ideas with a special intensity has a huge advantage in life. This blessing came to both Buffett and myself in large measure, sometimes from the same persons and ideas. One common, beneficial example for us both was Warren’s uncle, Fred Buffett, who cheerfully did the endless grocery-store work that Warren and I ended up admiring from a safe distance. Even now, after I have known so many other people, I doubt if it is possible to be a nicer man than Fred Buffett was, and he changed me for the better.

Warren Buffett:

If you tell me who your heroes are, I’ll tell you how you’re gonna turn out. It’s really important in life to have the right heroes. I’ve been very lucky in that I’ve probably had a dozen or so major heroes. And none of them have ever let me down. You want to hang around with people that are better than you are. You will move in the direction of the crowd that you associate with.

 

(3) Disliking/Hating Tendency

Munger notes that Switzerland and the United States have clever political arrangements to “channel” the hatreds and dislikings of individuals and groups into nonlethal patterns including elections.

But the dislikings and hatreds never go away completely… And we also get the extreme popularity of very negative political advertising in the United States.

Munger explains:

Disliking/Hating Tendency also acts as a conditioning device that makes the disliker/hater tend to (1) ignore virtues in the object of dislike, (2) dislike people, products, and actions merely associated with the object of dislike, and (3) distort other facts to facilitate hatred.

Distortion of that kind is often so extreme that miscognition is shockingly large. When the World Trade center was destroyed, many Muslims concluded that the Hindus did it, while many Arabs concluded that the Jews did it. Such factual distortions often make mediation between opponents locked in hatred either difficult or impossible. Mediations between Israelis and Palestinians are difficult because facts in one side’s history overlap very little with facts from the other side’s.

 

(4) Doubt-Avoidance Tendency

Munger says:

The brain of man is programmed with a tendency to quickly remove doubt by reaching some decision. It is easy to see how evolution would make animals, over the course of eons, drift toward such quick elimination of doubt. After all, the one thing that is surely counterproductive for a prey animal that is threatened by a predator is to take a long time in deciding what to do. And so man’s Doubt Avoidance Tendency is quite consistent with the history of his ancient, nonhuman ancestors.

Munger then observes:

What triggers Doubt-Avoidance Tendency? Well, an unthreatened man, thinking of nothing in particular, is not being prompted to remove doubt through rushing to some decision. As we shall see later when we get to Social-Proof Tendency and Stress-Influence Tendency, what usually triggers Doubt-Avoidance Tendency is some combination of puzzlement and stress. Both of these factors naturally occur in facing religious issues. (page 10)

 

(5) Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency

Munger explains:

The brain of man conserves programming space by being reluctant to change, which is a form of inconsistency avoidance. We see this in all human habits, constructive and destructive. Few people can list a lot of bad habits that they have eliminated, and some people cannot identify even one of these. Instead, practically everyone has a great many bad habits he has long maintained despite their being known as bad…. chains of habit that were too light to be felt before they became too heavy to be broken.

If you’re wise, self-improvement is lifelong:

The rare life that is wisely lived has in it many good habits maintained and many bad habits avoided or cured.

Munger:

It is easy to see that a quickly reached conclusion, triggered by Doubt-Avoidance Tendency, when combined with a tendency to resist any change in that conclusion, will naturally cause a lot of errors in cognition for modern man. And so it observably works out. We all deal much with others whom we correctly diagnose as imprisoned in poor conclusions that are maintained by mental habits they formed early and will carry to their graves.

So great is the bad-decision problem caused by Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency that our courts have adopted important strategies against it. For instance, before making decisions, judges and juries are required to hear long and skillful presentations of evidence and argument from the side they will not naturally favor, given their ideas in place. And this helps prevent considerable bad thinking from ‘first conclusion bias.’ Similarly, other modern decision makers will often force groups to consider skillful counterarguments before making decisions.

And proper education is one long exercise in high cognition so that our wisdom becomes strong enough to destroy wrong thinking, maintained by resistance to change.

Munger points out that, as humans, we collect many attitudes and conclusions that are wrong:

And so, people tend to accumulate large mental holdings of fixed conclusions and attitudes that are not often reexamined or changed, even though there is plenty of good evidence that they are wrong.

But we can develop good mental habits by modeling people who excel at minimizing their biases. Munger:

One of the most successful users of an antidote to first conclusion bias was Charles Darwin. He trained himself, early, to intensively consider any evidence tending to disconfirm any hypothesis of his, more so if he thought his hypothesis was a particularly good one. The opposite of what Darwin did is now called confirmation bias, a term of opprobrium. Darwin’s practice came from his acute recognition of man’s natural cognitive faults arising from Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency.He provides a great example of psychological insight correctly used to advance some of the finest mental work ever done.

 

(6) Curiosity Tendency

There is a lot of innate curiosity in mammals, but its nonhuman version is highest among apes and monkeys. Man’s curiosity, in turn, is much stronger than that of his simian relatives. In advanced human civilization, culture greatly increases the effectiveness of curiosity in advancing knowledge… Curiosity, enhanced by the best of modern education… much helps man to prevent or reduce bad consequences arising from other psychological tendencies. The curious are also provided with much fun and wisdom long after formal education has ended.

Munger has long maintained that you should be a learning machine:

I constantly see people rise in life who are not the smartest, sometimes not even the most diligent, but they are learning machines. They go to bed every night a little wiser than they were when they got up and boy does that help, particularly when you have a long run ahead of you.

 

(7) Kantian Fairness Tendency

Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ – a sort of ‘golden rule’ – “that required all humans to follow those behavior patterns that, if followed by all others, would make the surrounding human system work best for everybody. And it is not too much to say that modern acculturated man displays, and expects from others, a lot of fairness as thus defined by Kant.” (page 12)

Munger gives an example:

In a small community having a one-way bridge or tunnel for autos, it is the norm in the United States to see a lot of reciprocal courtesy, despite the absence of signs or signals.

 

(8) Envy/Jealousy Tendency

Envy/jealousy is extreme in myth, religion, and literature wherein, in account after account, it triggers hatred and injury…

And envy/jealousy is also extreme in modern life…

Munger has pointed out that envy is particularly stupid because there’s no upside. Buffett has agreed with Munger on this, adding:

Gluttony is a lot of fun. Lust has its place, too, but we won’t get into that.

Buffett:

It is not greed that drives the world, but envy.

 

(9) Reciprocation Tendency

Munger:

The automatic tendency of humans to reciprocate both favors and disfavors has long been noticed as it is in apes, monkeys, dogs, and many less cognitively gifted animals. The tendency facilitates group cooperation for the benefit of members.

Unfortunately, hostility can get extreme. But we have the ability to train ourselves. Munger:

The standard antidote to one’s overactive hostility is to train oneself to defer reaction. As my smart friend Tom Murphy so frequently says, ‘You can always tell the man off tomorrow, if it is such a good idea.’ (page 13)

Munger then notes that the tendency to reciprocate favor for favor is also very intense. He mentions strange pauses in fighting during wars, caused by some minor courtesy or favor by one side which was then reciprocated by the other side. Furthermore:

It is obvious that commercial trade, a fundamental cause of modern prosperity, is enormously facilitated by man’s innate tendency to reciprocate favors. In trade, enlightened self-interest joining with Reciprocation Tendency results in constructive conduct.

Reciprocation Tendency operates largely subconsciously, like the other tendencies.

Munger mentions an experiment conducted by the psychology professor Robert Cialdini:

…Cialdini caused his ‘compliance practitioners’ to wander around his campus and ask strangers to supervise a bunch of juvenile delinquents on a trip to a zoo… one person in six out of a large sample actually agreed to do this… His practitioners next wandered around the campus asking strangers to devote a big chunk of time every week for two years to the supervision of juvenile delinquents. This ridiculous request got him a one hundred percent rejection rate. But the practitioner had a follow-up question: ‘Will you at least spend one afternoon taking juvenile delinquents to a zoo?’ This raised Cialdini’s former acceptance rate of 1/6 to 1/2 – a tripling.

What Cialdini’s ‘compliance practitioners’ had done was make a small concession, which was reciprocated by a small concession from the other side.

Munger gives an important example from the real world:

The importance and power of reciprocate-favor tendency was also demonstrated in Cialdini’s explanation of the foolish decision of the attorney general of the United States to authorize the Watergate burglary. There, an aggressive subordinate made some extreme proposal for advancing Republican interests… When this ridiculous request was rejected, the subordinate backed off, in gracious concession, to merely asking for consent to a burglary, and the attorney general went along. Cialdini believes that subconscious Reciprocation Tendency thus became one important cause of the resignation of a United States president in the Watergate debacle, and so do I. Reciprocation Tendency subtlely causes many extreme and dangerous consequences, not just on rare occasions but pretty much all the time. (page 14)

But, while the Reciprocation Tendency is often dangerous, on the whole it causes more good than bad, says Munger:

Overall, both inside and outside religions, it seems clear to me that Reciprocation Tendency’s constructive contributions to man far outweigh its destructive effects. In cases of psychological tendencies being used to counter or prevent bad results from one or more other psychological tendencies – for instance, in the case of interventions to end chemical dependency – you will usually find Reciprocation Tendency performing strongly on the constructive side.

And the very best part of human life probably lies in relationships of affection wherein parties are more interested in pleasing than being pleased – a not uncommon outcome in display of reciprocate-favor tendency.

Guilt is also rooted in evolution. But Munger views it as a positive, on the whole:

…To the extent the feeling of guilt has an evolutionary base, I believe the most plausible cause is the mental conflict triggered in one direction by reciprocate-favor tendency and in the opposite direction by reward superresponse tendency pushing one to enjoy one hundred percent of some good thing. Of course, human culture has often greatly boosted the genetic tendency to suffer from feeling of guilt. Most especially, religious culture has imposed hard-to-follow ethical and devotional demands on people… And if you, like me… believe that, averaged out, feelings of guilt do more good than harm, you may join in my special gratitude for reciprocate-favor tendency, no matter how unpleasant you find feelings of guilt.

 

(10) Influence-from-Mere-Association Tendency

Munger observes that advertisers know the power of mere association. For instance, Coca-Cola advertisements strive to associate Coke with happiness.

However, our minds can be misled by random association, as Munger explains:

Some of the most important miscalculations come from what is accidentally associated with one’s past success, or one’s liking and loving, or one’s disliking and hating, which includes a natural hatred for bad news. (page 15)

Munger continues:

To avoid being misled by the mere association of some fact with past success, use this memory clue. Think of Napoleon and Hitler when they invaded Russia after using their armies with much success elsewhere. And there are plenty of mundane examples of results like those of Napoleon and Hitler. For instance, a man foolishly gambles in a casino and yet wins. This unlikely correlation causes him to try the casino again, or again and again, to his horrid detriment. Or a man gets lucky in an odds-against venture headed by an untalented friend. So influenced, he tries again what worked before – with terrible results.

Munger advises:

The proper antidotes to being made such a patsy by past success are (1) to carefully examine each past success, looking for accidental, non-causative factors associated with such success that will tend to mislead as one appraises odds implicit in a proposed new undertaking and (2) to look for dangerous aspects of the new undertaking that were not present when past success occurred.

Hating and disliking also cause miscalculation triggered by mere association. In business, I commonly see people underappraise both the competency and the morals of competitors they dislike. This is a dangerous practice, usually disguised because it occurs on a subconscious basis.

Munger later comments on “Persian Messenger Syndrome”:

…Persian Messenger Syndrome is alive and well in modern life, albeit in less lethal versions. It is actually dangerous in many careers to be a carrier of unwelcome news. Union negotiators and employer representatives often know this, and it leads to many tragedies in labor relations. Sometimes lawyers, knowing their clients will hate them if they recommend an unwelcome but wise settlement, will carry on to disaster…

CBS, in its late heyday, was famous for occurrence of Persian Messenger Syndrome because Chairman Paley was hostile to people who brought him bad news. The result was that Paley lived in a cocoon of unreality, from which he made one bad deal after another, even exchanging a large share of CBS for a company that had to be liquidated shortly thereafter.

 

(11) Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial

Munger says:

This phenomenon first hit me hard in World War II when the superathlete, superstudent son of a family friend flew off over the Atlantic Ocean and never came back. His mother, who was a very sane woman, then refused to believe he was dead. That’s Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial. The reality is too painful to bear, so one distorts the facts until they become bearable. We all do that to some extent, often causing terrible problems. The tendency’s most extreme outcomes are usually mixed up with love, death, and chemical dependency.

 

(12) Excessive Self-Regard Tendency

Excessive self-regard is one of the more obvious tendencies.

We all commonly observe the excessive self-regard of man. He mostly misappraises himself on the high side, like the ninety percent of Swedish drivers that judge themselves to be above average. Such misappraisals also apply to a person’s major ‘possessions.’ One spouse usually overappraises the other spouse. And a man’s children are likewise appraised to be higher by him than they are likely to be in a more objective view. Even man’s minor possessions tend to be overappraised. Once owned, they suddenly become worth more to him than he would pay if they were offered for sale to him and he didn’t already own them. There is a name in psychology for this overappraise-your-own-possessions phenomenon: the ‘endowment effect.’And all man’s decisions are suddenly regarded by him as better than would have been the case just before he made them.

Man’s excess of self-regard typically makes him strongly prefer people like himself… (page 16)

Munger continues:

Some of the worse consequences in modern life come when dysfunctional groups of cliquish persons, dominated by Excessive Self-Regard Tendency, select as new members of their organizations persons who are very much like themselves…

Well, naturally, all forms of excess of self-regard cause much error. How could it be otherwise?

Moreover, says Munger:

Intensify man’s love of his own conclusions by adding the possessory wallop from the ‘endowment effect,’ and you will find that a man who has already bought a pork-belly future on a commodity exchange now foolishly believes, even more strongly than before, in the merits of his speculative bet.

And foolish sports betting, by people who love sports and think they know a lot about relative merits of teams, is a lot more addictive than race track betting – partly because of man’s automatic overappraisal of his own complicated conclusions.

Also extremely counterproductive is man’s tendency to be, time after time, in games of skill, like golf or poker, against people who are obviously much better players. Excessive Self-Regard Tendency diminishes the foolish bettor’s accuracy in appraising his relative degree of talent.

Munger then adds:

More counterproductive yet are man’s appraisals, typically excessive, of the quality of the future service he is to provide to his business. His overappraisal of these prospective contributions will frequently cause disaster.

There is a famous passage somewhere in Tolstoy that illuminates the power of Excessive Self-Regard Tendency. According to Tolstoy, the worst criminals don’t appraise themselves as all that bad. They come to believe either (1) that they didn’t commit their crimes or (2) that, considering the pressures and disadvantages of their lives, it is understandable and forgivable that they behaved as they did and become what they became. (pg. 17)

Munger comments:

The second half of the ‘Tolstoy effect’, where the man makes excuses for his fixable poor performance, instead of providing the fix, is enormously important. Because a majority of mankind will try to get along by making way too many unreasonable excuses for fixable poor performance, it is very important to have personal and institutional antidotes limiting the ravages of such folly. On the personal level a man should try to face the two simple facts:

  • fixable but unfixed bad performance is bad character and tends to create more of itself, causing more damage to the excuse giver with each tolerated instance, and
  • in demanding places, like athletic teams and General Electric, you are almost sure to be discarded in due course if you keep giving excuses instead of behaving as you should.

The best antidote to folly from an excess of self-regard is to force yourself to be more objective when you are thinking about yourself, your family and friends, your property, and the value of your past and future activity. This isn’t easy to do well and won’t work perfectly, but it will work much better than simply letting psychological nature take its normal course.

Most of the time, excessive self-regard harms our ability to make a good decision. If you have an important decision, you have to learn to slow yourself down and be humble. Munger:

You’re less pleasing than you think you are. You know less than you think you do.

It’s easy for us to see the shortcomings in others, but it’s much harder for us to see our own flaws clearly. It’s good to be able to laugh at yourself.

 

(13) Overoptimism Tendency

Demosthenes:

Nothing is easier than self-deceit. For what a man wishes, that also he believes to be true.

Munger suggests:

One standard antidote to foolish optimism is trained, habitual use of the simple probability math of Fermat and Pascal, taught in my youth to high school sophomores. The mental rules of thumb that evolution gives you are not adequate. They resemble the dysfunctional golf grip you would have if you relied on a grip driven by evolution instead of golf lessons. (page 18)

 

(14) Deprival-Superreaction Tendency

Munger states:

The quantity of man’s pleasure from a ten dollar gain does not exactly match the quantity of his displeasure from a ten dollar loss. That is, the loss seems to hurt much more than the gain seems to help. Moreover, if a man almost gets something he greatly wants and has it jerked away from him at the last moment, he will react much as if he had long owned the reward and had it jerked away. I include the natural human reactions to both kinds of loss experience – the loss of the possessed reward and the loss of the almost possessed reward – under one description, Deprival Superreaction Tendency.

In displaying Deprival Superreaction Tendency, man frequently incurs disadvantage by misframing his problems. He will often compare what is near instead of what truly matters. For instance, a man with $10 million in his brokerage account will often be extremely irritated by the loss of $100 out of the $300 in his wallet.

Munger observes:

…A man ordinarily reacts with irrational intensity to even a small loss, or threatened loss, of property, love, friendship, dominated territory, opportunity, status, or any other valued thing. As a natural result, bureaucratic infighting over the threatened loss of dominated territory often causes immense damage to an institution as a whole. This factor among others, accounts for much of the wisdom of Jack Welch’s long fight against bureaucratic ills at General Electric. Few business leaders have ever conducted wiser campaigns.

Deprival-Superreaction Tendency often protects ideological or religious views by triggering dislike and hatred directed toward vocal nonbelievers. This happens, in part, because the ideas of the nonbelievers, if they spread, will diminish the influence of views that are now supported by a comfortable environment including a strong belief-maintenance system. University liberal arts departments, law schools, and business organizations all display plenty of such ideology-based groupthink that rejects almost all conflicting inputs…

It is almost everywhere the case that extremes of ideology are maintained with great intensity and with great antipathy to non-believers, causing extremes of cognitive dysfunction. This happens, I believe, because two psychological tendencies are usually acting concurrently toward this same sad result: (1) Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency, plus (2) Deprival-Superreaction Tendency.

One antidote to intense, deliberate maintenance of groupthink is an extreme culture of courtesy, kept in place despite ideological differences, like the behavior of the justices now serving on the U.S. Supreme Court. Another antidote is to deliberately bring in able and articulate disbelievers of incumbent groupthink….

Even a one-degree loss from a 180-degree view will sometime create enough Deprival-Superreaction Tendency to turn a neighbor into an enemy, as I once observed when I bought a house from one of two neighbors locked into hatred by a tiny tree newly installed by one of them.

Moreoever, says Munger:

Deprival-Superreaction Tendency and Inconsistency-Avoidance Tendency often join to cause one form of business failure. In this form of ruin, a man gradually uses up all his good assets in a fruitless attempt to rescue a big venture going bad. One of the best antidotes to this folly is good poker skill learned young. The teaching value of poker demonstrates that not all effective teaching occurs on a standard academic path.

Deprival-Superreaction Tendency is also a huge contributor to ruin from compulsion to gamble. First, it causes the gambler to have a passion to get even once he has suffered loss, and the passion grows with each loss. Second, the most addictive forms of gambling provide a lot of near misses and each one triggers Deprival-Superreaction Tendency. Some slot machine creators are vicious in exploiting this weakness of man. Electronic machines enable these creators to produce a lot of meaningless bar-bar-lemon results that greatly increase play by fools who think they have very nearly won large rewards. (page 19)

 

(15) Social-Proof Tendency

Munger notes:

The otherwise complex behavior of man is much simplified when he automatically thinks and does what he observes to be thought and done around him. And such followership often works fine…

Psychology professors love Social-Proof Tendency because in their experiments it causes ridiculous results. For instance, if a professor arranges for some stranger to enter an elevator wherein ten ‘compliance practitioners’ are all standing so that they face the rear of the elevator, the stranger will often turn around and do the same.

Of course, like the other tendencies, Social-Proof has an evolutionary basis. If the crowd was running in one direction, typically your best response was to follow.

But, in today’s world, simply copying others often doesn’t make sense. Munger:

And in the highest reaches of business, it is not at all uncommon to find leaders who display followership akin to that of teenagers. If one oil company foolishly buys a mine, other oil companies often quickly join in buying mines. So also if the purchased company makes fertilizer. Both of these oil company buying fads actually bloomed, with bad results.

Of course, it is difficult to identify and correctly weigh all the possible ways to deploy the cash flow of an oil company. So oil company executives, like everyone else, have made many bad decisions that were triggered by discomfort from doubt. Going along with social proof provided by the action of other oil companies ends this discomfort in a natural way. (page 20)

Munger remarks:

When will Social-Proof Tendency be most easily triggered? Here the answer is clear from many experiments: Triggering most readily occurs in the presence of puzzlement or stress, and particularly when both exist.

Because stress intensifies Social-Proof Tendency, disreputable sales organizations, engaged, for instance, in such action as selling swampland to schoolteachers, manipulate targets into situations combining isolation and stress. The isolation strengthens the social proof provided by both the knaves and the people who buy first, and the stress, often increased by fatigue, augments the targets’ susceptibility to the social proof. And, of course, the techniques of our worst ‘religious’ cults imitate those of the knavish salesmen. One cult even used rattlesnakes to heighten the stress felt by conversion targets.

Munger points out that Social-Proof can sometimes be constructive:

Because both bad and good behavior are made contagious by Social-Proof Tendency, it is highly important that human societies (1) stop any bad behavior before it spreads and (2) foster and display all good behavior.

Often people find it difficult to resist the social contagion of bad behavior. Munger:

…And, therefore, we get “Serpico Syndrome,” named to commemorate the state of a near-totally corrupt New York police division joined by Frank Serpico. He was then nearly murdered by gunfire because of his resistance to going along with the corruption in the division. Such corruption was being driven by social proof plus incentives, the combination that creates Serpico Syndrome. The Serpico story should be taught more than it now is because the didactic power of its horror is aimed at a very important evil, driven substantially by a very important force: social proof.

Munger gives another example:

In social proof, it is not only action by others that misleads but also their inaction. In the presence of doubt, inaction by others becomes social proof that inaction is the right course. Thus, the inaction of a great many bystanders led to the death of Kitty Genovese in a famous incident much discussed in introductory psychology courses.

In the ambit of social proof, the outside directors on a corporate board usually display the near ultimate form of inaction. They fail to object to anything much short of an axe murder until some public embarrassment of the board finally causes their intervention…

Typically there are many psychological tendencies operating at the same time – such as Liking/Loving, Disliking/Hating, Doubt-Avoidance, Inconsistency-Avoidance, and Social-Proof. Unchecked, a confluence of such tendencies can lead to extreme situations. Munger gives an example:

…By now the resources spent by Jews, Arabs, and all others over a small amount of disputed land if divided arbitrarily among land claimants, would have made every one better off, even before taking into account any benefit from reduced threat of war, possibly nuclear. (pg. 21)

 

(16) Contrast-Misreaction Tendency

Munger asserts:

Because the nervous system of man does not naturally measure in absolute scientific units, it must rely instead on something simpler. The eyes have a solution that limits their programming needs: the contrast in what is seen is registered. And as in sight, so does it go, largely, in the other senses. Moreover, as perception goes, so goes cognition. The result is man’s Contrast-Misreaction Tendency. Few psychological tendencies do more damage to correct thinking. Small-scale damages involve instances such as man’s buying an overpriced $1,000 leather dashboard merely because the price is so low compared to this concurrent purchase of a $65,000 car. Large-scale damages often ruin lives, as when a wonderful woman having terrible parents marries a man who would be judged satisfactory only in comparison to her parents. Or as when a man takes wife number two who would be appraised all right only in comparison to wife number one.

A particularly reprehensible form of sales practice occurs in the offices of some real estate brokers. A buyer from out of the city, perhaps needing to shift his family there, visits the office with little time available. The salesman deliberately shows the customer three awful houses at ridiculously high prices. Then he shows him a merely bad house at a price only moderately too high. And, boom, the broker often makes an easy sale.

Munger continues:

Contrast-Misreaction Tendency is routinely used to cause disadvantage for customers buying merchandise and services. To make an ordinary price seem low, the vendor will very frequently create a highly artificial price that is much higher than the price always sought, then advertise his standard price as a big reduction from his phony price. Even when people know that this sort of customer manipulation is being attempted, it will often work to trigger buying… [It demonstrates that] being aware of psychological ploys is not a perfect defense. When a man’s steps are consecutively taken toward disaster, with each step being very small, the brain’s Contrast-Misreaction Tendency will often let the man go too far toward disaster to be able to avoid it. This happens because each step presents so small a contrast from his present position.

 

(17) Stress-Influence Tendency

Munger reflects:

Everyone recognizes that sudden stress, for instance from a threat, will cause a rush of adrenaline in the human body, prompting faster and more extreme reaction. And everyone who has taken Psych 101 knows that stress makes Social-Proof Tendency more powerful.

 

(18) Availability-Misweighing Tendency

Munger observes:

Man’s imperfect, limited-capacity brain easily drifts into working with what’s easily available to it. And the brain can’t use what it can’t remember or what it is blocked from recognizing because it is heavily influenced by one or more psychological tendencies bearing strongly on it, as the fellow is influenced by the nearby girl in the song. And so the mind overweighs what is easily available and thus displays Availability-Misweighing Tendency.

Munger mentions antidotes:

The main antidote to miscues from Availability-Misweighing Tendency often involve procedures, including use of checklists, which are almost always helpful.

Another antidote is to behave somewhat like Darwin did when he emphasized disconfirming evidence. What should be done is to especially emphasize factors that don’t produce reams of easily available numbers, instead of drifting mostly or entirely into considering factors that do produce such numbers. Still another antidote is to find and hire some skeptical, articulate people with far-reaching minds to act as advocates for notions that are opposite to the incumbent notions.

If some event is vivid or recent, it will generally be more available. Munger:

One consequence of this tendency is that extra-vivid evidence, being so memorable and thus more available in cognition, should often consciously be underweighed while less vivid evidence should be overweighed.

Munger offers a suggestion:

The great algorithm to remember in dealing with this tendency is simple: An idea or a fact is not worth more merely because it is easily available to you.

(19) Use-It-or-Lose-It Tendency

Munger discusses the importance of practice:

All skills attenuate with disuse… The right antidote to such a loss is to make use of the functional equivalent of the aircraft simulator employed in pilot training. This allows a pilot to continuously practice all of the rarely used skills that he can’t afford to lose.

Throughout his life, a wise man engages in practice of all his useful, rarely used skills, many of them outside his discipline, as a sort of duty to his better self. If he reduces the number of skills he practices and, therefore, the number of skills he retains, he will naturally drift into error from man with a hammer tendency. His learning capacity will also shrink as he creates gaps in the latticework of theory he needs as a framework for understanding new experience. It is also essential for a thinking man to assemble his skills into a checklist that he routinely uses. Any other mode of operation will cause him to miss much that is important. (page 23)

If the skill in question is important enough, gaining fluency is wise, says Munger:

The hard rule of Use-It-or-Lose-It Tendency tempers its harshness for the diligent. If a skill is raised to fluency, rather than merely being crammed in briefly to enable one to pass some test, then the skill (1) will be lost more slowly and (2) will come back faster when refreshed with new learning. These are not minor advantages, and a wise man engaged in learning some important skill will not stop until he is really fluent in it.

 

(20) Drug-Misinfluence Tendency

“This tendency’s destructive power is so widely known to be intense, with frequent tragic consequences for cognition and the outcome of life, that it needs no discussion here to supplement that previously given under ‘Simple, Pain-Avoiding Psychological Denial’.”

 

(21) Senescence-Misinfluence Tendency

All of us naturally decay over time. Munger points out:

But some people remain pretty good in maintaining intensely practiced old skills until late in life, as one can notice in many a bridge tournament.

Loving to learn can help:

Continuous thinking and learning, done with joy, can somewhat help delay what is inevitable.

 

(22) Authority-Misinfluence Tendency

A disturbingly significant portion of copilots will not correct obvious errors made by the pilot during simulation exercises. There are also real world examples of copilots crashing planes because they followed the pilot mindlessly. Munger states:

…Such cases are also given attention in the simulator training of copilots who have to learn to ignore certain really foolish orders from boss pilots because boss pilots will sometimes err disastrously. Even after going through such a training regime, however, copilots in simulator exercises will too often allow the simulated plane to crash because of some extreme and perfectly obvious simulated error of the chief pilot.

Psychologist Stanley Milgram wanted to understand why so many seemingly normal and decent people engaged in horrific, unspeakable acts during World War II. Munger:

After Corporal Hitler had risen to dominate Germany, leading a bunch of believing Lutherans and Catholics into orgies of genocide and other mass destruction, one clever psychology professor, Stanley Milgram, decided to do an experiment to determine exactly how far authority figures could lead ordinary people into gross misbehavior. In this experiment, a man posing as an authority figure, namely a professor governing a respectable experiment, was able to trick a great many ordinary people into giving what they had every reason to believe were massive electric shocks that inflicted heavy torture on innocent fellow citizens. This experiment did demonstrate a terrible result contributed to by Authority-Misinfluence Tendency, but it also demonstrated extreme ignorance in the psychology professoriate right after World War II.

Almost any intelligent person with my checklist of psychological tendencies in his hand would, by simply going down the checklist, have seen that Milgram’s experiment involved about six powerful psychological tendencies acting in confluence to bring about his extreme experimental result. For instance, the person pushing Milgram’s shock lever was given much social proof from presence of inactive bystanders whose silence communicated that his behavior was okay…

 

(23) Twaddle Tendency

Munger mentions:

Man, as a social animal who has the gift of language, is born to prattle and to pour out twaddle that does much damage when serious work is being attempted. Some people produce copious amounts of twaddle and others very little. (page 24)

 

(24) Reason-Respecting Tendency

People naturally love thinking, reasoning, and learning:

There is in man, particularly one in an advanced culture, a natural love of accurate cognition and a joy in its exercise. This accounts for the widespread popularity of crossword puzzles, other puzzles, and bridge and chess columns, as well as all games requiring mental skill.

Always trying to understand WHY things happen is a central part of the learning process, says Munger:

In general, learning is most easily assimilated and used when, life long, people consistently hang their experience, actual and vicarious, on a latticework of theory answering the question: Why? Indeed, the question ‘Why?’ is a sort of Rosetta stone opening up the major potentiality of mental life.

But often we don’t notice when meaningless or incorrect reasons are given:

Unfortunately, Reason-Respecting Tendency is so strong that even a person’s giving of meaningless or incorrect reasons will increase compliance with his orders and requests. This has been demonstrated in psychology experiments wherein ‘compliance practitioners’ successfully jump to the head of the lines in front of copying machines by explaining their reason: ‘I have to make some copies.’ This sort of unfortunate byproduct of Reason-Respecting Tendency is a conditioned reflex, based on a widespread appreciation of the importance of reasons. And, naturally, the practice of laying out various claptrap reasons is much used by commercial and cult ‘compliance practitioners’ to help them get what they don’t deserve.

 

Can you supply a real world model, instead of a Milgram-type controlled psychology experiment, that uses your system to illustrate multiple psychological tendencies interacting in a plausibly diagnosable way?

The answer is yes. One of my favorite cases involves the McDonnell Douglas airliner evacuation test. Before a new airliner can be sold, the government requires that it pass an evacuation test, during which a full load of passengers must get out in some short period of time. The government directs that the test be realistic. So you can’t pass by evacuating only twenty-year-old athletes. So McDonnell Douglas scheduled such a test in a darkened hangar using a lot of old people as evacuees. The passenger cabin was, say, twenty feet above the concrete floor of the hangar and was to be evacuated through moderately flimsy rubber chutes. The first test was made in the morning. There were about twenty very serious injuries, and the evacuation took so long it flunked the time test. So what did McDonnell Douglas next do? It repeated the test in the afternoon, and this time there was another failure, with about twenty more serious injuries, including one case of permanent paralysis.

What psychological tendencies contributed to this terrible result? Well, using my tendency list as a checklist, I come up with the following explanation. Reward-Superresponse Tendency drove McDonnell Douglas to act fast. It couldn’t sell its airliner until it passed the test. Also pushing the company was Doubt-Avoidance Tendency with its natural drive to arrive at a decision and run with it. Then the government’s direction that the test be realistic drove Authority-Misinfluence Tendency into the mischief of causing McDonnell Douglas to overreact by using what was obviously too dangerous a test method. By now the course of action had been decided, so Inconsistency Avoidance Tendency helped preserve the near idiotic plan. When all the old people got to the dark hangar, with its high airline cabin and concrete floor, the situation must have made McDonnell Douglas employees very queasy, but they saw other employees and supervisors not objecting. Social Proof Tendency, therefore, swamped the queasiness. And this allowed continued action as planned, a continuation that was aided by more Authority-Misinfluence Tendency. Then came the disaster of the morning test with its failure, plus serious injuries. McDonnell Douglas ignored the strong disconfirming evidence from the failure of the first test because confirmation bias, aided by the triggering of strong Deprival Superreaction Tendency favored maintaining the original plan. McDonnell Douglas’ Deprival Superreaction Tendency was now like that which causes a gambler, bent on getting even after a huge loss, to make his final big bet. After all, McDonnell Douglas was going to lose a lot if it didn’t pass its test as scheduled. More psychology-based explanation can probably be made, but the foregoing discussion is complete enough to demonstrate the utility of my system when used in checklist mode. (page 26)

 

In the practical world, what good is the thought system laid out in this list of tendencies? Isn’t practical benefit prevented because these psychological tendencies are so thoroughly programmed into the human mind by broad evolution [the combination of genetic and cultural evolution] that we can’t get rid of them?

Well, the answer is that the tendencies are probably more good than bad. Otherwise, they wouldn’t be there, working pretty well for man, given his condition and his limited brain capacity. So the tendencies can’t be simply washed out automatically, and they shouldn’t be. Nevertheless, the psychological thought system described, when properly understood and used, enables the spread of wisdom and good conduct and facilitates the avoidance of disaster. Tendency is not always destiny, and knowing the tendencies and their antidotes can often help prevent trouble that would otherwise occur.

 

Here is a short list of examples reminding us of the great utility of elementary psychological knowledge.

  • Carl Braun’s communication practices.
  • The use of simulators in pilot training.
  • The system of Alcoholics Anonymous.
  • Clinical training methods in medical schools.
  • The rules of the U.S. Constitutional Convention: totally secret meetings, no recorded vote by name until the final vote, votes reversible at any time before the end of the convention, then just one vote on the whole Constitution. These are very clever psychology-respecting rules. If the founders had used a different procedure, many people would have been pushed by various psychological tendencies into inconsistent, hardened positions. The elite founders got our Constitution through by a whisker only because they were psychologically acute.
  • The use of Granny’s incentive-driven rule to manipulate oneself toward better performance of one’s duties.
  • The Harvard Business School’s emphasis on decision trees. When I was young and foolish I used to laugh at the Harvard Business School. I said, ‘They’re teaching twenty-eight year-old people that high school algebra works in real life?’ But later, I wised up and realized that it was very important that they do that to counter some bad effects from psychological tendencies. Better late than never.
  • The use of autopsy equivalents at Johnson & Johnson. At most corporations, if you make an acquisition and it turns out to be a disaster, all the people, paperwork, and presentations that caused the foolish acquisition are quickly forgotten. Nobody wants to be associated with the poor outcome by mentioning it. But at Johnson & Johnson, the rules make everybody revisit old acquisitions, comparing predictions with outcomes. That is a very smart thing to do.
  • The great example of Charles Darwin as he avoided confirmation bias, which has morphed into the extreme anti-confirmation-bias method of the “double blind” studies wisely required in drug research by the FDA.
  • The Warren Buffett rule for open-outcry auctions: Don’t go.

 

Aren’t there factual and reasoning errors in this talk?

The answer is yes, almost surely yes. The final revision was made from memory over about fifty hours by a man eighty-one years old, who never took a course in psychology and has read none of it, except one book on developmental psychology, for nearly fifteen years. Even so. I think the totality of my talk will stand up very well, and I hope all my descendants and friends will carefully consider what I have said. I even hope that more psychology professors will join me in:

  • making heavy use of inversion;
  • driving for a complete description of the psychological system so that it works better as a checklist; and
  • especially emphasizing effects from combinations of psychological tendencies.

 

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Cognitive Biases


November 20, 2022

In the great bookThinking, Fast and Slow(2011), Daniel Kahneman explains in detail two different ways of thinking that human beings use. Kahneman refers to them as System 1 and System 2, which he defines as follows:

System 1: Operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort or sense of voluntary control. Makes instinctual or intuitive decisions – typically based on heuristics.

System 2: Allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations involving logic, math, or statistics. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.

Heuristics are simple rules we use – via System 1 – to form judgments or make decisions. Heuristics are mental shortcuts whereby we simplify a complex situation in order to jump to a quick conclusion.

Most of the time, heuristics work well. We can immediately notice a shadow in the grass, alerting us to the possible presence of a lion. And we can automatically read people’s faces, drive a car on an empty road, do easy math, or understand simple language. (For more on System 1, see the last section of this blog post.)

However, if we face a situation that requires the use of logic, math, or statistics to reach a good judgment or decision, heuristics lead to systematic errors. These errors arecognitive biases.

Let’s examine some of the main cognitive biases:

  • anchoring effect
  • availability bias, vividness bias, recency bias
  • confirmation bias
  • hindsight bias
  • overconfidence
  • narrative fallacy
  • information and overconfidence
  • self-attribution bias

 

ANCHORING EFFECT

anchoring effect: people tend to use any random number as a baseline for estimating an unknown quantity, despite the fact that the unknown quantity is totally unrelated to the random number.

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky did one experiment where they spun a wheel of fortune, but they had secretly programmed the wheel so that it would stop on 10 or 65. After the wheel stopped, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the UN. Participants who saw “10” on the wheel guessed 25% on average, while participants who saw “65” on the wheel guessed 45% on average, ahuge difference.

Behavioral finance expert James Montier has run his own experiment on anchoring. People are asked to write down the last four digits of their phone number. Then they are asked whether the number of doctors in their capital city is higher or lower than the last four digits of their phone number. Results: Those whose last four digits were greater than 7000 on average report 6762 doctors, while those with telephone numbers below 2000 arrived at an average 2270 doctors. (James Montier,Behavioural Investing, Wiley 2007, page 120)

Those are just two experiments out of many. Theanchoring effectis “one of the most reliable and robust results of experimental psychology” (page 119, Kahneman). Furthermore, Montier observes that the anchoring effect is one reason why people cling to financial forecasts, despite the fact that most financial forecasts are either wrong, useless, or impossible to time.

When faced with the unknown, people will grasp onto almost anything. So it is little wonder that an investor will cling to forecasts, despite their uselessness. (Montier, page 120)

 

AVAILABILITY BIAS, VIVIDNESS BIAS,RECENCY BIAS

availability bias: people tend to overweight evidence that comes easily to mind.

Related to the availability bias arevividness biasandrecency bias. People typically overweight facts that are vivid (e.g., plane crashes or shark attacks). People also overweight facts that are recent (partly because they are more vivid).

Note: It’s also natural for people to assume that hard-won evidence or insight must be worth more. But often that’s not true, either.

 

CONFIRMATION BIAS

confirmation bias: people tend to search for, remember, and interpret information in a way that confirms their pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses.

Confirmation bias makes it quite difficult for many people to improve upon or supplant their existing beliefs or hypotheses. This bias also tends to make people overconfident about existing beliefs or hypotheses, since all they can see are supporting data.

We know that our System 1 (intuition) often errors when it comes to forming and testing hypotheses. First of all, System 1 always forms a coherent story (including causality), irrespective of whether there are truly any logical connections at all among various things in experience. Furthermore, when System 1 is facing a hypothesis, it automatically looks for confirming evidence.

But even System 2 – the logical and mathematical system that humans possess and can develop – by nature uses a positive test strategy:

A deliberate search for confirming evidence, known as positive test strategy, is also how System 2 tests a hypothesis. Contrary to the rules of philosophers of science, who advise testing hypotheses by trying to refute them, people (and scientists, quite often) seek data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they currently hold. (page 81, Kahneman)

Thus, the habit of always looking for disconfirming evidence of our hypotheses – especially our “best-loved hypotheses” – is arguably the most important intellectual habit we could develop in the never-ending search for wisdom and knowledge.

Charles Darwin is a wonderful model for people in this regard. Darwin was far from being a genius in terms of IQ. Yet Darwin trained himself always to search for facts and evidence that would contradict his hypotheses. Charlie Munger explains in “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment” (see Poor Charlie’s Alamanack: The Wit and Wisdom of Charles T. Munger, expanded 3rd edition):

One of the most successful users of an antidote to first conclusion bias was Charles Darwin. He trained himself, early, to intensively consider any evidence tending to disconfirm any hypothesis of his, more so if he thought his hypothesis was a particularly good one…He provides a great example of psychological insight correctly used to advance some of the finest mental work ever done.

 

HINDSIGHT BIAS

Hindsight bias: the tendency, after an event has occurred, to see the event as having been predictable, despite there having been little or no objective basis for predicting the event prior to its occurrence.

Hindsight bias is also called the “knew-it-all-along effect” or “creeping determinism.” (See:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias)

Kahneman writes abouthindsight biasas follows:

Your inability to reconstruct past beliefs will inevitably cause you to underestimate the extent to which you were surprised by past events. Baruch Fischhoff first demonstrated this ‘I-knew-it-all-along’ effect, orhindsight bias, when he was a student in Jerusalem. Together with Ruth Beyth (another of our students), Fischhoff conducted a survey before President Richard Nixon visited China and Russia in 1972. The respondents assigned probabilities to fifteen possible outcomes of Nixon’s diplomatic initiatives. Would Mao Zedong agree to meet with Nixon? Might the United States grant diplomatic recognition to China? After decades of enmity, could the United States and the Soviet Union agree on anything significant?

After Nixon’s return from his travels, Fischhoff and Beyth asked the same people to recall the probability that they had originally assigned to each of the fifteen possible outcomes. The results were clear. If an event had actually occurred, people exaggerated the probability that they had assigned to it earlier. If the possible event had not come to pass, the participants erroneously recalled that they had always considered it unlikely. Further experiments showed that people were driven to overstate the accuracy not only of their original predictions but also of those made by others. Similar results have been found for other events that gripped public attention, such as the O.J. Simpson murder trial and the impeachment of President Bill Clinton. The tendency to revise the history of one’s beliefs in light of what actually happened produces a robust cognitive illusion.(pages 202-3, my emphasis)

Concludes Kahneman:

The sense-making machinery of System 1 makes us see the world as more tidy, simple, predictable, and coherent that it really is. The illusion that one has understood the past feeds the further illusion that one can predict and control the future. These illusions are comforting. They reduce the anxiety we would experience if we allowed ourselves to fully acknowledge the uncertainties of existence. (page 204-5, my emphasis)

 

OVERCONFIDENCE

Overconfidence is such as widespread cognitive bias among people that Kahneman devotes Part 3 of his book entirely to this topic. Kahneman says in his introduction:

The difficulties of statistical thinking contribute to the main theme of Part 3, which describes a puzzling limitation of our mind: our excessive confidence in what we believe we know, and our apparent inability to acknowledge the full extent of our ignorance and the uncertainty of the world we live in. We are prone to overestimate how much we understand about the world and to underestimate the role of chance in events. Overconfidence is fed by the illusory certainty of hindsight. My views on this topic have been influenced by Nassim Taleb, the author ofThe Black Swan. (pages 14-5)

Several studies have shownthat roughly 90% of drivers rate themselves as above average. For more on overconfidence, see:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overconfidence_effect

 

NARRATIVE FALLACY

InThe BlackSwan, Nassim Taleb writes the following about thenarrative fallacy:

The narrative fallacy addresses our limited ability to look at sequences of facts without weaving an explanation into them, or, equivalently, forcing a logical link, anarrow of relationship, upon them. Explanations bind facts together. They make them all the more easily remembered; they help themmake more sense. Where this propensity can go wrong is when it increases ourimpressionof understanding. (page 63-4)

The narrative fallacy is central to many of the biases and misjudgments mentioned by Daniel Kahneman and Charlie Munger. The human brain, whether using System 1 (intuition) or System 2 (logic), always looks for or creates logical coherence among random data. Often System 1 is right when it assumes causality; thus, System 1 is generally helpful, thanks to evolution. Furthermore, System 2, by searching for underlying causes or coherence, has, through careful application of the scientific method over centuries, developed a highly useful set of scientific laws by which to explain and predict various phenomena.

The trouble comes when the data or phenomena in question are “highly random” – or inherently unpredictable (at least for the time being). In these areas, System 1 makes predictions that are often very wrong. And even System 2 assumes necessary logical connections when there may not be any – at least, none that can be discovered for some time.

Note: The eighteenth century Scottish philosopher (and psychologist) David Hume was one of the first to clearly recognize the human brain’s insistence on always assuming necessary logical connections in any set of data or phenomena.

 

INFORMATION AND OVERCONFIDENCE

InBehavioural Investing, James Montier explains a study done by Paul Slovic (1973). Eight experienced bookmakers were shown a list of 88 variables found on a typical past performance chart on a horse. Each bookmaker was asked to rank the piece of information by importance.

Then the bookmakers were given data for 40 past races and asked to rank the top five horses in each race. Montier:

Each bookmaker was given the past data in increments of the 5, 10, 20, and 40 variables he had selected as most important. Hence each bookmaker predicted the outcome of each race four times – once for each of the information sets. For each prediction the bookmakers were asked to give a degree of confidence ranking in their forecast. (page 136)

RESULTS:

Accuracy was virtually unchanged, regardless of the number of pieces of information the bookmaker was given (5, 10, 20, then 40).

But confidence skyrocketedas the number of pieces of information increased (5, 10, 20, then 40).

This same result has been found in a variety of areas. As people get more information, the accuracy of their judgments or forecasts typically does not change at all, while their confidence in the accuracy of their judgments or forecasts tends to increase dramatically.

 

SELF-ATTRIBUTION BIAS

self-attribution bias: people tend to attribute good outcomes to their own skill, while blaming bad outcomes on bad luck.

This ego-protective bias prevents people from recognizing and learning from their mistakes. This bias also contributes to overconfidence.

 

MORE ON SYSTEM 1

When we are thinking of who we are, we use System 2 to define ourselves. But, writes Kahneman, System 1 effortlessly originates impressions and feelings that are the main source of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of System 2.

Kahneman lists, “in rough order of complexity,” examples of the automatic activities of System 1:

  • Detect that one object is more distant than another.
  • Orient to the source of a sudden sound.
  • Complete the phrase “Bread and…”
  • Make a “disgust face” when shown a horrible picture.
  • Detect hostility in a voice.
  • Answer 2 + 2 = ?
  • Read words on large billboards.
  • Drive a car on an empty road.
  • Find a strong move in chess (if you are a chess master).
  • Understand simple sentences.
  • Recognize that “a meek and tidy soul with a passion for detail” resembles an occupational stereotype.

Kahneman writes that System 1 and System 2 work quite well generally:

The division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes performance. The arrangement works well most of the time because System 1 is generally very good at what it does: its models of familiar situations are accurate, its short-term predictions are usually accurate as well, and its initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate.

“Thinking fast” usually works fine. System 1 is remarkably good at what it does, thanks to evolution. Kahneman:

System 1 is designed to jump to conclusions from little evidence.

However, when we face situations that are unavoidably complex, System 1 systematically jumps to the wrong conclusions. In these situations, we have to train ourselves to “think slow” and reason our way to a good decision.

For the curious, here’s the most comprehensive list of cognitive biases I’ve seen:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

Who Else Wants to Get Rich?


November 13, 2022

There are many ways to get rich. One of the best ways is through long-term investing.

A wise long-term investment for most investors is an S&P 500 index fund. It’s just simple arithmetic, as Warren Buffett and Jack Bogle frequently observe: https://boolefund.com/warren-buffett-jack-bogle/

But you can do significantly better–roughly 18% per year (instead of 10% per year)–by systematically investing in cheap, solid microcap stocks.

Most professional investors never consider microcaps because their assets under management are too large. Microcaps aren’t as profitable for them. That’s why there continues to be a compelling opportunity for savvy investors. Because microcaps are largely ignored, many get quite cheap on occasion.

Warren Buffett earned the highest returns of his career when he could invest in microcap stocks. Buffett says he’d do the same today if he were managing small sums:https://boolefund.com/buffetts-best-microcap-cigar-butts/

Look at this summary of the CRSP Decile-Based Size and Return Data from 1927 to 2020:

Decile Market Cap-Weighted Returns Equal Weighted Returns Number of Firms (year-end 2020) Mean Firm Size (in millions)
1 9.67% 9.47% 179 145,103
2 10.68% 10.63% 173 25,405
3 11.38% 11.17% 187 12,600
4 11.53% 11.29% 203 6,807
5 12.12% 12.03% 217 4,199
6 11.75% 11.60% 255 2,771
7 12.01% 11.99% 297 1,706
8 12.03% 12.33% 387 888
9 11.55% 12.51% 471 417
10 12.41% 17.27% 1,023 99
9+10 11.71% 15.77% 1,494 199

(CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. You can find the data for various deciles here: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html)

The smallest two deciles–9+10–comprise microcap stocks, which typically are stocks with market caps below $500 million. What stands out is the equal weighted returns of the 9th and 10th size deciles from 1927 to 2020:

Microcap equal weighted returns = 15.8% per year

Large-cap equal weighted returns = ~10% per year

In practice, the annual returns from microcap stocks will be 1-2% lower because of the difficulty (due to illiquidity) of entering and exiting positions. So we should say that an equal weighted microcap approach has returned 14% per year from 1927 to 2020, versus 10% per year for an equal weighted large-cap approach.

 

VALUE SCREEN: +2-3%

By systematically implementing a value screen–e.g., low EV/EBITDA or low P/E–to a microcap strategy, you can add 2-3% per year.

IMPROVING FUNDAMENTALS: +2-3%

You can further boost performance by screening for improving fundamentals. One excellent way to do this is using the Piotroski F_Score, which works best for cheap micro caps. See: https://boolefund.com/joseph-piotroski-value-investing/

 

BOTTOM LINE

If you invest in microcap stocks, you can get about 14% a year. If you also use a simple screen for value, that adds at least 2% a year. If, in addition, you screen for improving fundamentals, that adds at least another 2% a year. So that takes you to 18% a year, which compares quite well to the 10% a year you could get from an S&P 500 index fund.

What’s the difference between 18% a year and 10% a year? If you invest $50,000 at 10% a year for 30 years, you end up with $872,000, which is good. If you invest $50,000 at 18% a year for 30 years, you end up with $7.17 million, which is much better.

Please contact me if you would like to learn more.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck


November 6, 2022

Michael Mauboussin wrote a great book called The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports, and Investing (Harvard Business Press, 2012).

Here’s an outline for this blog post:

    • Understand were you are on the skill-luck continuum
    • Assess sample size, significance, and swans
    • Always consider a null hypothesis
    • Think carefully about feedback and rewards
    • Make use of counterfactuals
    • Develop aids to guide and improve your skill
    • Have a plan for strategic interactions
    • Make reversion to the mean work for you
    • Know your limitations

 

UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU ARE ON THE SKILL-LUCK CONTINUUM

If an activity is mostly skill or mostly luck, it’s generally easy to classify it as such. But many activities are somewhere in-between the two extremes, and it’s often hard to say where it falls on the continuum between pure skill and pure luck.

An activity dominated by skill means that results can be predicted reasonably well. (You do need to consider the rate at which skill changes, though.) A useful statistic is one that is persistent–the current outcome is highly correlated with the previous outcome.

An activity dominated by luck means you need a very large sample to detect the influence of skill. The current outcome is not correlated with the previous outcome.

Obviously the location of an activity on the continuum gives us guidance on how much reversion to the mean is needed in making a prediction. In an activity that is mostly skill, the best estimate for the next outcome is the current outcome. In an activity that is mostly luck, the best guess for the next outcome is close to the base rate (the long-term average), i.e., nearly a full reversion to the mean.

Our minds by nature usually fail to regress to the mean as much as we should. That’s because System 1–the automatic, intuitive part of our brain–invents coherent stories based on causality. This worked fine during most of our evolutionary history. But when luck plays a significant role, there has to be substantial reversion to the mean when predicting the next outcome.

 

ASSESS SAMPLE SIZE, SIGNIFICANCE, AND SWANS

Even trained scientists have a tendency to believe that a small sample of a population is representative of the whole population. But a small sample can deviate meaningfully from the larger population.

If an activity is mostly skill, then a small sample will be representative of the larger population from which it is drawn. If an activity is mostly luck, then a small sample can be significantly different from the larger population. A small sample is not reliable when an activity is mostly luck–we need a large sample in this case in order to glean information.

In business, it would be an error to create a sample of all the companies that used a risky strategy and won, without also taking into account all the companies that used the same strategy and lost. A narrow sample of just the winners would obviously be a biased view of the strategy’s quality.

Also be careful not to confuse statistical significance with economic significance. Mauboussin quotes Deirdre McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak: “Tell me the oomph of your coefficient; and do not confuse it with mere statistical significance.”

Lastly, it’s important to keep in mind that some business strategies can produce a long series of small gains, followed by a huge loss. Most of the large U.S. banks pursued such a strategy from 2003-2007. It would obviously be a big mistake to conclude thata long series of small gains is safe ifin reality it is not.

Another example of ignoring black swans is Long-Term Capital Management. The fund’s actual trades were making about 1% per year. But LTCM argued that these trades had infintessimally small risk, and so they levered the trades at approximately 40:1. Many banks didn’t charge LTCM anything for the loan because LTCM was so highly regarded at the time, having a couple of Nobel Prize winners, etc. Then a black swan arrived–the Asian financial crisis in 1998. LTCM’s trades went against them, and because of the astronomically high leverage, the fund imploded.

 

ALWAYS CONSIDER A NULL HYPOTHESIS

Always compare the outcomes to what would have been generated under the null hypothesis. Many streaks can easily be explained by luck alone.

Mauboussin gives the example of various streaks of funds beating the market. Andrew Mauboussin and Sam Arbesman did a study on this. They assumed that the probability a given fund would beat the S&P 500 Index was equal to the fraction of active funds that beat the index during a given year. For example, 52 percent of funds beat the S&P 500 in 1993, so the null model assigns the same percentage probability that any given fund would beat the market in that year. Mauboussin and Arbesman then ran ten thousand random simulations.

They determined that, under the null model–pure luck and no skill–146.9 funds would have a 5-year market-beating streak, 53.6 funds would have a 6-year streak, 21.4 funds would have a 7-year streak, 7.6 funds would have an 8-year streak, and 3.0 funds would have a 9-year streak. They compared these figures to the actual empirical frequencies: 206 funds had 5-year streaks, 119 had 6-year streaks, 75 had 7-year streaks, 23 had 8-year streaks, and 28 had 9-year streaks.

So there were many more streaks in the empirical data than the null model generated. This meant that some of those streaks involved the existence of skill.

 

THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT FEEDBACK AND REWARDS

Everybody wants to improve. The keys to improving performance include high-quality feedback and proper rewards.

Only a small percentage of people achieve expertise through deliberate practice. Most people hit a performance plateau and are satisfied to stay there. Of course, for many activities–like driving–that’s perfectly fine.

The deliberate practice required to develop true expertise involves a great deal of hard and tedious work. It is not pleasant. It requires thousands of hours of very focused effort. And there must be a lot of timely and accurate feedback in order for someone to keep improving and eventually attain expertise.

Even if you’re not pursuing expertise, the keys to improvement are still focused practice and high-quality feedback.

In activities where skill plays a significant role, actual performance is a reasonable measure of progress. Where luck plays a strong role, the focus must be on the process. Over shorter periods of time–more specifically, over a relatively small number of trials–a good process can lead to bad outcomes, and a bad process can lead to good outcomes. But over time, with a large number of trials, a good process will yield good outcomes overall.

The investment industry struggles in this area. When a strategy does well over a short period of time, quite often it is marketed and new investors flood in. When a strategy does poorly over a short period of time, very often investors leave. Most of the time, these strategies mean revert, so that the funds that just did well do poorly and the funds that just did poorly do well.

Another area that’s gone off-track is rewards for executives. Stock options have become a primary means of rewarding executives. But the payoff from a stock option involves a huge amount of randomness. In the decade of the 1990’s, even poor-performing companies saw their stocks increase a great deal. In the decade of the 2000’s, many high-performing companies saw their stocks stay relatively flat. So stock options on the whole have not distinguished between skill and luck.

A solution would involve having the stock be measured relative to an index or relative to an appropriate peer group. Also, the payoff from options could happen over longer periods of time.

Lastly, although executives–like the CEO–are much more skillful than their junior colleagues, often executive success depends to a large extent on luck while the success of those lower down can be attributed almost entirely to skill. For instance, the overall success of a company may only have a 0.3 correlation with the skill of the CEO. And yet the CEO would be paid as if the company’s success was highly correlated with his or her skill.

 

MAKE USE OF COUNTERFACTUALS

Once we know what happened in history, hindsight bias naturally overcomes us and we forget how unpredictable the world looked beforehand. We come up with reasons to explain past outcomes. The reasons we invent typically make it seem as if the outcomes were inevitable when they may have been anything but.

Mauboussin says a good way to avoid hindsight bias is to engage in counterfactual thinking–a careful consideration of what could have happened but didn’t.

Mauboussin gives an example in Chapter 6 of the book: MusicLab. Fourteen thousand people were randomly divided into 8 groups–each 10% of the total number of people–and one independent group–20% of the total number of people. There were forty-eight songs from unknown bands. In the independent group, each person could listen to each song and then decide to download it based on that alone. In the other 8 groups, for each song, a person would see how many other people in his or her group had already downloaded the song.

You could get a reasonable estimate for the “objective quality” of a song by looking at how the independent group rated them.

But in the 8 “social influence” groups, strange things happened based purely on luck–or which songs were downloaded early on and which were not. For instance, a song “Lockdown” was rated twenty-sixth in the independent group. But it was the number-one hit in one of the social influence worlds and number forty in another.

In brief, to maintain an open mind about the future, it is very helpful to maintain an open mind about the past. We have to work hard to overcome our natural tendency to view what happened as having been inevitable. System 1 always creates a story based on causality–System 1 wants to explain simply what happened and close the case.

If we do the Rain Dance and it rains, then to the human brain, it looks like the dance caused the rain.

But when we engage System 2 (the logical, mathematical part of our brain)–which requires conscious effort–we can come to realize that the Rain Dance didn’t cause the rain.

 

DEVELOP AIDS TO GUIDE AND IMPROVE YOUR SKILL

Depending on where an activity lies on the pure luck to pure skill continuum, there are different ways to improve skill.

When luck predominates, to improve our skill we have to focus on learning the process for making good decisions. A good process must be well grounded in three areas:

  • analytical
  • psychological
  • organizational

In picking an undervalued stock, the analytical part means finding a discrepancy between price and value.

The psychological part of a good process entails an identification of the chief cognitive biases, and techniques to mitigate the influence of these cognitive biases. For example, we all tend to be wildly overconfident when we make predictions. System 1 automatically makes predictions all the time. Usually this is fine. But when the prediction involves a probabilistic area of life–such as an economy, a stock market, or a political situation–System 1 makes errors systematically. In these cases, it is essential to engage System 2 in careful statistical thinking.

The organizational part of a good process should align the interests of principals and agents–for instance, shareholders (principals) and executives (agents). If the executives own a large chunk of stock, then their interests are much more aligned with shareholder interests.

Now consider the middle of the continuum between luck and skill. In this area, a checklist can be very useful. A doctor caring for a patient is focused on the primary problem and can easily forget about the simple steps required to minimize infections. Following the suggestion of Peter Pronovost, many hospitals have introduced simple checklists. Thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars have been saved, as the checklists have significantly reduced infections and deaths related to infections.

A checklist can also help in a stressful situation. The chemicals of stress disrupt the functioning of the frontal lobes–the seat of reason. So a READ-DO checklist gets you to take the concrete, important steps even when you’re not thinking clearly.

Writes Mauboussin:

Checklists have never been shown to hurt performance in any field, and they have helped results in a great many instances.

Finally, anyone serious about improving their performance should write down–if possible–the basis for every decision and then measure honestly how each decision turned out. This careful measurement is the foundationfor continual improvement.

The last category involves activities that are mostly skill. The key to improvement is deliberate practice and good feedback. A good coach can be a great help.

Even experts benefit from a good coach. Feedback is the single most powerful way to improve skill. Being open to honest feedback is difficult because it means being willing to admit where we need to change.

Mauboussin concludes:

One simple and inexpensive technique for getting feedback is to keep a journal that tracks your decisions. Whenever you make a decision, write down what you decided, how you came to that decision, and what you expect to happen. Then, when the results of that decision are clear, write them down and compare them with what you thought would happen. The journal won’t lie. You’ll see when you’re wrong. Change your behavior accordingly.

 

HAVE A PLAN FOR STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS

The weaker side won more conflicts in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. This is because the underdogs learned not to go toe-to-toe with a stronger foe. Instead, the underdogs pursued alternative tactics, like guerrilla warfare. If you’re an underdog, complicate the game by injecting more luck.

Initially weaker companies almost never succeed by taking on established companies in their core markets. But, by pursuing disruptive innovation–as described by Professor Clayton Christensen–weaker companies can overcome stronger companies. The weaker companies pursue what is initially a low-margin part of the market. The stronger companies have no incentive to invest in low-margin innovation when they have healthy margins in more established areas. But over time, the low-margin technology improves to the point where demand for it increases and profit margins typically follow. By then, the younger companies are already ahead by a few of years, and the more established companies usually are unable to catch up.

 

MAKE REVERSION TO THE MEAN WORK FOR YOU

Mauboussin writes:

We are all in the business of forecasting.

Reversion to the mean is difficult for our brains to understand. As noted, System 1 always invents a cause for everything that happens. But often there is no specific cause.

Mauboussin cites an example given by Daniel Kahneman: Julie is a senior in college who read fluently when she was four years old. Estimate her GPA.

People often guess a GPA of around 3.7. Most people assume that being precocious is correlated with doing well in college. But it turns out that reading at a young age is not related to doing well in college. That means the best guess for the GPA would be much closer to the average.

Mauboussin adds:

Reversion to the mean is most pronounced at the extremes, so the first lesson is to recognize that when you see extremely good or bad results, they are unlikely to continue that way. This doesn’t mean that good results will necessarily be followed by bad results, or vice versa, but rather that the next thing that happens will probably be closer to the average of all things that happen.

KNOW YOUR LIMITATIONS

There is always a great deal that we simply don’t know and can’t know. We must develop and maintain a healthy sense of humility.

Predictions are often difficult in many situations. The sample size and the length of time over which you measure are essential. And you need valid data.

Moreover, things can change. If fiscal policy has become much more stimulative than it used to be, then bear markets may–or may not–be shallower and shorter. Andstocks may generally be higher than previously, as Ben Graham pointed out in a 1963 lecture, “Securities in an Insecure World”: http://jasonzweig.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/BG-speech-SF-1963.pdf

If monetary policy is much more stimulative than before–including a great deal of money-printing and zero or negative interest rates–then the long-term average of stock prices could conceivably make another jump higher.

The two fundamental changes just mentioned are part of why most great value investors never try to time the market. As Buffett has said:

  • Forecasts may tell you a great deal about the forecaster; they tell you nothing about the future.
  • I make no effort to predict the course of general business or the stock market. Period.
  • I don’t invest a dime based on macro forecasts.

Henry Singleton–who has one of the best capital allocation records of all time–perhaps put it best:

I don’t believe all this nonsense about market timing. Just buy very good value and when the market is ready that value will be recognized.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Ugliest Stocks Are the Best Stocks


October 16, 2022

Quantitative value investor Tobias Carlisle has written an excellent book entitled Deep Value: Why Activists and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of LOSING Corporations (Wiley, 2014).

The book has many important and counterintuitive lessons for quantitative value investors. This blog post is a brief summary of some chief lessons.

 

UGLY VALUE STOCKS OUTPERFORM

Companies with low growth or no growth that are trading at cheap valuations significantly outperform companies with high growth. In other words, as a group, companies that have been doing terribly and that are trading at cheap prices – seemingly justifiably – do much better than companies that have been doing well and growing fast.

It’s important to note that these findings apply to groups of stocks, not individual stocks. Cheap value stocks, as a group (and as a portfolio), significantly outperform companies that have been doing well and whose stocks have been doing well. Moreover, in states of the world including bear markets and recessions, value stocks do better than growth stocks. So value stocks are less risky as a group than growth stocks.

On an individual level, a value stock is riskier than an average stock. Whereas an average stock has a 50% chance of underperforming the market, a value stock – if it is just chosen based on cheapness alone, without additional criteria – has a greater than 50% chance of underperforming the market. But as a group (and as a portfolio), value stocks – when compared to either growth stocks or average stocks – are less risky and perform better over time.

If you are following a deep value approach, there are additional criteria that you can apply in the stock selection process to reduce the percentage of deep value stocks that underperform the market. One example is the Piotroski F-Score, which identifies companies that show improving fundamentals (e.g., increased cash flows or reduced debt levels). Joseph Piotroski came up with the F-Score because he discovered that while value stocks outperform as a group, there are many individual value stocks dragging down the overall performance of the value portfolio.

In sum, a portfolio of ugly value stocks far outperforms the market over time. Remarkably, this already significant outperformance can be noticeably improved by using the Piotroski F-Score to cut off the left tail of the return distribution. See: https://boolefund.com/joseph-piotroski-value-investing/

 

STAGNANT VALUE OUTPERFORMS GROWING VALUE

If you only look at value stocks, which as a group outperform, doesn’t it make sense to focus on the cheap stocks where the companies have been doing well – in terms of growth – rather than the cheap stocks where the companies have been doing terribly? No. Carlisle comments:

This is a fascinating finding. Intuitively, we are attracted to high growth and would assume that high-growth value stocks are high-quality stocks available at a bargain price. The data show, however, that the low- or no-growth value stocks are the better bet. It seems that the uglier the stock, the better the return, even when the valuations are comparable.

This same logic also applies to excellent, A+ companies versus unexcellent, D companies. Carlisle again:

Buying well-run companies with good businesses seems to make so much sense. Buying well-run companies with good businesses at bargain prices seems to make even more sense. The research shows, however, that the better investment – rather than the better company – is the value stock, the scorned, the unexcellent, the Ds, the loss-making net nets. And the better value stock, according to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s research, is the low- or ­no-growth value stock, what they describe as ‘contrarian value,’ and what I regard as deep value; the ugliest of the ugly.

Link to the famous 1994 paper by Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/contrarianinvestment.pdf?m=1360042367

 

QUANTITATIVE DEEP VALUE

Investing in general is difficult to do effectively, which is why Warren Buffett advises most people to invest in low-cost index funds.

Deep value investing can be even more difficult because it requires consistently buying what everyone else hates – the ugliest, the worst, the cheapest stocks available. Deep value stocks are almost always facing enormous business problems, and quite often the industries in which deep value stocks are found are doing horribly.

Thus, the best way for most investors to benefit from deep value stocks is to use a quantitative (statistical) approach. Carlisle explains:

Most deeply undervalued, fundamentally weak stocks are that way because their futures appear uncertain – they are losing money or marginally profitable – and, on an individual basis, don’t appear to be good candidates for purchase. We know, however, that in aggregate they provide excellent returns, outperforming the market in the long run and suffering fewer down years than the market. This is an area where our native intuition fails us. As we have seen, no matter how well trained we are, humans tend to have difficulty with probabilistic, uncertain, and random processes… Since the 1950s, social scientists have been comparing the predictive abilities of traditional experts and what are known are statistical prediction rules. The studies have found almost uniformly that statistical prediction rules are more consistently accurate than the very best experts.

I wrote about this here: https://boolefund.com/simple-quant-models-beat-experts-in-a-wide-variety-of-areas/

The conclusion is that, for a surprisingly wide range of prediction problems – including investing – statistical prediction rules are more reliable than human experts. Many people have objected that experts could do better than simple statistical prediction rules if they had the ability to override the rule in specific cases. But this turns out not to be true. The statistical prediction rules are a ceiling from which the expert detracts rather than a floor to which the expert adds.

As Daniel Kahneman explains so well in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow – see especially Part III – we humans are generally very overconfident about our ability to predict the future. Philip Tetlock did a landmark, 20-year study of experts making political and economic predictions. What Tetlock found based on more than 27,000 predictions over the course of two decades is that the experts were little better than chance. See Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, 2005).

People, especially experts, are simply way overconfident about their ability to predict many future events. Even Kahneman himself, after spending most of his life studying overconfidence, admits that he is “wildly overconfident” by nature, just like most people. Overconfidence is related to many cognitive biases that people have, especially hindsight bias:https://boolefund.com/cognitive-biases/

Statistical Prediction Rules Applied to Deep Value Investing

If you don’t understand value investing – or if trailing the market for a couple of years would make you abandon a value strategy – then your best long-term investment is a low-cost broad market index fund. Such an index fund will allow you to beat 85-90% of all investors over the course of several decades. And it takes very little time to implement and maintain this approach.

If you understand value investing, then you should consider a quantitative value fund. A quantitative value fund – like the Boole Microcap Fund – is a fund that systematically picks cheap stocks. Typically, systematic stock selection is fully automated, thereby maximizing long-term results by minimizing human error.

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

How to Get Rich


October 9, 2022

There are many ways to get rich. One of the best ways is through long-term investing.

A wise long-term investment for most investors is an S&P 500 index fund. It’s just simple arithmetic, as Warren Buffett and Jack Bogle frequently observe: https://boolefund.com/warren-buffett-jack-bogle/

But you can do significantly better–roughly 18% per year (instead of 10% per year)–by systematically investing in cheap, solid microcap stocks.

Most professional investors never consider microcaps because their assets under management are too large. Microcaps aren’t as profitable for them. That’s why there continues to be a compelling opportunity for savvy investors. Because microcaps are largely ignored, many get quite cheap on occasion.

Warren Buffett earned the highest returns of his career when he could invest in microcap stocks. Buffett says he’d do the same today if he were managing small sums:https://boolefund.com/buffetts-best-microcap-cigar-butts/

Look at this summary of the CRSP Decile-Based Size and Return Data from 1927 to 2020:

Decile Market Cap-Weighted Returns Equal Weighted Returns Number of Firms (year-end 2020) Mean Firm Size (in millions)
1 9.67% 9.47% 179 145,103
2 10.68% 10.63% 173 25,405
3 11.38% 11.17% 187 12,600
4 11.53% 11.29% 203 6,807
5 12.12% 12.03% 217 4,199
6 11.75% 11.60% 255 2,771
7 12.01% 11.99% 297 1,706
8 12.03% 12.33% 387 888
9 11.55% 12.51% 471 417
10 12.41% 17.27% 1,023 99
9+10 11.71% 15.77% 1,494 199

(CRSP is the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. You can find the data for various deciles here: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html)

The smallest two deciles–9+10–comprise microcap stocks, which typically are stocks with market caps below $500 million. What stands out is the equal weighted returns of the 9th and 10th size deciles from 1927 to 2020:

Microcap equal weighted returns = 15.8% per year

Large-cap equal weighted returns = ~10% per year

In practice, the annual returns from microcap stocks will be 1-2% lower because of the difficulty (due to illiquidity) of entering and exiting positions. So we should say that an equal weighted microcap approach has returned 14% per year from 1927 to 2020, versus 10% per year for an equal weighted large-cap approach.

 

VALUE SCREEN: +2-3%

By systematically implementing a value screen–e.g., low EV/EBITDA or low P/E–to a microcap strategy, you can add 2-3% per year.

IMPROVING FUNDAMENTALS: +2-3%

You can further boost performance by screening for improving fundamentals. One excellent way to do this is using the Piotroski F_Score, which works best for cheap micro caps. See: https://boolefund.com/joseph-piotroski-value-investing/

 

BOTTOM LINE

If you invest in microcap stocks, you can get about 14% a year. If you also use a simple screen for value, that adds at least 2% a year. If, in addition, you screen for improving fundamentals, that adds at least another 2% a year. So that takes you to 18% a year, which compares quite well to the 10% a year you could get from an S&P 500 index fund.

What’s the difference between 18% a year and 10% a year? If you invest $50,000 at 10% a year for 30 years, you end up with $872,000, which is good. If you invest $50,000 at 18% a year for 30 years, you end up with $7.17 million, which is much better.

Please contact me if you would like to learn more.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.

The Intelligent Investor


October 2, 2022

Warren Buffett, arguably the greatest investor of all time, was the only student to whom professor Ben Graham gave an A+ for the course he taught on security analysis at Columbia University. Buffett later worked for Graham for a couple of years. Graham was a teacher, a mentor, and a friend to Buffett. Buffett said about Ben Graham’s The Intelligent Investor:

Chapters 8 and 20 have been the bedrock of my investing activities for more than 60 years. I suggest that all investors read those chapters and reread them every time the market has been especially strong or weak.

A man in suit and tie sitting at a table.

(Ben Graham, by Equim43 via Wikimedia Commons)

 

CHAPTER 8: THE INVESTOR AND MARKET FLUCTUATIONS

Graham notes that stock prices fluctuate widely, and the intelligent investor should be interested in profiting from these swings. Graham says there are two ways to do this: timing and pricing. Timing is an attempt to predict stock prices. Graham:

By pricing we mean the endeavor to buy stocks when they are quoted below their fair value and to sell them when they rise above such value.

Note that fair value, also called intrinsic value, is how much a knowledgeable buyer would pay for a business, based either upon how much the business can earn or based upon the balance sheet of the business.

Graham continues by noting that trying to time the market is speculation, and will not result in profits over the long term. Many investors feel compelled to listen to stock market forecasts. But, says Graham:

There is no basis either in logic or in experience for assuming that any typical or average investor can anticipate market movements more successfully than the general public, of which he is himself a part.

This is understating the case. There is no evidence that any individual forecaster has been able to consistently predict the short-term movements of the stock market.

A man in a suit and tie holding a telescope.
Illustration by Maxim Popov

Graham points out that one factor that leads the speculator to rely on shorter-term stock market predictions is that the speculator is in a hurry to make money. An investor, by contrast, does not mind waiting one year or several years for a sound investment to pay off.

Furthermore, timing formulas based on the past tend not to work as well in the future, as Graham explains:

Those formulas that gain adherents and importance do so because they have worked well over a period, or sometimes merely because they have been plausibly adapted to the statistical record of the past. But as their acceptance increases, their reliability tends to diminish. This happens for two reasons: First, the passage of time brings new conditions which the old formula no longer fits. Second, in stock-market affairs the popularity of a trading theory has itself an influence on the market’s behavior which detracts in the long run from its profit-making possibilities.

Graham writes of several theories that tried to identify buying conditions and selling conditions in the market. Even Graham himself developed a “central value method.” However, says Graham:

The moral seems to be that any approach to moneymaking in the stock market which can be easily described and followed by a lot of people is by its terms too simple and too easy to last.

An an investor, one should expect wide fluctuations in stock prices. But what do you do after stock prices have advanced a great deal? Graham:

But has the price risentoo high, and should you think of selling? Or should you kick yourself for not having bought more shares when the level was lower? Orworst thought of allshould you now give way to the bull-market atmosphere, become infected with the enthusiasm, the overconfidence and the greed of the great public (of which, after all, you are a part), and make larger and dangerous commitments? Presented thus in print, the answer to the last question is a self-evident no, but even the intelligent investor is likely to need considerable will power to keep from following the crowd.

Graham continues:

It is for these reasons of human nature, even more than by calculation of financial gain or loss, that we favor some kind of mechanical method for varying the proportion of bonds to stocks in the investor’s portfolio. The chief advantage, perhaps, is that such a formula will give himsomething to do. As the market advances he will from time to time make sales out of his stockholdings, putting the proceeds into bonds; as it declines he will reverse the procedure. These activities will provide him some outlet for his otherwise too-pent-up energies. If he is the right kind of investor he will take added satisfaction from the thought that his operations are exactly opposite from those of the crowd.

Business Valuations versus Stock-Market Valuations

Graham writes:

The impact of market fluctuations upon the investor’s true situation may be considered also from the standpoint of the shareholder as the part owner of various businesses. The holder of marketable shares actually has a double status, and with it the privilege of taking advantage of either at his choice. On the one hand his position is analogous to that of a minority shareholder or silent partner in a private business. Here his results are entirely dependent on the profits of the enterprise or on a change in the underlying value of its assets. He would usually determine the value of such a private-business interest by calculating his share of the net worth as shown in the most recent balance sheet. On the other hand, the common-stock investor holds a piece of paper, an engraved stock certificate, which can be sold in a matter of minutes at a price which varies from moment to momentwhen the market is open, that isand often is far removed from the balance-sheet value.

Graham goes on to note that many successful businesses sell above their net worth. (Note that net worth is also called book value, balance-sheet value, asset value, net asset value, and tangible book value.) In this sense, Graham considers such businesses speculative as compared to unspectacular businesses selling at book value or below. (It should be noted that businesses with a sustainably high ROICreturn on invested capitalshould sell above book value. Some successful technology companies fall into this category.)

Graham:

The previous discussion leads us to a conclusion of practical importance to the conservative investor in common stocks. If he is to pay some special attention to the selection of his portfolio, it might be best for him to concentrate on issues selling at a reasonably close approximation to their tangible-asset valuesay, at not more than one-third above that figure. Purchases made at such levels, or lower, may with logic be regarded as related to the company’s balance sheet, and as having a justification or support independent of the fluctuating market prices….

A person is writing on paper with a pen and calculator.

(Illustration byTeguh Jati Prasetyo)

Graham adds:

A caution is needed here. A stock does not become a sound investment merely because it can be bought at close to its asset value. The investor should demand, in addition, a satisfactory ratio of earnings to price, a sufficiently strong financial position, and the prospect that its earnings will at least be maintained over the years. This may appear like demanding a lot from a modestly priced stock, but the prescription is not hard to fill under all but dangerously high market conditions. Once the investor is willing to forgo brilliant prospectsi.e., better than average expected growthhe will have no difficulty in finding a wide selection of issues meeting these criteria.

Graham then makes a central point:

The investor with a stock portfolio having such book values behind it can take a much more independent and detached view of stock-market fluctuations than those who have paid high multiples of both earnings and tangible assets. As long as the earning power of his holdings remains satisfactory, he can give as little attention as he pleases to the vagaries of the stock market. More than that, at times he can use these vagaries to play the master game of buying low and selling high.

The A. & P. Example

Graham gives the example of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. The shares sold as high as $494 in 1929, and ended up declining to a new low of $36 in 1938. At that price, the company had a market capitalization of of $126 million, which was lower than its net current assets of $134 million. Essentially, the company was selling below net cash, which is cash minus all liabilities. So its value as a going concern was lower than its value in a liquidation would be. Graham explains:

Why? First, because there were threats of special taxes on chain stores; second, because net profits had fallen off in the previous year; and, third, because the general market was depressed. The first of these reasons was an exaggerated and eventually groundless fear; the other two were typical of temporary influences.

What about the investor who bought at $80 in 1937? Graham says the investor should carefully have studied the situation, but should have concluded that the market price was a temporary vagary. In fact, the investor should have bought more if he had the funds and the courage to do so.

By 1939, A. & P. was selling at $117.5. In the years following 1949, A. & P. continued to advance, eventually reaching a split-adjusted price of $705. At that price, the stock had a price-to-earnings ratio of 30, which implied that holders of the stock expected brilliant growth. Such expectations were not justified. The stock fell to an equivalent of $340, but even then was still not a bargain. Eventually if fell to the equivalent of $215 in 1970 and then $180 in 1972, when the company reported its first quarterly loss in its history.

Graham comments:

We see in this history how wide can be the vicissitudes of a major American enterprise in little more than a single generation, and also with what miscalculations and excesses of optimism and pessimism the public has valued its shares.

Graham concludes:

There are two chief morals to this story. The first is that the stock market often goes far wrong, and sometimes an alert and courageous investor can take advantage of its patent errors. The other is that most businesses change in character and quality over the years, sometimes for the better, perhaps more often for the worst. The investor need not watch his companies’ performance like a hawk; but he should give it a good, hard look from time to time.

Graham returns to the idea that a holder of marketable shares is like someone who owns a private business:

The true investor scarcely everis forced to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free to disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him byother persons’ mistakes of judgment.

Graham then introduces the concept of “Mr. Market.” Imagine you own a share in a private business:

One of your partners, named Mr. Market, is very obliging indeed. Every day he tells you what he thinks your interest is worth and furthermore offers either to buy you out or to sell you an additional interest on that basis. Sometimes his idea of value appears plausible and justified by business developments and prospects as you know them. Often, on the other hand, Mr. Market lets his enthusiasm or his fears run away with him, and the value he proposes seems to you a little short of silly.

Graham makes the point that you do not form your opinion about the value of the business based on Mr. Market’s daily communication:

Only in case you agree with him, or in case you want to trade with him. You may be happy to sell out to him when he quotes you a ridiculously high price, and equally happy to buy from him when his price is low. But the rest of the time you will be wiser to form your own ideas of the value of your holdings, based on full reports from the company about its operations and financial position.

Graham argues that owning a share of stock is similar to the Mr. Market analogy:

Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies.

A blue stock chart with the word " stock " written in front of it.

(Illustration by Andrii Vinnikov)

Graham concludes:

The investor with a portfolio of sound stocks should expect the prices to fluctuate and should neither be concerned by sizable declines nor become excited by sizable advances. He should always remember that market quotations are there for his convenience, either to be taken advantage of or to be ignored. He should never buy a stockbecauseit has gone up or sell onebecauseit has gone down.

Graham makes one final point:

Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices.

 

CHAPTER 20: “MARGIN OF SAFETY” AS THE CENTRAL CONCEPT OF INVESTMENT

Graham writes:

In the old legend the wise men finally boiled down the history of mortal affairs into the single phrase, “This too will pass.” Confronted with a like challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto, MARGIN OF SAFETY.

Graham comments:

Here the function of the margin of safety is, in essence, that of rendering unnecessary an accurate estimate of the future. If the margin is a large one, then it is enough to assume that future earnings will not fall far below those of the past in order for an investor to feel sufficiently protected against the vicissitudes of time.

Graham again:

The margin of safety is always dependent on the price paid. It will be large at one price, small at some higher price, nonexistent at some still higher price.

A green circle with the words margin of safety written in it.

(Photo by Chuahtc8)

Graham explains margin of safety:

The margin-of-safety idea becomes much more evident when we apply it to the field of undervalued or bargain securities. We have here, by definition, a favorable difference between price on the one hand and indicated or appraised value on the other. That difference is the margin of safety. It is available for absorbing the effect of miscalculations or worse than average luck. The buyer of bargain issues places particular emphasis on the ability of the investment to withstand adverse developments. For in most such cases he has no real enthusiasm about the company’s prospects.

Graham goes on to note that a moderate decline in earnings power will not necessarily prevent a cheaply bought stock from producing a satisfactory investment result.

A Criterion of Investment versus Speculation

Graham writes:

Probably most speculators believe they have the odds in their favor when they take their chances, and therefore they may lay claim to a safety margin in their proceedings… But such claims are unconvincing. They rest on subjective judgment, unsupported by any body of favorable evidence or any conclusive line of reasoning. We greatly doubt whether the man who stakes money on his view that the market is heading up or down can ever be said to be protected by a margin of safety in any useful sense of the phrase.

Graham observes that, by contrast, buying stocks below a conservative appraisal of intrinsic value does imply a margin of safety and therefore does classify as investment rather than speculation.

To Sum Up

Graham sums up the chapter:

Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike. It is amazing to see how many capable businessmen try to operate in Wall Street with complete disregard of all the sound principles through which they have gained success in their own undertakings. Yet every corporate security may best be viewed, in the first instance, as an ownership interest in, or a claim against, a specific business enterprise. And if a person sets out to make profits from security purchases and sales, he is embarking on a business venture of his own, which must be run in accordance with accepted business principles if it is to have a chance of success.

Graham says the investor should know as much about the intrinsic values of the businesses in which he invests as he would need to know about the value of merchandise that he proposed to manufacture and sell.

Graham adds that the investor should be able to supervise adequately the running of the business in which he invests, and the investor should have confidence in the integrity and ability of the managers running the business.

Moreover, the investor should have a reasonable chance of profit, while possible losses should be minimal by comparison.

Furthermore, notes Graham, have the courage of your knowledge and experience, regardless of how many others agree or disagree.

You are neither right nor wrong because the crowd disagrees with you. You are right because your data and reasoning are right… in the world of securities, courage becomes the supreme virtueafter adequate knowledge and a tested judgment are at hand.

 

BOOLE MICROCAP FUND

An equal weighted group of micro caps generally far outperforms an equal weighted (or cap-weighted) group of larger stocks over time. See the historical chart here: https://boolefund.com/best-performers-microcap-stocks/

This outperformance increases significantly by focusing on cheap micro caps. Performance can be further boosted by isolating cheap microcap companies that show improving fundamentals. We rank microcap stocks based on these and similar criteria.

There are roughly 10-20 positions in the portfolio. The size of each position is determined by its rank. Typically the largest position is 15-20% (at cost), while the average position is 8-10% (at cost). Positions are held for 3 to 5 years unless a stock approachesintrinsic value sooner or an error has been discovered.

The mission of the Boole Fund is to outperform the S&P 500 Index by at least 5% per year (net of fees) over 5-year periods. We also aim to outpace the Russell Microcap Index by at least 2% per year (net). The Boole Fund has low fees.

 

If you are interested in finding out more, please e-mail me or leave a comment.

My e-mail: [email protected]

 

 

 

Disclosures: Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This material is distributed for informational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates, and certain information contained herein should not be considered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particular security, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed.No part of this article may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Boole Capital, LLC.